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Abstract 
 
The picture presented and often referred to in EU internal market law and legal 
scholarship is clear. Within the internal market private actors are the recipients of 
rights and public authorities are constrained in their (regulatory) powers. The notion 
of this new individualism is bound up with capacities, powers, and resources that 
empower private actors to engage in the internal market and cross-border situations; 
ultimately serving the objectives the internal market seeks to attain. Yet, within this 
new individualism a conceptually different class of private actors has emerged that is 
constrained in economic freedoms, i.e. through obligations, rather than being 
empowered in the context of the internal market. This thesis will enquire the reasons 
that led to the development of this counter-culture. Why did it emerge? To what extent 
does this phenomenon affect the roles of private actors in the internal market?  
 
I will demonstrate that under the counter-culture private actors are responsibilized 
and transformed into ‘competent authorities’, i.e. alternative forms of regulatory 
authority, in the internal market. Private actors are placed into systems of shared 
responsibilities the relationships of which are coordinated by EU internal market law. 
In this regard, the concept of responsibility will serve as a tool to bridge the gap 
between the new positions EU internal market law allocates to private actors and the 
emerging legal consequences, i.e. allocation of obligations or tasks. The legal contexts 
of EU free movement law, EU discrimination law, EU food safety law and EU data 
protection law will serve as case studies against which the construed conceptual 
framework will be tested. Under the counter-culture the new individualism is no 
longer only about the exercise of self-interests. Rather, this form of the new 
individualism comes with a requirement to give account to the interests of other 
actors within the internal market. 
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Introduction 
 
 
EU Internal Market Law  
and the Transformation of the Roles of Private 
Actors 
 
 
 
Introductory words 
Societies, all societies, are constituted in a certain way that forms their 
constitution. In EU internal market law the constitution is comprised of treaties 
that constitute the internal market. In this European context the internal market 
provides a ‘new social arrangement’ comprising of and affecting different national 
socio-economic sectors. What is new about the internal market is its ‘common’ 
character. The ‘common’ relates to the geographical reach of the internal market, 
which is transnational and intended to unify the national markets of the Member 
States.1 The internal market is best described as a space consisting of multiple 
national markets that are highly regulated at the national level. In the context of 
the internal market, the notion of construction does not entail the building of 
something but rather the reduction of diversities between the national markets 
and laws, in order to enhance the functioning of competition between economic 
agents located in the different national markets. 
 
 
1. The internal market as a new social arrangement 
EU internal market law and the internal market are constructed in a way that 
opens up national markets in order to create more economic opportunities for 
private actors. This transition from organisation at a state level towards a form of 																																																								
1 See Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, 'EU Law' (Fourth edn.: Oxford: OUP, 2008), at Chapter 
1; and Pierre Pescatore, 'The Law of Integration' (A.W. Sijthoff, 1974); and William Wallace and 
Royal Institute of International Affairs., 'The Dynamics of European integration' (Pinter Publishers 
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990). 
	2 
advanced liberalism at European level “takes place more through stratification 
than replacement of paradigms.”2 In this regard, EU internal market law adds an 
additional layer of regulation to national law, the intention of which is to ensure 
the existence of a transnational market economy and maintain stability despite 
conflicting and divergent national laws. The competition and potential conflicts 
between the two legal orders were solved by the development of specific 
doctrines such as the supremacy of EU internal market law and Member State 
liability that hierarchically place the EU legal order above national laws.3  
 
EU internal market law provides the ‘new legal order’ that guides the 
construction and the structure of this new social arrangement.4 The internal market 
is simply the social context to which EU internal market law relates. Its function 
as a European project is to  
 
promote throughout the community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous balanced expansion, an increase 
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between the states belonging to it.5  
 
In relation to this objective of the internal market, EU internal market law is not 
seen in a Kantian fashion, i.e. as a set of normatively neutral statements, but as 
reflecting a social ideal. EU internal market law is the internal market.6 This 
social ideal reflected in EU internal market law is the constitutional and material 
																																																								
2 Marco Dani, 'The subjectification of the citizen in European public law', EUI Working Paper LAW, 
2015/02 (2015) at 10-11. 
3 To this effect see the Court of Justices decisions in Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] 
ECR 583; and Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v 
Italian Republic, [1991] ECR I-05357 at 30-36; and Cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA 
v. Germany, and R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others, [1996] ECR I-
1029 at 20-28. Further see for example Michael Dougan, 'When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of 
the Relationship between Direct Effect and Supremacy', Common Market Law Review, 44/4 (2007), 
931-963; and Bruno De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Primacy, and the nature of the Legal Order', in Paul Craig 
and Grainne De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU law (2nd Edition: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
and Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the 
European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies 
31/4 (1993) at 418. 
4 Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
5 Now Article 3(3) TEU.  
6 Compare to Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history' (1st edn.: 
Knopf, 2002),  at 205-206. 
	 3 
structure of the internal market. 7  It concerns the roles, positions, and 
relationships of legal subjects in the internal market, e.g. how the market ought 
to be organised? What actors are equipped with power? In this regard EU 
internal market law transforms roles and positions of actors in the internal 
market in order to provide a constitutional infrastructure that ensures the unity 
and functioning of the internal market. This constitutional side of EU internal 
market law is to be distinguished from the material side that relates to the 
content of these new defined relationships, e.g. What may actors decide upon? 
What choices are left to the market actors? In what social, economic and legal 
environment are they supposed to act? 
 
Lawrence Friedman refers to this as legal culture: the “ideas, attitudes, values and 
beliefs that people hold about the legal system.”8 Although the law appears 
‘natural’ and almost self-evident, the “law and legal disciplines always tend, to a 
greater or narrower extent, to mirror the reality in which they are born and in 
which they grow.”9 EU internal market law and the organisation of the internal 
market do not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, the EU legal culture and EU internal 
market law relate to the specific characteristics of the internal market and its 
objectives while constructing and maintaining the functioning of the internal 
market.  
 
While EU internal market law aims to ensure the construction and functioning 
of the internal market, national interests are in stark contrast and instead 
attempt to ensure the integrity and maintenance of national economies and to 
prevent foreign competitors from entering their ‘dominion.’ National economies 
are integrated in a complex web of national policies on economic, political, social, 
and even cultural matters. The role of EU internal market law is to reduce the 
national boundaries/distortions emerging from the national policies in order to 
foster a deeper and wider interweaving of the national economies and markets. 
‘Boundaries’ shall not necessarily be understood as geographical frontiers, but as 
distortions to the construction and functioning of the internal market. Pierre 
Pescatore captures this well: “It is clear that nobody thinks of removing political 																																																								
7 For example see Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and 
Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration'. 
8 Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Legal Culture and the Welfare State', in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas 
of Law in the Welfare State (De Gruyter, 1988),  at 13. 
9 Mauro Zamboni, 'The "Social" in Social Law', Scandinavian Studies in Law, 50 (2007), 513 at 514. 
	4 
frontiers … In fact, these ‘frontiers’ seem to concern nothing else than obstacles 
maintained by divergent national legislation.” 10  For this deeper and wider 
integration, EU internal market law is the instrument and amongst others it was 
primarily the Court of Justice that developed the legal techniques that promoted 
the process to unify national markets through legal means. Treaties acting as a 
general blueprint of the internal market and specialised secondary law 
instruments are intended to provide the legal basis to boost and ensure the 
integration of the internal market by constantly removing distortions and 
restrictions.  
 
The internal market is unique in that it was set up to function as an alternative 
decision-making process to the purely national decisions made on economic and 
social aspects. The underlying objective is that some policy choices cannot be, or 
shall no longer be, made at a national level due to current global challenges to 
national economies and social structures. Globalisation, mass immigration and 
the limits to growth to national economies are challenges faced by Member 
States. The underlying assumption is that the internal market, as a tool to make 
certain policy choices, is more efficient and provides a better arena for at least 
parts of the socio-economic choices made formerly within national contexts only. 
This is reflected in the treaties by the creation of internal markets for goods, 
services, labour, and capital, within which the free flow of production factors 
among the Member States supports effective allocation of resources. For 
example, the creation of a transnational labour market where labour forces 
within the internal market are free to move to other Member States and compete 
there in the labour market can lower unemployment rates. Work opportunities 
are now determined by market forces of demand and supply at a European scale. 
This in turn will increase the welfare for society as a whole by increasing 
employment and reducing social costs. Welfare of society as a whole is now 
generated through the creation of opportunities for individuals to improve their 
personal situations and welfare, i.e. through the opportunity to engage in gainful 
employment in a transnational labour market. In theory, this would also increase 
the overall net level of welfare of society as a whole. The more individuals capable 
of taking care of themselves and able to earn a living, the higher the welfare 
																																																								
10 For example see Pierre Pescatore, 'Some Critical Remarks on the "Single European Act"', Common 
Market Law Review, 24/1 (1987), 9-18. 
	 5 
standard is in society as a whole. 11  The difference between the alternative 
processes is reflected in the different methodologies on how welfare is generated: 
choices through individualism (i.e. through self-interest) v. choices through 
collectivism (i.e. general regulation).12 
 
 
2. The idea of an internal market 
The market, as a process for making certain policy choices in society, is 
functionally different from the legislative processes in the Member States. The 
market as a form of social organisation is not new in modern liberal democracies. 
The market as a tool for decision-making, i.e. generation of welfare for society, is 
institutionally and procedurally different from the state where the state decides 
for the common good. While private actors give up power in the state it is the 
other way around in the market economy. Here, state control is reduced to 
benefit individualism. The market as a private law construct was intended to 
create a space where private actors could engage under market dynamics (i.e. 
economic factors) and where private actors occupy the centre of organisation in 
relation to ‘political power.’ Ever since industrialisation, civilised nations have 
seen a tremendous emergence of ‘private space.’ It was a technique to empower 
private actors to freely engage in economic activities as a means to increase their 
wellbeing.13 Economic choices as a source to increase welfare could be carried out 
free from state intervention. The power to make choices based on self-interest 
thus is a core element of the market economy.14 In this respect, the internal 
market is understood as an alternative mechanism to make policy choices (e.g. in 
contrast to top-down regulation). The difference is that it relies on market 
dynamics at a transnational scale. 
 
																																																								
11 To this effect see Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law', European 
Papers, 1/2 (2016), 405 at 406. 
12 N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state' (Fifth edn.: Oxford: OUP, 2012),  at 31. 
13 For this see Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private Distinction', University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 130 (1981-1982), 1423-1428; and Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought', Minnesota Law Review, 89 
(2004-2005), 342; and N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state'; and Bruno De Witte, 'The 
crumbling public/private divide: horizontality in European anti-discrimination law', Citizenship Studies, 
13/5 (2009), 515-525. 
14 For example see Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 229; 
and N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state'. 
	6 
For the sake of the organisation of the internal market part of the political power 
consequently shifts from Member States to private actors. It is EU internal 
market law that legally exercises and structures this shift. It gives and transfers 
power to private actors that are needed for the market process to function. The 
internal market is guided by the idea that if individuals act for the individual 
good (i.e. self-interests) then the sum of all the transactions exercised in the 
market context will produce social outcomes (i.e. certain policy objectives) in the 
EU.15 In this way, policy objectives in the EU are produced within the market 
process. This refers to the ‘invisible hand theorem’ developed by Adam Smith.16 
Liberalism, individualism, and choices driven by self-interest are central to the 
organisation of the market structure and the market process.17 As a simplified 
image, the internal market process,  
 
operates without a central authority. It is atomistic, and the 
accomplishment of social results is inadvertent. That is the results 
are produced by innumerable transactions between individuals, 
none of whom is concerned with aggregate results such as resource 
allocation efficiency or the general distribution of wealth and 
opportunity.18 
 
The competitive advantage of the internal market process over the national 
political processes in relation to the issues governed by the internal market is its 
lack of specific (national) focus. The treaties set out broad objectives for which 
the internal market is set up: i.e. peace, an ever closer union, high level of 
employment and social progress, sustainable growth, constructing a highly 
competitive social market economy or the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice.19 EU internal market law continuously governs, regulates, 
structures, organises and corrects the internal market through legal means in 																																																								
15 Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller 
(eds.), The Foucault Effect (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991),  at 13-14. 
16 On this point consider Adam Smith, 'The Wealth of Nations' (Reprint: Bantam Classics, 2003). 
17 For the market dynamics consider François Ewald, 'A Concept of Social Law', in Gunther 
Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (De Gruyter, 1988),  at 42. Elmar Altvater, 'The 
future of the market : an essay on the regulation of money and nature after the collapse of "actually existing 
socialism"' (Verso, London, 1991),  at 251; and Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives' (Chicago: UCP, 
1994). 
18 N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state',  at 45. 
19 Article 3 TEU .
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order to keep the process of integration on track.20 This refers to an atomistic 
market, which understands “competition and diversity not as a temporary 
strategy before choosing the superior solution in any given scenario, but rather as 
a means for continuous change and improvement.”21 The internal market thus, is 
better understood as a legally structured process of equal participation of 
interests where multiple transactions and engagements inadvertently serve the 
objectives of the EU. 
 
 
2.1 The transnational dimension of the internal market 
What was new under EU internal market law was the transnational dimension 
and the fact that the internal market was not set up all at once but constructed 
through the approximation and unification of multiple national markets.  
 
EU internal market law concerns the juxtaposition of national laws and markets, 
and considers how to reconcile the differences in order to construct and ensure 
the functioning of the internal market and the transnational space in which 
private actors can engage under economic conditions. 22  Consequently, the 
internal market is often referred to as an on-going process, the functioning of 
which is of constant concern to EU internal market law.23 Thus, another way to 
view the internal market is as a space of different national markets that open up 
towards each other: this process is legally structured through the EU Economic 
Constitution, i.e. the treaties. Hence, EU internal market law continuously 
shapes the roles and functions of private actors in this transnational space of the 
internal market. The principles of free movement and non-discrimination form 
the constitutional kernel of the construction of the internal market.24 
 																																																								
20 In particular this is the case where the process of integration or the functioning of the internal 
market process is distorted by national laws or other activities, public or private, originating in 
the Member States.  
21 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 98. 
22 Consider the decision of the Court of Justice in Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity 
requirement), [1987] ECR 1227. 
23 Hans Kutscher, 'Methods of Interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court of Justice', Judicial and 
Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976 (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1976); 
and Pierre Pescatore, 'The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant Disease of Community Law', 
European Law Review, 8 (1983), 155-177; and Pierre Pescatore, 'The Law of Integration'. 
24 Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, [1974] ECR 153 at 11; and Case C-237/94, O'Flynn v. 
Adjudication Officer, [1996]  ECR I-2617 at 17; and Michael Dougan, 'Minimum Harmonization and 
the Internal Market', Common Market Law Review, 37 (2000), 853 at 860.  
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2.2 The function of EU internal market law 
Part of the function of EU internal market law is to reorganise political powers 
within the internal market. Deciding who should hold power to make choices 
and influence the ‘policy-making process’ is a challenge the Court of Justice has 
been confronted with from the beginning.25 Intriguingly, EU internal market law 
relies on economic dynamics, the market process, and individualism and 
liberalism as a framework for decision-making.  
 
Geographically economic and political power should shift from a national 
environment to the European market context. Institutionally, in the internal 
market economic and political power also shifts from Member States to 
individuals as economic actors.26 In no way does this mean that Member States 
powers to regulate are abolished in the internal market, but rather that their 
powers are confined in the light of the objectives EU internal market law seeks to 
attain. This is a process of alignment or close coordination of rules, which seeks 
to ensure that the internal market functions efficiently despite differences in the 
national laws. Where Member States had previously taken responsibility for the 
wellbeing of groups in society, this power now shifts to the internal market and is 
aligned with the new constitutional infrastructure of the internal market.  
 
The position of private actors in a market context in general, but especially in the 
internal market, changes their function. Private actors are imbedded in a 
decision-making process that relies on market structures and dynamics. Any 
actors involved in the market context, be it public and private entities alike, 
become authorities and actors that compete or decide on aspects in a certain 
‘policy arena’ (i.e. economic context) based on market mechanisms.27 Interests, 
i.e. self-interest, become the currency in this new policy arena and the 
participation of interests in the market context, i.e. through the exercise of 
																																																								
25 In particular see Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the 
European Economic Constitution' (Hart, 1998),  at Chapter 1. Also see: Loic Azoulai, 'The European 
Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)', in Loic Azoulai, Ségolène Barbou 
Des Places, and Etienne Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law - Rights, Roles and Identities 
(Hart Publishing 2016),  at 206. 
26 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought',  at 381. 
27 Alexander Somek, 'Individualism : an essay on the authority of the European Union' (Oxford: OUP, 
2008),  at 22-23. Ronen Shamir, 'The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality', Economy 
and Society, 37/1 (2008), 1-19 at 14. 
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choices, the key element to produce change. EU internal market law and the 
construction of the internal market relies on an organisation,  
 
based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens from 
passive to active roles. The exercise of normative authority is 
pluralized. Increased participation permeates the many levels and 
stages of legal process-legislation, promulgation of rules, 
implementation of policies, and enforcement.28 
 
The “economic becomes the political” and private actors are transformed into 
legal objects that hold regulatory authority and are integrated into an order of 
commodities. In the EU the internal market becomes the space for political 
debate, allowing those having interests to participate, contribute and compete 
(i.e. ‘debate’) in the internal market.29 It is no longer the public realm that is the 
only appropriate framework for political debate. EU internal market law 
transforms and implements this ‘process’ as one of economic interaction at a 
transnational level. Through choices and decisions, private actors have the power 
and the ability to produce change: they exercise political power.30 The market 
process not only provides for participation but also requires individuals to 
participate due to the decentralisation of normative authority in relation to 
decision-making.31 Their choices and their participation in the internal market, 
both qualitative and quantitative, impact on the functioning of the market 
process and the generation of optimal policy outcomes. Equal participation of 
interests determines the efficiency of the internal market as a decision-making 
process. EU internal market law and the internal market promote this active 
model of individuals.  
 																																																								
28 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought',  at 373. 
29 On the private space see Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private Distinction'. Orly 
Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought',  at 380. This private realm emerged over time. Also see Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect 
alternatives',  at 98. 
30 Nikolas S. Rose and Peter Miller, 'Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government', 
The British Journal of Sociology, 43/2 (Jun. 1992), 173; and James M. Buchanan, 'Individual Choice 
in Voting and the Market', Journal of Political Economy, 62/4 (Aug. 1954), 334; and Robert C. 
Hockett and Saule T. Omarova, '"Private" Means to "Public" Ends: Governments as Market Actors', 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 15.1 (2014). 
31 John Hyman, 'Action, knowledge, and will', Oxford scholarship online. (First edition. edn.; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 1 online resource. at 26. 
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The importance of liberal thought and individualism is evident. Choices based on 
self-interests are the driving force in the market process. Participation and the 
capacity to make choices in an environment of state-free interaction is a 
prerequisite for the internal market process to function efficiently. This means 
that the possibilities for individuals to choose must increase and this “often 
means restraining rather than empowering governments.”32 The consequence is 
the decentralisation of political power towards “the private sector, including 
private business and non-profit organizations.”33 Their function and interests in 
regard to a specific ‘policy arena’ are of importance. 
 
This shift of power is most clearly reflected in the rights culture present in EU 
internal market law. It was the Court of Justice that interpreted the treaties to 
constitute a ‘new legal order’ that consequently created directly enforceable 
rights for individuals in relation to the internal market context. 34  Rights 
conferred under EU internal market law, for example free movement rights or 
the right to equal pay, realised “an ability to achieve certain consequences” in the 
internal market vis-à-vis other actors. 35  These rights protect and encourage 
private actors to engage in the transnational market and in cross-border 
economic transactions.  
 
 
2.3 Competing visions about individualism 
EU internal market law has a profound impact on the life of individuals in the 
EU. Economic integration towards an ‘ever closer union’ increasingly affects the 
way EU citizens think.36 EU internal market law and the integration project 
shackle our thinking about society in a purely national context, where states are 																																																								
32 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 229-230. 
33 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought',  at 381. 
34 Bruno De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Primacy, and the nature of the Legal Order',  at; and Michael 
Dougan, 'When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship between Direct Effect and 
Supremacy'; and Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
35 Joseph Raz, 'Legal Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 4/1 (1984b), 1-21 at 13. 
36 For example see Joseph H. H. Weiler, 'Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On 
Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights', in Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas 
(eds.), The European Union and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); and Loic Azoulai, 
'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at 205-206; and 
Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer', European Law Review, 36/3 (2011), 326; 
and Marco Dani, 'The subjectification of the citizen in European public law'. 
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the only source of authority. The creation of the internal market not only 
expanded economic opportunities, but also transformed the roles of private 
actors in the European context into alternative forms of authority. EU internal 
market law and the internal market constitute a substantive part of the EU. The 
outreach of individual opportunities and the power to make choices extends far 
beyond purely national contexts.  
 
A key difference to the internal market is that economies, economic choices and 
their social effects are no longer organised in a purely national environment, i.e. 
private actors as economic actors are no longer engaging in isolation. The 
economic activities of private actors can have effects beyond their national 
borders. Formerly, the state as a normative authority determined the legal setting 
in which private actors should and could engage under market conditions. 
National markets were organised and framed through national law and had a 
clear social purpose. This national organisation of markets comes with its own 
vision about individualism and how private relationships should be organised. 
National law was the framework in which the individual as an economic actor 
was constructed. In this context, national laws shape the roles and positions of 
private actors. An example of this is the creation of a private space for state-free 
interactions through private law. The private autonomy created reflects a form of 
delegation of public power to the private sector. At the same time, national law is 
the context in which private actors are to define themselves vis-à-vis other actors.  
 
The market and the economy were considered as an instrument to provide 
welfare to the nation as a whole. Public authorities and political actors in the 
state are in charge of providing–in the ordo-liberal tradition–guidance through 
legal means to the national market, i.e. to provide a legal framework for private 
actions in a way that ensures the functioning of the market process.37 In this 
capacity, national economies were designed to serve the nation as a whole. 
Political power was organised in a national environment.38 Regulatory choices in 
relation to the Wettbewerbsordnung of the national market were based on national 																																																								
37 Orly Lobel refers to the ‘regulatory state’ and Ronen Shamir to the ‘old governance principles’. 
See Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought'; and Ronen Shamir, 'The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality'; and 
Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution',  at 7. 
38 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought' (Cambridge: CUP, 1999),  at 15; and 
Case C-334/14, Belgian State v. Nathalie De Fruyter, of 2 July 2015 (not yet reported) at 55. The 
Court of Justice refers to Member States as having set up a monopoly within a national context. 
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interests and national economic and social structures.39 The expertise on how to 
structure the national economy is centralised in public authorities.40 Territorial 
boundaries “demarcate the basis on which individuals are included and excluded 
from participation in decisions affecting their lives” and in the access to 
economic opportunities.41  
 
The individualism developed within EU internal market law is distinctive. EU 
internal market law constructs a specific private actor closely affiliated to the 
internal market, the homo economicus.42 In this form individuals constitutionally 
and procedurally occupy a central position in EU internal market law and the 
internal market as economic actors. The notion of this new individualism is 
bound up with capacities, powers, and resources that empower private actors to 
engage in the internal market and economic cross-border situations. Although 
individuals are conceived within a similar social construct–a market economy–the 
regulation of the internal market in terms of shaping roles and positions of 
private actors seeks to construct private actors as legal subjects in the internal 
market. In this regard, “the Court of Justice and the EU legislator when 
interpreting EU internal market law enforces upon private actors positions/roles 
in relation to their opinion” of how private actors can best contribute to the 
functioning of the internal market.43 This concerns placing private actors that 
were formally framed in a national context, in a new transnational context and 
confers resources and powers that ensure access to and participation in the 
internal market. In summary, EU internal market law adds a regulatory layer that 
shapes certain private actors qua legal subjects in the internal market in which 
they are supposed to act, i.e. as workers, as service providers, as producers and 
also as EU citizens.44 This new role is protected by the concept of supremacy of 																																																								
39 In particular majority decision-making, debating and expertise gathering characterise this 
process of deliberation, before decision-making is carried out.  
40 Elmar Altvater, 'The future of the market : an essay on the regulation of money and nature after the 
collapse of "actually existing socialism"',  at 251. 
41 See Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought'. 
42Jens-Uwe Franck and Kai Purnhagen, 'Homo economicus, behavioural sciences, and economic regulation 
: on the concept of man in internal market regulation and its normative basis', EUI working papers LAW 
2012/26; and Alexander Somek, 'Individualism : an essay on the authority of the European Union',  at 1-2. 
43 Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer',  at 363. 
44 Concerning the construction of the individual within EU internal market law see Loic Azoulai, 
'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at 206-207. Further 
see: Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer'; and Marco Dani, 'The subjectification 
of the citizen in European public law'. 
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EU internal market law, which ensures that the EU legal framework that shapes 
private actors prevails over the national legal framework.45 
 
With regard to the determination and allocation of roles and positions to private 
actors, EU internal market law benefits from its structural completeness. This means 
that EU internal market law constitutes, through the treaties, the legal order 
creating the internal market (i.e. the constitutional structure and social ideal)46 
with free movement and competition that is based on an open market policy. 
However, at the same time EU internal market law provides the legal resources, 
institutions, and techniques (i.e. fundamental principles, legal powers, openness 
of principles) to develop and construct the internal market in order to ensure the 
effective functioning of the market process. This outlines a closed system that 
provides all the resources needed to develop its potential–institutional and 
material. 47  EU internal market law is both reason and telos (i.e. reason and 
justification) for the establishment and the functioning of the internal market.48 
 
Deliberately, EU internal market law and the way it shapes the power of actors in 
the internal market offers a fine sample of social theory. This is how to organise 
roles and positions and their interactions at a transnational level as a means to 
ensure the functioning of the internal market. Roles are transformed and relate 
to the constitutional structure of the internal market while the shaping, steering 
and the determination on how those roles are supposed to interact in a specific 
policy-making environment is attained through legal means and instruments (i.e. 
rights and obligations).  
 
 
																																																								
45 To this effect see Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 583; and Michael Dougan, 
'When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship between Direct Effect and Supremacy'; and 
Sacha Prechal, 'Direct effect, indirect effect, supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the European 
Union', in Catherine Barnard (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
46 For example see Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12; and Case C-294/83, Les Verts [1986] ECR 
1339 at 23. 
47 While ‘institutional’ refers to the constitutional infrastructure of the internal market, ‘material’ 
covers the subject matter that is decided within certain relationships and legal contexts regulated 
by EU internal market law. 
48 Loic Azoulai, 'The force and forms of European Legal Integration', EUI Working Papers, LAW 
2011/06 (2011) at 3. 
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2.4 A new actor in the game? 
The role of private actors in the economic integration process is unique. The 
perception of individualism and the role of private actors differ significantly 
between the internal market and national economies. EU internal market law 
constructs individuals and private actors according to their function in a defined 
context of the internal market. The doctrine of direct effect of the treaty, which 
turned treaty provisions into subjective rights for individuals, opened the door 
for the Court of Justice to manage and assemblage the roles and positions of 
private actors in the context of the internal market.49 Eventually, this allocation 
of rights had direct practical effects in relation to the construction of the internal 
market; they constitutionally structured and manifested the internal market. A 
key element here is that private actors also function as a commodity and tool to 
ensure the economic and social integration of the internal market. Put 
differently, the doctrine of direct effect turned the principles of economic 
integration into direct effective tools (i.e. rights) for economic integration. 
Private actors, when exercising their rights under EU internal market law became 
tools for economic integration.  
 
The exercise of rights becomes applied constitutional law and private actors 
become constitutional agents. Private actors are transformed into a part of the 
constitutional infrastructure of the internal market. Much has been written 
about this effect of the rights-culture on EU internal market law that turns 
private actors into tools for economic integration. 
 
This thesis will not challenge this vision but will place emphasis on a rather 
undeveloped phenomenon, where EU internal market law constrains the 
freedoms of private actors in order to attain policy objectives. The difference to 
the rights-culture is evident. Private actors are not encouraged or empowered to 
seek opportunities in the internal market. Rather EU internal market law puts a 
‘legal belt’ on the activities and powers of some private actors. Due to the 
methodological difference to the rights culture, which basically empowers private 
actors, this phenomenon will be referred to as the counter-culture. A good example 
of this is the expansion of legal obligations under the treaties to private actors. 
The effect is that private actors are constrained in their economic freedoms 
within the internal market through EU internal market law. A methodological 																																																								
49 Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer',  at 363. 
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and structural analysis of this phenomenon and of the reasons for this 
development is needed.  
 
 
3. Research objective 
The problem faced with regard to the counter-culture is one of social roles and 
social functions of private actors in relation to the internal market. How do EU 
institutions transform the role of private actors in certain contexts to attain 
particular policy objectives? So far, the counter-culture has not been subject to a 
coherent or sustainable analytical approach, the consequence being a lack of 
conceptual and methodological considerations. When EU internal market law is 
developed and choices are made to allocate legal constraints to private actors this 
occurs in a pragmatic manner. Whenever this occurs, EU internal market law and 
EU Institutions do not provide an explanation as to why these specific actors and 
positions are constrained in their freedoms. Similarly, EU legal scholarships failed 
to devise a conceptual or methodological approach providing normative 
convincing arguments supporting the development and emergence of the 
counter-culture within EU internal market law.  
 
 
3.1 The gap in the legal doctrine 
I am aware that what I refer to as counter-culture has not gone undetected by 
legal scholarship. Rather, my claim is that the existing conceptual approaches are 
incomplete or only deal with specific expressions of the counter-culture. First 
and foremost, the horizontal effect debate of EU internal market law should be 
mentioned.50 Part of the problem with the horizontal effect concept is that it is 
borrowed from national constitutional law and thus bound to national 
constitutional doctrine. The horizontal effect concept developed in relation to 
the expansion of the effects of classically vertical rights (i.e. fundamental rights in 
public-private relationships) to horizontal situations (i.e. private-private 																																																								
50 On the horizontal effect debate with regard to EU free movement law see Gareth Davies, 
'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract', European Review of Private Law, 3 
(2012), 805; and Alan Dashwood, 'Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct Effect', Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 10/2007-2008 (2008), 525-540; and Nuno Ferreira, Joanna 
Krzeminska-Vamvaka, and Teresa Russo, 'The horizontal effect of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
European Union Law', in Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, and Giovanni Comande 
(eds.), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union Vol. 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 2010); and 
Eva Julia Lohse, 'Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors - towards an 'Indirect Horizontal Effect'', 
European Public Law, 13/1 (2007), 159-190. 
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relationships). The conceptual similarity to the expansion of treaty articles is 
obvious. Treaty articles, which emerged as subjective rights against national 
authorities (i.e. vertical relationship) in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
first, were soon expanded to include private relationships (i.e. horizontal).51 
 
The problem with the concept of horizontal effect is its limited scope. 
Horizontal effect relates to specific legal situations, namely the direct application 
of constitutional rights to private situations. Thus, in analytical terms the scope 
of the horizontal effect concept is limited to situations where treaty provisions 
are directly applied to private relationships. This limited capacity of the concept 
of horizontal effect already emerges in relation to the free movement of goods. 
Within the context of the free movement of goods, the Court of Justice refused 
to apply the treaty provisions in private relationships. Theoretically, this 
approach comes within the concept of indirect horizontal effect. The application 
is indirect because the constitutional right is channelled through public 
authorities, which are required to control the private actors in light of the treaty 
provisions. The problem is that the horizontal effect concept (i.e. direct or 
indirect) fails to provide a convincing explanation for the methodological 
inconsistency between the different free movement rights and their application 
to private relationships. Why did the Court of Justice develop these different 
approaches even though it had the chance to expand the treaty provisions in a 
legally consistent manner with the other freedoms? Similarly, the analysis does 
not answer why only some private actors are constrained. This relates to the 
personal scope of the application of EU free movement law, which is only 
expanded to collective entities and the employer in the labour market. Why 
should they be treated differently? 
 
Another issue with the concept of horizontal effect is its limited capacity to deal 
with situations beyond the expansion of treaty provisions to private relationships. 
It does not explain why there is an emergence of the technique to allocate 
obligations to private actors in secondary law instruments.52 Consequently, a 																																																								
51 This emerged first in Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist 
internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 
1405. 
52 For example see the legal frameworks created by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1–24) ; and Directive 95/46/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
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more contextual and holistic approach is needed giving account to the emergence 
of the counter-culture under primary law and secondary law. The phenomenon of 
constraining private actors in their economic freedoms is found cross-sector. The 
difference between the allocation of obligations through the Court of Justice 
under the treaty or through the EU legislator in secondary law instruments is 
merely a difference in the source of the legal obligation (i.e. institutional source 
and legal framework). However, the technique used to constrain the economic 
freedoms, through the allocation of legal obligations, of private actors is similar.  
 
 
3.2. Research objective and research question 
My contention is that in relation to the counter-culture those actors addressed 
by legal obligations occupy specific positions in certain parts of the internal 
market. The private actors concerned are recognised as legal subjects by EU 
internal market law, reflecting a form of ‘Europeanisation’.53 This is similar to the 
rights-culture, where rights are allocated to private actors acting in the capacity 
of predetermined legal subjects within a certain part of the internal market, e.g. 
worker in the labour market. Similar to the rights culture, EU internal market 
law uses legal means to transform and define the role of private actors under the 
counter-culture. However, the difference to the rights-culture is that these actors 
are not protected or empowered to act in the internal market but rather that 
they are constrained in their powers and economic freedoms.  
 
A decisive factor in relation to the emergence of the counter-culture seems to be 
the ‘power’ private actors hold in a certain sector regulated by EU internal 
market law. Where under the rights-culture potentially weak actors are 
strengthened through the allocation of rights, obligations have the opposite 
function in the counter-culture. Obligations are intended to confine and limit the 
unbridled power of some private actors in the internal market context. A feature 
of these positions that are bound up with the counter-culture is that they have 																																																																																																																																																														
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281 , 
23/11/1995 P. 0031).  
53 For a similar notion of ‘Europeanisation’ see Olha Cherednychenko, 'The Harmonisation of 
Contract Law in Europe by Means of the Horizontal effect of Fundamental Rights?', Erasmus Law Review, 
1/1 (2007), 37-57; and Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of 
Contract'; and Arthur Hartkamp, 'The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private Law: On Direct and Indirect 
Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law', ibid.18/3 (2010), 527-548; and Mattias Kumm, 'Who is 
afraid of the total constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private 
Law', German Law Journal, 7/4 (2006), 341-370. 
	18 
the capacity in a certain part of the internal market which can be described as 
‘power to affect’ others. The actors concerned are in a position to embrace the 
capacity to potentially influence the personal, social or structural conditions under 
which they may engage in the internal market. It is effectively power to enforce 
their own will, even against the unwillingness and reluctance of acceptance of the 
other actors.54 In this regard, due to the capacity to affect the policy-making 
environment in which other private actors are supposed to act and engage, these 
private actors (and their positions) can be considered as alternative ‘forms of 
governance’ competing with EU internal market law about the regulatory 
competence to regulate the structure parts of the internal market. 55  The 
allocation of obligations (and the concurrent subordination to EU internal 
market law) to these actors is, thus, a form of clarifying the relationship of these 
‘private forms of governance’ with the EU legal order. In this respect, the 
allocation of legal obligations is a consequence of the position that the actors hold in a 
certain market context governed by EU internal market law.  
 
From this perspective the counter-culture is a technique of governance, having 
the clear purpose of constructing and ensuring the functioning of the internal 
market in response to a particular form of distortion. In the case of the counter-
culture this distortion results from the ‘power to affect’ that some private actors 
have in private relationships governed by EU internal market law. Similar to the 
rights culture, under the counter-culture private actors are transformed and 
placed as commodities into the constitutional structure of the internal market. 
The allocation of obligations has consequences. Firstly, it recognises that some 
private actors occupy positions in a certain market context, which constitute 
alternative forms of governance. This is reflected in the capacity these private 
actors have to affect the opportunities of other private actors in the internal 
market. Secondly, EU internal market law recognises these positions and 
alternative forms of governance as integral parts of certain contexts governed by 
EU internal market law. The private actors may be needed to provide important 
impetus to the market (i.e. affecting the market dynamics) or to provide 
alternative, more efficient forms of organisation. The obligation confines this 
private power and ensures that it does not affect or distort the functioning of the 
economic process. This is reflected in the material content of the obligation. 																																																								
54 Wallace C. Peterson, 'Market Power', Journal of Economic Issues, 23/2 (1989), 379 at 381. 
55 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 413. 
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Obligations define a specific activity that should be prevented. The result is that 
this objective, reflected in the obligation, is internalised into the economic 
choices and activities of the private actor concerned. Private actors under the 
counter-culture are transformed into competent authorities because they 
actively, through compliance with legal requirements, contribute to (‘produce’) 
the attainment of policy objectives within the internal market. Competing 
interests may exist between EU internal market law and the private actors. In 
this regard, EU internal market law provides the forum within which the dispute 
is solved, mainly on the basis of the proportionality test (i.e. legitimate aim and 
proportionality).56 
 
Clearly, the situation described above raises many practical and legal issues and 
this thesis should not be assumed to be a grand theory concerning the role of 
private actors in the internal market. Rather, the aim of this work is to provide a 
new way of viewing the role of private actors in the internal market and the 
techniques EU internal market law uses to shape these roles. The following 
simple questions will guide my analysis. Why are some private actors constrained 
in their freedoms and others are not? What are the factors that affect the 
allocative choices made by EU institutions when determining and defining ‘legal 
subjects’ in a certain part of the internal market? What is their relationship to 
the rights culture? Why did the counter-culture emerge under EU internal 
market law? To what extent does the counter-culture comply with requirements 
that are fundamental to the functioning of a market process, i.e. individualism 
and liberalism? A by-product of this analysis may be that other phenomena, i.e. 
the liability of private actors under EU internal market law, could be considered 
from a new perspective.  
 
 
3.3 Analytical framework 
The actors that are subject to legal constraints have a specific function in the 
context in which they are supposed to act. The question we have to ask relates to 																																																								
56 For the balancing of competing interests between EU internal market law and alternative 
private ‘forms of governance’ see the proportionality test applied by the Court of Justice in Case 
C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; and Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation 
and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; and 
Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767; 
and Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177; and Case C-176/96, 
Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-0268. 
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the organisation of roles and functions underlying a specific context governed by 
EU internal market law. The relationship between the social position an actor 
has in a specific context and how this manifests in the legal system requires 
investigation. However, this is problematic because EU Institutions and EU 
internal market law barely define social positions or roles. This makes it 
particularly difficult to make a link between the social function of an actor and 
the legal consequences thereof. While the latter is visible in EU internal market 
law, the social role and function are not.  
 
In order to bridge this gap I will have recourse to the concept of responsibility. The 
concept of responsibility is not a positive legal concept, but will function as an 
analytical tool. The usefulness of the concept of responsibility for the analysis of 
the counter-culture is reflected in its capacity to bridge the gap between the 
social function an actor has in a specific context and the legal consequence 
thereof. This distinction is made on the basis of the social function and the 
normative function, both of which are included in the concept of responsibility. 
The social function relates to the allocation of positions or the roles of private 
actors in a specific context. The normative function then acts to justify the 
allocation of legal requirements to these positions and roles. What needs to be 
clarified in relation to EU internal market law are the following: What is special 
about these positions? What is their social role? What is the environment they 
are acting in or are supposed to act in? How does this relate to the legal 
expressions that emerge in EU internal market law (i.e. legal obligations)?  
 
The difficulty will be to go beyond the mere black letter analysis and engage with 
questions concerning social roles, social theory, and those concerning the 
allocation of roles and the imputability of legal requirements in relation to 
organising transnational policy-making environments into more ‘efficient’ 
systems compared with existing local and regional ones. In relation to questions 
of allocation for example, the counter-culture is not open to every actor. This 
implies an allocative choice in terms of the actor concerned has characteristics 
for which reason he is recognised as occupying a central position in a specific 
context defined by EU internal market law. For example, this is the food business 
operator in EU food law, the data controller in EU data protection law or trade 
unions and business organisations in EU free movement law, all of which reflect 
specific positions and all come with certain characteristics attached to the actors. 
These characteristics define the personal scope of those ‘positions.’ Also in the 
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rights culture particular criteria define the personal scope of positions that come 
with rights for individuals, for example, a worker, a job seeker, a part-time 
worker, or a service provider, as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice to 
have certain characteristics.57 In relation to the counter-culture, this doctrine 
that determines the characteristics when private actors come within the scope of 
certain positions is significantly underdeveloped.  
 
The structure of this thesis will build upon the following core chapter: Chapter 1. 
In this chapter, the subject matter of the thesis and the analytical angle to be 
taken will be defined. Following a thorough examination of the differences 
between the rights culture and the counter-culture, the concept of responsibility 
will be introduced as the analytical tool to assess the role of actors being subject 
to the counter-culture. Moreover, the first chapter will frame the reasons and 
specialties in EU internal market law that led to the development of the concept 
of counter-culture. The concept of responsibility will serve as a tool to bridge the 
gap between the new positions EU internal market law allocates to private 
economic actors and the resulting legal consequences that emerge.  
 
Having established the conceptual framework concerning the counter-culture in 
EU internal market law in Chapter 1, Chapters 2–5 will examine the counter-
culture in four different contexts. EU free movement law, EU discrimination law, 
EU data protection law, and EU food safety law will serve as study objects against 
which the construed conceptual framework will be tested.  
 
Finally, recourse will be made to the implications the counter-culture has for EU 
internal market law, national law, and the transformation of society. It will be 
shown that under the counter-culture private actors are installed as competent 
authorities in the context of the internal market and that this technique of 
governance is increasingly relied on under the ‘Better Regulation’ initiative of the 
EU Commission.58 This entails that under the counter-culture these economic 
actors are increasingly installed as active agents in attaining specific objectives of 
EU internal market law in line with the functioning of the internal market. This 
EU paternalism is considered to be in stark contrast to the idea of individualism 																																																								
57 On this matter see Catherine Barnard, 'The substantive law of the EU : the four freedoms' (Fourth 
edn., 2013). 
58 For this effect see European Commission Press Release (Ip/15/4988) of 19 May 2015 'on Better 
Regulation Agenda: Enhancing Transparency and scrutiny for better EU law-making'. 
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and freedom of economic action EU internal market law promotes in its rights 
culture. Also, some criticism of the counter-culture will be raised in relation to 
the liability of private actors that are subject to legal requirements under EU 
internal market law.   
  
	 23 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Responsibility of Private Actors in EU Internal 
Market Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The construction of the internal market is permanently triggered by the inherent 
conflict between the objectives and interests represented by EU internal market 
law and national law. With regard to the construction and functioning of the 
internal market, the EU institutions and EU internal market law compete for 
authority with other national legal orders or other forms of governance, e.g. 
emerging from plain market forces.59 Each of which reflect a form of regulatory 
authority capable of regulating the internal market within its own spheres of 
competence. EU institutions are permanently required to offer better solutions 
than other organisations. Part of the problem is that when providing these ‘better 
solutions’ EU internal market law must rely on subjects within the Member 
States to realise them. This leads to an intensive and extensive responsibilization 
of actors under EU internal market law and a ‘transformation of roles’ of actors 
involved in the internal market. 60  In this regard, EU internal market law 
integrates other actors and sources of authority into the internal market as 
commodities and turns them into constitutive elements of the internal market. 
Private actors and public authorities alike occupy positions in the organisation of 
the internal market bound up with regulatory authority. In other terms, the 
allocation of rights to private actors and the allocation of obligations to public 
and private actors reflect forms of responsibilization; this integrates actors into 																																																								
59 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 406. Also see Miguel 
Poiares Maduro, 'Europe and the Consitution: what if this is as good as it gets?', in Joseph H. H. Weiler 
and Marlene Wind (eds.), European constitutionalism beyond the state (Cambridge: CUP, 2003); and 
Joseph H. H. Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', The Yale Law Journal, 100/8 (1991), 2403-
2483; and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution'; and Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer'. 
60 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 406. 
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the internal market and ensures that their activities do not distort the objectives 
of EU internal market law.  
 
 
1. Constitutionally structuring the internal market 
The problem encountered by EU institutions and EU internal market law is how 
to construct the internal market and ensure its effectiveness by “relying on 
domestic socio-economic structures.”61 The construction and functioning of the 
internal market is attained through a reorganisation of the roles and functions of 
its legal subjects.62 EU internal market law reflects a wirtschaftspolitische Leitidee 
(i.e. economic main idea), i.e. how the internal market should be organised and 
structured in order to function effectively. The role of private actors is framed in 
this ‘new social arrangement’ and ascribes private actors a pivotal role in this EU 
legal culture.63  The transformation of private actors reflects a new form of 
individualism that subjectifies private actors in a transnational environment. This 
new individualism created by EU internal market law is without equal. Private 
actors are placed in a European and transnational context. The allocation of 
directly enforceable rights was a giant step in creating a constitutional 
infrastructure of the internal market. It turned the objective principles 
constituting the internal market into subjective legal rights, which were applied 
in specific individual cases.64 The doctrine of direct effect and the allocation of 
rights was a major tool developed by the Court of Justice to emancipate 
“individuals from the legal and territorial boundaries of domestic markets and 
their regulatory structures” and to integrate them into the transnational market 
context.65 Simultaneously it alienates private actors from national and domestic 
frameworks and provides a space within which they are to consider themselves in 
a new collective space: the internal market. EU internal market law constructs 
legal subjects so as to find their new ‘home’ in the internal market. The identity 																																																								
61 Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at 
207. 
62 See Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought'. 
63 Marco Dani, 'The subjectification of the citizen in European public law',  at 12. 
64 Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution',  at 8. 
65 “Under EU law the most obvious form to integrate private actors into the internal market is to 
grant individuals rights that make them ‘ integrable ’ into institutions that derive from the pre- 
structuration of national societies, irrespective of the individuals ’ legal categorisation under the 
law of their country of origin.” For this see Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of 
Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at 206. 
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private actors are bestowed under EU internal market law essentially links them 
to a European context and to being an integral part of the transnational 
community.66 Private actors are placed in a legal framework and their ‘roles’ are 
constructed with an “unmediated connection to Europe as a whole.”67 However, 
powers and functions assigned to private actors under EU internal market law 
only relate to activities in the realm of the internal market and economic 
integration.  
 
 
1.1 Rights culture in EU internal market law as a tool for economic integration 
As it emerged in the context of the principle of direct effect, the rights-culture 
relates to the negative integration paradigm that developed under the principle of 
free movement. The rights culture and the individualism it reflects functions as a 
tool to unify national markets. Private actors are entrusted with rights protected 
under EU internal market law so as to bring about change–for themselves and for 
the economies of the Member States.68  
 
The consequence of this rights culture is the empowerment of private actors to 
make choices. The allocation of rights is a technique to transform “the ways in 
which individuals come to think of themselves, through inculcating desires for 
self-development” and to ensure that private actors are legally empowered to 
exercise these choices.69 Rights derived under EU free movement provisions in 
the treaties empowered private actors to move to another country to seek 
employment, 70  to sell goods in another country, 71  or to simply require fair 
																																																								
66 Ibid., at 215. 
67 Ibid., at 205 and 206-207. Further see Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer'; 
and Marco Dani, 'The subjectification of the citizen in European public law'. 
68 The internal market as process provides a common approach to […] promote throughout the 
community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous balanced expansion, 
an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between the states belonging to it. See Article 3(3) TEU. Further see Nikolas S. Rose and Peter 
Miller, 'Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government'. 
69 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 88. 
70 For example see Case C-292/89, Antonissen, [1991] ECR I-745 at 21; and Case C-281/98 Roman 
Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139.  
71 See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; and Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG 
v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649; and Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM (I), 
[1974] ECR 52; and Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227. 
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treatment in employment relationships.72 Rights have given private actors the 
power to pursue their self-interests in a transnational context. 73  Rights 
recognised under EU internal market law, for example free movement rights or 
the right to equal pay acknowledged “an ability to achieve certain 
consequences.”74  For this reason, the treaties provided a basic catalogue of 
normative expectations for which powers were to be conferred to private actors 
and which powers were to remain within the Member States sphere of 
competence. 75  As soon as a national law or practice interferes with these 
expectations individuals have an incentive to go to court and challenge the 
national measure limiting their opportunities. In this context the commonly 
accepted that the Court of Justice provided rights for private actors and 
constrained the powers of Member States in order to unify the internal market 
and to compensate for national protectionist measures. In this view, individuals 
exercising the right to free movement are allocated a social function at the same 
time. This function is reflected in the consequence the exercise of the right 
produces. Where free movement is possible the internal market, in principle, is 
unified. The consequence of free movement is economic integration in practice 
and the allocation of factors of production. 
 
The infinite scope of this rights culture as a tool for economic integration 
becomes evident. The analogy of a metal detector used on the beach can be used 
to describe the functioning of rights. As soon as the metal detector crosses a 
metal piece it gives an audible signal. Rights function in the same way. As soon as 
someone interferes with a right, the rights-holder gives a signal (most likely in 
front of a court). The special feature of rights is the interest behind it. Someone 
who holds a right is given a benefit that is legally protected by society: it creates a 
																																																								
72 See Case 33/88, Allué and Coonan, [1989] ECR 1591; and Case C-350/96, Clean Car Autoservice 
GmbH, [1998] ECR I-2521; and Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union 
cyclist internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] 
ECR 1405; and Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 
[1976] ECR 455. 
73 Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution',  at 9. 
74 Joseph Raz, 'Legal Rights',  at 13. 
75Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, 'Law as ouroboros', Thesis (PhD) (European University Institute 
(SPS) 2012, 2012) at 126; and Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima Kastner, 'Law as a 
social system' (Oxford: OUP, 2004),  at 174; and Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction',  at 1432. 
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normative expectation.76 EU internal market law protects those private actors 
having an interest “in the obtaining of some benefit.”77  
 
This is why private actors became active players in the integration process of the 
internal market. For example, under current EU internal market law the rights of 
workers to move freely in the internal market are constantly expanding. The 
rights of workers have been interpreted broadly and now cover job-seekers, 
unemployed, and part-time workers.78 Bosman expanded the right to workers to 
be protected against any obstacle, public or private, to free movement and to 
access employment.79 This does not negate the power of Member States to 
hinder access, although the power of Member States is fading. While any direct 
discrimination is unjustifiable, indirect discrimination may be justified for 
legitimate reasons and if the measure is proportionate.80 The prohibition of 
differential treatment on grounds of nationality, for example, (which can be 
understood as a synonym for protectionism) takes away power from Member 
States and enhances the opportunities for private actors.81 
 
Along this development the role of Member States and public authorities in the 
realm of the internal market changed. Under EU internal market law their role is 
transformed into being a facilitator. Their competence to structure national 
markets and to decide on allocation issues through general laws independently is 
reduced by legal constraints imposed by EU internal market law. Under the EU 
legal framework, Member States are responsible for the maintenance of the 
“infrastructure of law and order” while adapting to the needs and dynamics of the 
																																																								
76 On the effect of normative expectations see Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima 
Kastner, 'Law as a social system',  at Chapter 3. 
77 Joseph Raz, 'Legal Rights',  at 13; and Joseph Raz, 'Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties', Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 4/1 (1984a), 123-131 at 126. 
78 Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, [1982] ECR 1035 at 12-17; and Case C-292/89, 
Antonissen, [1991] ECR I-745 at 9-13. 
79 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 103. 
80 For example see Case C-297/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225; and Case C-325/08, Olympique 
Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177 at 39. 
81 In this regard the allocation of obligations and constraints is a more radical form of control as it 
prohibits specific practices or forms of regulation. In this case it does not matter if legal 
obligations emerge from the treaties directly or in harmonising measures, the effect remains the 
same. The difference being that harmonisation as a form of control of national means is more 
lenient as the drafting process involves representatives of Member States and the instrument of 
Directives gives discretion to Member States on how to transpose the legal requirements into 
national law. Harmonisation also does control Member State power.  
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internal market.82 For example, in relation to rights conferred by EU internal 
market law it is the “Member States responsibility to ensure that those rights are 
effectively protected.”83 Although EU internal market law does not generally 
prohibit national laws or new regulations, regulatory activities are required to be 
in accordance with the principles set by EU internal market law. The realm 
where public authorities still enjoy discretion to decide matters in national 
contexts and where conflicts with EU internal market law may emerge is 
reviewed and balanced in the framework of exceptions and justifications.  
 
This reorganisation of the function of Member States includes not only 
legislative and executive branches but also the judicial branch. In Defrenne II, the 
Court of Justice clarified that national courts are under a duty to protect directly 
enforceable rights in national proceedings. 84  The principle of ‘consistent 
interpretation’85 or the requirement to not apply national law86 where there is a 
conflict with EU internal market law are just other examples that define the 
function of the judiciary in the context of EU internal market law. The emphasis 
on individualism and rights results in the judicial branch gaining importance 
particularly in the realm of EU internal market law. National courts in 
combination with the subjectivation of EU internal market law and under the 
preliminary ruling procedure become European courts as well. Courts provide the 
forum for private actors in the case of conflicts between two competing interests 
or rights.87  
 
																																																								
82 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history'; and Nikolas S. Rose, 
'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 139; and Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality',  
at 41.  
83 Case C-397/11, Jōrös, [2013] ECR 340 at 50. 
84Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 24. Rights become the forum to determine the scope of protection under EU internal 
market law and and not political deliberation in the Member States. Interesting to see is that 
with increase of power of individuals the role of courts increased, which is in my opinion a logical 
consequence as courts provide a forum for private actors to solve problems concerning their 
rights. 
85 On consistent interpretation see Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 01891. 
86 For example see Case C-194/94, CIA Security, [1996]ECR I-2201. 
87 Giandomenico Majone, 'From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes 
in the Mode of Governance', Journal of Public Policy, 17/2 (May-Aug.1997), 139 at 155; and Guilherme 
Vasconcelos Vilaça, 'Law as ouroboros'; and Neil Komesar, 'A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the 
Constitution in a massive and complex society', Michigan Law Review, 86/4 (1988), 657-721. 
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This development referred to under the rights culture is well reflected in the Beer 
Purity case. The case concerned a German law fostering consumer habits through 
beer purity requirements. Only products complying with the product 
requirements set out in the Beer Purity law could be sold as ‘Bier’ in Germany. 
The Beer Purity law had the effect of protecting beer produced in Germany from 
beers produced in other Member States now being sold in the German market 
under the same label.88 In the Beer purity case the Court of Justice reconstructed 
the role of the Member State and the consumer in light of the unity of the 
internal market. The Court of Justice argued that the German law could not 
“crystallise given consumer habits in a Member State or in a given region.” This 
would assimilate the consumer in this region to a specific group. As a 
consequence, it would maintain the partitioning of the internal market on the 
basis of quality standards. The German law would protect national beer 
producers that had been working under this regulation for years. Instead, the 
consumer should be given the choice to change its preference based on the 
establishment of the internal market.89 The consumer should decide what is 
consumed as Bier or an equivalent alternative. Consumers are transformed into a 
commodity in the internal market. With this status, the consumer is voting 
through any decision that is made in the market context. At the same time, the 
consumer becomes a means for the unification of the internal market.  
 
A final point to be raised is that the rights culture is no phenomenon of primary 
law and the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the treaties. On the contrary, the 
emergence of rights is not, as the direct effect doctrine presumes, limited to 
primary law and the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. Rights allocated to private 
actors emerge in other contexts as well. For example, consumer rights protection 
reflects a detailed legal framework under which consumers are entrusted legal 
rights vis-à-vis producer or trader.90 Rights in relation to product qualities, return 
policies, or liability for defective products shape the legal position in the 
relationship with businesses of products. Alternatively, EU data protection law 																																																								
88 Similarly see the cases decided under the free movement of goods and the protection of 
industrial and commercial property under national law. The Court of Justice held national laws 
protecting industrial property are in principle liable to maintain a partitioning of the internal 
market. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] ECR 489; and Case 62/79, Coditel v. 
Ciné Vog Films, [1980] ECR 881; and Case 40/70, Sirena v. EDA, [1971] ECR 69. 
89 Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227. 
90 See Directive 2011/83/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
on consumer rights, (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011). 
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sets out a detailed legal framework that allocates rights to data subject’s vis-à-vis 
the data controller.91  
 
 
1.2 The emergence of a counter-culture 
The picture presented and often referred to in legal scholarship is clear. Private 
actors are the recipients of rights and public authorities are constrained in their 
activities for the sake of protection of the rights. Yet, conceptually different 
from the rights culture, a class of private actors that is constrained in freedoms rather 
than empowered in the context of the internal market has emerged. Thus, it is a 
class of actors that is tied to both groups, public and private, and their ‘place’ 
under EU internal market law. Under the counter-culture private actors are 
treated similarly to ‘public’ actors in the sense that they are constrained in their 
freedoms through legal means. The key difference to the rights culture is that 
private actors are legally required to act in a specific way. This is reflected in the 
allocation of duties, obligations, or other functions or tasks defined by law, which 
require specific behaviours from the actors concerned. This counter-culture can 
be seen emerging throughout the various sectors and disciplines of EU internal 
market law and in the context of primary law and secondary law. 
 
 
1.3 The counter-culture 
Intriguingly, the most contested legal constraints imposed on private actors 
under EU internal market law emerged in the case-law of the Court of Justice 
that expanded treaty provisions to directly bind private actors. The difficulty in 
following the Court of Justice’s reasoning emerged from the understanding that 
the treaties as a form of public law could only bind public actors. However, under 
free movement law the Court of Justice expanded the obligations so not to 
interfere with the free movement rights of private actors through activities that 
																																																								
91 For this see Directive 95/46/EC. 
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were discriminatory on grounds of nationality. Walrave and Koch92, Lehtonen,93 and 
Bosman94 are cases where the Court of Justice repeatedly clarified that:  
 
17 Prohibition of such discrimination does not only apply to the 
action of public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other 
nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and 
the provision of services.  
 
18 The abolition as between Member States of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide 
services, which are fundamental objectives of the Community 
contained in Article 3(c) of the Treaty, would be compromised if 
the abolition of barriers of national origin could be neutralized by 
obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by 
associations or organizations which to not come under public law.95  
 
Similarly, employers have been recipients of obligations to ensure equality for 
workers in relation to employment conditions under primary law. The Court of 
Justice in Defrenne II and Angonese clarified that the mandatory nature of the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex or nationality extends likewise to 
any private agreement concerning paid labour.96  
 
While the decisions of the Court of Justice in the context of free movement and 
non-discrimination law have been discussed extensively in legal literature, similar 
developments in EU internal market law have largely not been considered. This 
refers to cases where some private actors hold a special position in a specific 
context, the consequence of which is that they are constrained in their freedom 
of action or required to act in a particular way. This ‘technique’ can be found 																																																								
92 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405. 
93 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-
0268. 
94 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 95. 
95 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 17-18. Emphasis 
added. 
96 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 39; and Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-
4139 at 35. 
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throughout different sectors of EU internal market law including secondary law 
instruments. A similar approach is found in Regulation 1612/68/EEC which 
addressed specific private activities. Article 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68/EEC 
requires that:  
 
Any clause of a collective or individual agreement or of any other 
collective regulation concerning eligibility for employment, 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work or 
dismissal shall be null and void in so far as it lays down or 
authorises discriminatory conditions in respect of workers who are 
nationals of the other Member States.97 
 
In other words, any collective or individual agreement or any other collective 
regulation may not impose discriminatory requirements concerning eligibility for 
employment, employment remuneration and other conditions of work or 
dismissal. And this requirement has existed since the internal market’s infancy.  
 
More recently, different initiatives under EU internal market law follow a similar 
pattern and have given rise to the notion of the counter-culture in more specific 
regulatory contexts. In relation to food safety law, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 
states that the food business operator:  
 
at all stages of production, processing and distribution within the 
businesses under their control shall ensure that foods or feeds 
satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to their 
activities and shall verify that such requirements are met.98 
 
In the context of food safety, the food business operator is in charge of 
something that can be called due diligence. They are not only required to ensure 
that the marketed food is safe for human consumption, but beyond this, they are 
required to monitor and to inform the public and revoke contaminated food 
from the food market where necessary.99 In contrast to free movement and non-																																																								
97 Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (OJ 
1968/L 257/2) at Article 7(4). 
98 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 30 and Article 17 and 18. 
99 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181; and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat 
Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000. 
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discrimination law, the constraint does not stem from a prohibition to act in a 
particular way but from the imposition of specific protective duties under 
secondary law. Therefore, the food business operator occupies a special position 
with regard to ensuring food safety in the internal market, the consequence of 
which is the additional protective duties imposed.  
 
Directive 95/46/EC sets out the data protection framework within the internal 
market.100 Data protection law gained prominence in the aftermath of the Google 
Spain case.101  Although the Court of Justice recognised the obligation for search 
engines to delete out-dated and irrelevant personal information stored on its 
servers, the data protection regime on which basis the case was decided has 
existed since 1995. Google Spain is interesting concerning the Court of Justices 
articulation of the task of data controller. The Court of Justice held that the data 
controller, in respect of processing personal data, must, 
 
ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and 
capabilities, that that procession meets the requirements of 
Directive 95/46, in order that the guarantees laid down by the 
directive may have full effect.102  
 
Similar to EU food safety law in EU data protection law some private actor is put 
in a genuine position, which is bound up with certain legal requirements in a 
defined context. In the context of data protection it is the data controller to 
which a special task is entrusted, through the allocation of a specific legal duty to 
comply with the requirements set out in Directive 95/46/EC. This amounts to a 
complex framework, which is set up to ensure that personal data are only 
processed where this is lawful. In this context, the data controller occupies the 
centre of organisation on how data protection is delivered in practice to data 
subjects.103  																																																								
100 Directive 95/46/EC. 
101 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317. 
102 Ibid., at 83. 
103 In terms of responsibility of private actors it is interesting to see that the upcoming Data 
Protection Regulation refers to responsibility of the data controller directly. See Regulation (EU) 
No 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA 
relevance), (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88 ),  Article 5(2). 
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Environmental law and consumer law are further examples that support the 
argument that the counter-culture is widely present in EU internal market law. 
In both contexts some private actors are entrusted with special tasks. For 
example, in consumer protection this may be the producer of goods that places 
his products on the internal market. The EU Consumer Rights Directive 
2011/83/EU and the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EC both impose an information 
duty on the producer. Thus, in order to pursue business in the internal market, 
under the consumer protection regime, producers bear a special information 
duty.104 In environmental law, EU internal market law puts the private sector 
partly in charge so as to prevent environmental damage from happening. For 
example, Article 5(1) of Regulation 2004/35/EU requires that:  
 
1. where environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an 
imminent threat of such damage occurring, the operator shall, 
without delay, take the necessary preventive measures.105 
 
This preventive duty also includes a measure to prevent damage already caused 
from expanding or increasing. Private actors that act as operators under the 
environmental law regime are subject to a precautionary duty. 
 
 
2. Making sense of the counter-culture 
The rights culture and the counter-culture both relate to positions and roles of 
private actors within the internal market. This integration and transformation of 
individuals into the internal market is of an instrumental nature. Private actors 
are commodities in this market: they have a certain function in attaining 
objectives for which the internal market (and the market process) is considered 
to be the better alternative in terms of decision-making.106 Rights and obligations 																																																								
104 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms  in consumer contracts, (OJ L 
95, 21.04.1993, p. 29),  Article 3 and 7. Also see Directive 2011/83/EU. 
105 Directive 2004/35/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, 
(OJ L 143, 30.4.2004, p. 56–75),  Article 5(1). 
106  “Individuals are turned into legal subjects, recognised qua worker, employer, producer, 
consumer, service provider and so on, with a view to create a new institutional order originally 
labelled the ‘ Common Market ’ and now framed as the ‘Internal Market’.“ For this see Loic 
Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at 207. 
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are legal instruments that are allocated as a consequence of the nature of the 
actor, and of the position and function EU internal market law ‘considers’ 
appropriate for them in a defined context.  
 
 
2.1 Viewing the counter-culture through the concept of responsibility 
In order to provide some methodological and structural coherence to my analysis 
I will have recourse to the socio-political concept of responsibility as an 
analytical tool. The concept of responsibility in its capacity as an analytical tool 
comes with a fully equipped toolbox to take into account the specific features of 
the phenomenon of the counter-culture. First and foremost it functions as a tool 
to bridge the gap between the roles an actor has in a specific context and the 
legal consequences thereof.  
 
Responsibility is an ambiguous term that has different meanings depending on 
the context in which it is used. Responsibility, responsabilité or Verantwortung may 
have different meanings in different languages, different legal systems or other 
contexts such as morals or religion.107 This ambiguity is paired with the vagueness 
of the concept of responsibility, which comes with all possible notions. In legal 
terms, responsibility is assumed to be a synonym for liability.108 Others argue that 
responsibility relates to an idea of accountability and answerability. In this sense, 
responsibility refers to conditions that have to be complied with by those being 
responsible.109 Herbert Hart developed a taxonomy of responsibility in his book 
‘Punishment and Responsibility’.110 With regard to the counter-culture, the concept 
of responsibility is understood in terms of role-responsibility. Role-responsibility 
assumes that a person is in charge for a specific aspect (which may or may not be 
legally defined) due to a social role or position occupied in a defined context.111  
 																																																								
107 On the concept of responsibility see Roland J. Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility', in Carl J. 
Friedrich (ed.), Responsibility (The Liberal Arts Press New York, 1960); and John Deigh, 'On Rights 
and Responsibilities', Law and Philosophy, 7/2 (1988), 147-178; and Neil Maccormick, 'Taking 
Responsibility Seriously', Edinburgh Law Review, 9 (2005), 168-175; and Iris Marion Young, 
'Responsibility for justice' (Oxford: OUP, 2011); and Ronen Shamir, 'The age of responsibilization: on 
market-embedded morality'. 
108 Peter Cane, 'Responsibility in law and morality' (Hart Publishing, 2002),  at 1-2. 
109 J. R. Lucas, 'Responsibility' (Oxford: OUP, 1993),  at 182. 
110 See Herbert L. A. Hart, 'Punishment and responsibility : essays in the philosophy of law' (Rev. edn.: 
Clarendon Press., 1973). 
111 Ibid., at 212-215. 
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In recent years this concept has gained increasing relevance in legal contexts. In 
environmental law, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) deals with the 
question of the role of companies in relation to externalities. CSR developed as a 
form of control different from top down regulation. McKeon follows this idea of 
development holding that:  
 
the emergence of responsibility is not simply a curiosity amongst 
philosophers, but something issuing from the practical problems of 
government; the expansion of constitutional and responsible forms 
of government promising self-determination and self-governance, 
which, by the time he is writing, have been extended to an 
enormous number of peoples of the world, which had not 
previously enjoyed such rights.112 
 
Similarly, Shamir argues that responsibility plays an important role in relation to 
modern forms of governance. Responsibility emerges in response to the 
liberalism, individualism and economic liberties that are now being legally 
protected at a transnational level as a tool to govern certain actors in defined 
contexts.113  
 
 
2.1.1 Social roles and law 
Social roles relate to behaviour in a specific socio-political context, i.e. how we 
ought to behave in this context –an ideal coordination of behaviour.114 The 
internal market constitutes such a socio-political context that relies on the 
coordination of roles and positions in order to ensure the functioning of the 
internal market, i.e. the functioning of the internal market as an alternative 
decision-making process. In this regard, the definition of social role relies on four 
concepts: behaviour, person, context, and characteristics. (1) Roles relate to 
behaviour, in particular, what the role is expected to do or what it characteristically 
does. (2) Roles are personal in the sense that who is in charge is defined 
																																																								
112 Christopher M. Kelty, 'Responsibility: McKeon and Ricoeur', Anthropology of the Contemporary 
Research Collaboratory, May 2008/no.12 (2008) at 9. 
113 On this matter see Ronen Shamir, 'The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality'. 
114 This applies to any form of social arrangement: State, Market, Community or Family. 
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irrespective of whether it is a natural person, a legal entity, or any other 
institution. (3) Roles are limited by contextual specification.115 
 
The concept of role-responsibility may be applied to any organisation with social 
roles. Almost any societal context relies on roles and individuals may have 
different roles in different contexts. For example, my role as a lecturer in a 
university differs from my role as a father in the context of my family. The 
contextual relation is important for the understanding of social roles (and the 
legal consequences thereof). 116 The concept of role-responsibility relates the 
position individuals have to the context they act in and combines the social 
function and legal requirements relating to this position. Herbert Hart gives the 
example of a ship captain who is, because of his status, required to protect the 
individuals or goods on his vessel. This is the social role of the captain in the 
context of ships or vessels going to sea.117 The responsibility relates to the 
assumption on how a certain person ought to behave when acting in the capacity 
of a certain role. A consequence is that in its normative function the concept of 
role-responsibility justifies the imposition of legal requirements on private actors 
to require a specific behaviour and inflict punishment if necessary.118 What some 
actor is legally in charge for or required to do thus, is part of the responsibility 
ascribed to actor in a certain context.  
 
In earlier times, morals, nature, and even the church were very influential in 
determining the function of roles in a specific context and their derived 
consequences and in ensuring that conduct complied with the expectations of a 
role. In modern societies law, through the allocation of legal requirements, is the 
key instrument in defining the behaviour of roles in specific social contexts. Legal 
contexts overlap with social contexts. Law determines the way we shall behave in 
a specific societal context. In practical terms, law is concerned with the control 
and structuring of power and power relationships. Legal instruments determine what 
																																																								
115 Bruce J. Biddle, 'Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors' (Academic Press Inc, New 
York, 1979),  at 58. 
116 See Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, 'Unorthodox Marxism' (First edn.: South End Press, 
Boston, 1978). 
117 Herbert L. A. Hart, 'Punishment and responsibility : essays in the philosophy of law',  at 212-215. 
118 The idea of role responsibility may also work for rights. Because you have a specific position in 
a social environment you are conferred rights. See Peter Cane, 'Responsibility in law and morality',  
at 251. 
	38 
individuals should and can do and what they should not and cannot do.119 This 
takes place on the basis of an incentive structure that determines what kind of 
conduct is legal and what is illegal.120 Lon Fuller describes this as the “subjecting 
of human conduct to the governance of rules.”121 Law is the way social contexts 
are structured.122 This function of law is essential for the stability of society. As 
Albert and Hahnel emphasise, 
 
it is evident that if society is to be stable people must generally fit 
the role slots they are going to fill; actual behaviour must generally 
conform to the expected patterns of behaviour defined by societies 
major social institutions.123 
 
This is also found in EU internal market law, which relies on positions or ‘legal 
subjects’ to structure a certain ‘socio-political context’ or ‘policy-making 
environments’ (e.g. workers in the labour market, service providers, consumers in 
the context of consumer protection, or data subjects in EU data protection law 
etc.).  
This responsibilization of private actors as legal subjects in the constitutional 
structure of the internal market underlies both the rights culture and the 
counter-culture. 124  It reflects part of the EU legal culture on how the 
construction and functioning of the internal market is attained. In EU internal 
market law the recognition of ‘roles’ within the internal market is reflected in the 
recognition of ‘legal subjects’. Where an actor is recognised as legal subject 
within the internal market this reflects a choice these actors, coming with certain 
characteristics, occupy a position in the constitutional infrastructure of a defined 
context (i.e. workers, service providers, data controller, food business operators 
etc.). What is decisive is that the legal subject recognised is actor neutral in 																																																								
119 For example see Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima Kastner, 'Law as a social system'. 
120 Neil Maccormick, 'Institutions of law : an essay in legal theory' (Oxford: OUP, 2007); and Peter 
Cane, 'Responsibility in law and morality'; and Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima 
Kastner, 'Law as a social system',  at Chapter 3 and 4.| 
121 Tom W. Bell, 'The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law', Research Paper, University of Chicago 
(1992) at 5-6. 
122 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 205-206. 
123 Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, 'Unorthodox Marxism',  at 107. 
124 On the idea of responsibilization of private actors in EU internal market law see Damian 
Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law'; and Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured 
European Consumer'; and Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, 
Family, Society)',  at 206. 
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principle. Yet, some positions are more likely to be occupied by private actors 
than others simply because these are activities normally carried out by private 
actors, i.e. private actors when acting in the capacity as workers in contrast to 
data controller. Ultimately, EU internal market law defines these positions 
through legal means, i.e. rights, obligations or other privileges or requirements. 
With the concept of responsibility a link can be made between the position 
occupied by a private actor as a legal subject in a certain context governed by EU 
internal market law and the legal consequences that EU internal market law 
applies to this position. The legal consequences that emerge under EU internal 
market law are intended to guide the behaviour and activities of the private 
actors acting in the capacity qua legal subjects in a manner that EU internal 
market law deems to be most suitable for ensuring the functioning of the internal 
market.  
 
 
2.1.2 Responsibility and legal instruments 
Role and position are not legal but social, and are only defined through legal 
means. Modern societies use law to structure and control society and the 
relationships within. While rights empower, the allocation of obligations limits 
power. This is an effective way to determine and arrange the power relationships 
between two or more actors (Machtverhältnisse). Law as an instrument of 
government not only manifests the roles, but it determines how we are supposed 
to act.  
 
This function of law applies to any sector or discipline of the legal system. Only 
through the legal coordination of behaviour is the stability of the social 
organisation ensured and social objectives may be attained. Thus, law has some 
organic features as it aims to ensure the sustainability of a form of social 
organisation over time. 125   Importantly, for a “society to persist, peoples 
personalities must be largely in conformity with the roles they must occupy and 
the activities they must engage in.”126 Law as an instrument allocates roles, 
empowers or constrains powers so as to organise positions and behaviour in a 
certain context. These choices for governance reflect a mode of social 																																																								
125 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history'; and Charles E. Clark, 
'The Function of Law in a Democratic Society', University of Chicago Law Review, 9 (1942), 393. Also 
see Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima Kastner, 'Law as a social system'. 
126 Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, 'Unorthodox Marxism',  at 138. 
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coordination “between states as well as public and private actors.” 127 Governance 
refers to the processes of governing through law and how the law coordinates the 
exercise of power to attain specific objectives.128 It concerns the  
 
rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers 
are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.129 
 
Governance is about the control of conduct. The counter-culture as it emerged 
in EU internal market law reflects a form of governance that lies somewhere “in 
between the polar extremes of absolute discretion and total control” of private 
activities.130 On the one hand it constrains power which may have negative 
effects on other actors and moreover on the market. On the other hand, 
obligations maintain a certain degree of discretion for the addressee, i.e. to 
exercise economic choices. Responsibility as a technique of governance is a 
choice in any context it emerges. It is a choice to accept that the power of some 
actors will affect others and the relevant freedom of those powerful actors that 
may be needed in this context. 
 
 
2.1.3 Contextual neutrality 
The contextual neutrality of the concept of responsibility is an asset. In the 
internal market there is no such thing as a ‘role’ in the internal market in general. 
Roles and positions are always determined and legally defined in a defined 
context. In EU internal market law the legal context concerned is the point of 
departure and it determines the choices to be made in terms of allocating social 
roles and how this is manifested in law, i.e. free movement of workers, data 
protection, consumer protection, environmental protection etc. Private actors 
are transformed in each of these specific legal contexts, one consequence of 
which is the allocation of obligations.  																																																								
127 Maria Weimer, 'Democratic legitimacy though European conflicts-law?: the case of EU administrative 
governance of GMOs', PhD Law (European University Institute (LAW) 2012) at 96. 
128 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 16-17. 
129 COM(2001)428 final European Governance - A White Paper, (OJ 2001/C 287/01); and Mario 
Monti, 'A New Strategy for the Single Market', Report to the President of the European Commission 
(2010). 
130 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, 'Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation', University of Penn 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11, (2010), 1 at 1. 
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The context in which the ‘role’ is defined is decisive. The legal context defines 
the positions occupied by the different actors and relationships between these 
actors according to the dynamics in this context. The important point is that the 
allocation of roles is distinct for every legal context. Every legal context relates to 
different social objectives and, consequently, each legal context comes with its 
own ideal organisation of roles and functions in terms of efficiency in attaining 
the underlying social objectives. The specific feature of EU internal market law is 
that it consists of multiple legal contexts in which EU internal market law 
governs the activities of private actors. Who occupies roles in what context, thus 
depends on the legal context and the objectives to be attained. For example, free 
movement law relates to the attainment of economic integration, EU 
discrimination law relates to social integration, while the objectives in EU data 
protection law and EU food safety law are self-explanatory. The responsibility of 
private actors always relates to the legal context that defines their role and 
function.  
 
EU internal market law is about the stabilisation of policy-making environments 
in the context of the internal market.131 Part of the power of EU internal market 
law is derived from ensuring and guaranteeing the normative expectations it 
creates. Thus, participation and a functioning internal market process are 
fundamental requirements against which the effectiveness and the legitimacy of 
power exercised by EU internal market law are measured. As with the rights 
culture, the counter-culture is committed to this EU legal culture.  
 
In practice, the internal market consists of many markets and submarkets in 
which behaviour needs to be coordinated. The core of the internal market is 
constituted by the internal market for goods, labour, services, and capital.132 Each 
of the four core markets comes with its own ideal organisation of roles occupying 
the centre (i.e. the economic interests involved) and actors at the periphery (i.e. 
institutions and agencies entrusted with the task to ensure an effective legal 
framework). The individual organisation of each context reflects the ideal policy-
making environment in which market dynamics are supposed to lead to optimal 
outcomes. In this regard, EU internal market law does not define policies but 
intends to create a policy-making environment in which market dynamics 																																																								
131 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 412-413. 
132 Dennis Swann, 'The economics of the Common Market' (Seventh edn., 1992),  at 11-12.  
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produce ‘optimal’ outcomes.133 For example, in the labour market the economic 
interests of the employer and the employee occupy the centre of organisation. It 
is the relationship and interaction of the worker and employer that determines 
the optimal allocation of labour resources throughout the EU. The allocation of 
rights and obligations intended to define roles and behaviour is the technique to 
structure this policy-making environment. 
 
Alternatively, where no specific ‘market’ is regulated, EU internal market law 
corrects a market failure or instances where the market is distorted. In relation 
to the specific nature of the internal market this is likely to be the case where the 
diversity in national laws hinders cross-border economic activities. 
Harmonisation of national laws is a way to deal with this kind of distortions to 
the internal market. In this regard, secondary law instruments are intended to 
complement the structure of a specific market. This would be the case, where 
market dynamics would not automatically correct the distortion or failure, i.e. a 
race to the bottom concerning safety standards. In this regard a level playing field 
is set to which all actors in the internal market must adhere. EU internal market 
law adds an additional regulatory layer intended to correct the inefficiency of a 
market based solely on free movement and non-discrimination. EU wide 
regulation is intended to increase the efficiency of the market process.  
 
 
2.1.4 Specific legal consequences under EU internal market law 
In contrast to the rights culture, the notion of responsibility and the imposition 
of legal constraints naturally raises the question of how to handle cases of non-
compliance with the legal requirements. In contrast to the rights culture, where 
the exercise of rights is voluntary, the counter-culture makes compliance 
obligatory. Naturally this constellation of obligation is linked to questions of 
aversion and retribution. Where an actor did not act according to the legal 
expectation, two possibilities emerge: justification of the deviation of the legal 
requirements or punishment as a means to enforce. The concept of responsibility 
provides the enquiry with analytical tools to deal with side issues emerging from 
the counter-culture, which are important for the understanding of the concept. 
In the internal market the possibility of justification and liability are 																																																								
133 Loic Azoulai, 'The Complex Weave of Harmonisation', in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015),  at 609. 
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consequences for actors that are dealt with under the counter-culture. Where 
under EU internal market law private actors are deemed to occupy positions of 
‘alternative’ regulatory authority they are treated, in general, similarly to public 
authorities. 
 
a) Justification 
To justify a specific behaviour assumes a form of acceptable non-compliant 
behaviour. Only where there is a conflict between the required behaviour (by law) 
and the actual behaviour does the issue of justification arise. In this space, private 
actors may explain–with good reasons–why they deviated from the expected 
behaviour and why it was necessary in this specific case. It is in this individual 
context that exceptions to the legal rule are assessed in relation to the wider 
social benefit that a compliant behaviour would have produced.  
 
In Bosman the Court of Justice elaborated on the possibility to justify deviations 
from the legal requirements under the free movement provisions for sport 
associations. Sport associations should not impose obstacles to the free 
movement of workers in terms of transfer fees. In fact the result of such transfer 
fees would distort the transition from a club in one Member State to another 
club in another Member State.134 The Court of Justice recognised the specific 
nature of the activities pursued, that sport associations and trade unions for 
example might restrict the free movement of others for overriding legitimate 
reasons.135 Sustaining a youth player’s education136 or the protection of workers137 
was accepted as legitimate reasons in this context. Nevertheless, the possibility 
to justify is yet to be put under the scrutiny of the Court of Justice and be subject 
to a proportionality test.  
 																																																								
134 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
135 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405; and Case C-176/96, 
Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-0268; and Case C-
415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and 
Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; and Case 
C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
136 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177 at 38. 
137 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and 
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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Similarly, in the data protection framework we find legally defined reasons for 
non-compliance with the legal requirements. The general principle bestowed on 
the data controller is to ensure that the processing of personal data must be 
lawful. Where personal data are processed under lawful conditions, the principle 
of data protection is ensured. Directive 95/46/EC sets out specific requirements 
where processing may be lawful. Only Article 7(d)–(f) allow some freedom for the 
data controller to act on behalf of their own or public interests. Yet, this 
discretion has been interpreted restrictively in Google Spain. This case concerned 
the erasure by Google of out-of-date personal data from the list of results of 
Google’s search engine. The Court of Justice made it clear that rights concerning 
personal data override, “as a rule, not only the economic interests of the operator 
of the search engine, but also the interests of the general public in finding that 
information” unless “it is justified by the preponderant interest of the public to 
have access to this information.”138 Thus, while interpreting economic and public 
interests in a narrow fashion, the Court of Justice did not prohibit either of the 
interests from prevailing over interests relating to personal data under specific 
circumstances.  
 
b) Liability 
Responsibility and liability form an almost natural symbiosis. If someone that is 
responsible for some activity does not act according to it, liability emerges. 
Liability is a way of holding someone accountable for his actions. In light of the 
counter-culture, it is pertinent to ask about the liability of these hybrid actors, 
i.e. private in nature but exercising regulatory authority, which is normally 
associated with public entities. Without doubt, liability is an efficient technique 
to provide a further incentive for compliance with legal requirements.139 With 
regard to EU internal market law and the counter-culture the problem faced is 
that liability is not conceptualised in a general manner. There is no EU tort law 
that determines who is liable under what conditions: rather liability emerges 
contextually.  
 
The question to be dealt with here is one of completeness. How is compliance 
with legal obligations ensured under EU internal market law? Where 																																																								
138 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 81 and 97. 
139  Barend Van Leeuwen, 'Private Regulation and Public Responsibility in the Internal Market', 
Yearbook of European Law,  (2014), 1 at 8. 
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responsibility emerges and where obligations are allocated to the private actors 
by a legal system, the question of how this legal system ensures compliance needs 
to be considered. Sanctioning and judicial enforcement emerge from non-
compliance with the legal requirements imposed on an individual under EU 
internal market law in national courts. Inevitably this creates a risk on 
consistency and coherence of enforcement throughout the EU. Therefore, failure 
to ensure that the legal obligations imposed under EU internal market law are 
enforced efficiently would impair and challenge the effectiveness of the concept 
of responsibility. 
 
 
2.2 New individualism in EU internal market law 
Taking a step back and trying to picture what really happens when EU internal 
market law allocates rights and obligations to private actors, we see that the 
private actors that are normally imbedded in national social, economic, political 
or legal contexts are taken out of their familiar environment and placed at the 
centre of a new social arrangement on a transnational scale. The allocation of 
rights and obligations is merely the legal consequence of the positions and 
powers that actors are ascribed in a certain ‘policy-making environment’ under 
EU internal market law. Under this new individualism EU internal market law 
not only identifies the positions qua legal subjects that may be occupied by 
private actors in a certain policy-making environment, but at the same time, EU 
internal market law ‘governs’ their conduct. EU internal market transforms 
private actors and places them into the constitutional structure of the internal 
market. The legal framework provided by EU internal market law in a certain 
context sets out clear rules, processes and requirements that determine how 
power ‘should’ be exercised.140 
 
This transformation is amplified and visualised through the allocation of rights 
and obligations. EU internal market law is about the creation of a legal 
environment where private actors are supposed to act. In this context, rights and 
obligations as they are applied to private actors in different legal contexts are 
always intended to attain certain policy objectives. Rights and obligations are 
simply instruments to realise EU policies.141 This understanding of EU internal 																																																								
140 COM(2001)428 final ; and Mario Monti, 'A New Strategy for the Single Market'. 
141 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 412-413. 
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market law goes back to the very nature of the relationship it has with national 
law and other market forces. It is a relationship based on conflicts and 
competition about power and regulatory authority. EU internal market law and 
the institutions applying EU internal market law in specific cases compete with 
national authorities and other actors within the market about the effective 
organisation of parts of the internal market, local markets, or other policy 
objectives that are to be attained within the internal market.  
 
The function of the EU legal culture is to reorganise power at EU level in order 
to protect the economic and social objectives of EU internal market law. In this 
regard, the counter-culture and the allocation of obligations is not only a tool of 
integration of the internal market. 142 The difference to the rights culture is found 
in the ‘personal’ characteristics of the private actors that are addressed under the 
counter-culture. The difference between the rights culture and the counter-
culture is determined by the power and relative strength private actors have in a 
certain economic relationship. Where private actors are potentially weak and 
disadvantaged in a certain relationship, EU internal market law and the Court of 
Justice strengthens their positions through the allocation of rights or other 
resources. Alternatively, where private actors are strong in terms of power to 
affect other actors in the market (similar to public power held by public 
authorities), EU internal market law and the Court of Justice allocates 
obligations as a means to analyse and control unrestrained power. This ‘balancing 
of power’ through legal instruments is intended to ensure a level playing field for 
competition.143 While rights have the function to encourage an activity or choice, 
obligations or the risk of liability provide an incentive to abstain from certain 
activities. In this pure form, through determining what is legal and what is illegal, 
EU internal market law steers the market process in a way to produce ‘social 
outcomes.’  
 
The technique reflected in the recognition of private actors qua legal subjects and 
the control of their conduct through the allocation of legal instruments is a 
technique of governance to control unchecked private power in parts of the 
																																																								
142 Loic Azoulai, 'The Complex Weave of Harmonisation',  at 609; and Damian Chalmers, 'The 
unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 412-413. 
143  Private actors should enjoy special freedoms. For this see Case 222/82, Apple and Pear 
Development Council, [1982] ECR 4083 at 17. 
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internal market. 144  It is private power in terms of a competing ‘regulatory 
authority,’ i.e. where private actors are in a position to affect the environment in 
which other private actors are supposed to engage, which triggers the allocation 
of obligations. This concerns EU internal market law competing with other 
systems of governance and how EU internal market law and EU institutions 
maintain the status as hegemon within the internal market. Part of the EU legal 
culture is about the determination of its relationship with other sources of authority 
that may exercise regulatory power within the internal market. It is thus irrelevant if 
the nature of the alternative source of authority in a certain market context 
emerges in a national or international context or if it is of a public or private 
nature.145 In situations where the counter-culture emerges, private actors occupy 
positions in a specific market that are loaded with ‘legal’ forms of regulatory 
authority. These are forms of power that are capable of determining the ‘rules of 
the internal market’ beyond EU institutions and EU internal market law. 
Similarly, strong market actors may affect the structure and functioning of the 
market process irrespective of their public or private nature. Market forces may 
hold this kind of power in a market context.146 For example, this would be the 
case with the employer in the labour market or the data controller in relation to 
data protection law. A consequence being that EU internal market law not only 
competes with formal sources of power, such as states or public authorities, but 
also with functional forms of power that emerge in certain contexts governed by 
EU internal market law.  
 
 
3. Counter-culture reassessed—responsibilization of private actors 
The concept of responsibility starts with the position that the allocation of 
obligations is a consequence of the position an actor occupies in a specific 
context. Put differently, EU internal market law empowers private actors as 																																																								
144 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 412-413. 
145 In this view, the Court of Justices decision in Kadi fits in as well. In Kadi the relationship of 
the EU legal order to the UN legal order was at stake which was referred to by Advocate General 
Maduro (21) “This brings us to the question of how the relationship between the International 
legal order and the Community legal order must be described“. Part of the EU legal culture is 
about the determination of its relationship with other sources of authority that may exercise 
regulatory power within the internal market. To this effect see Case C-402 and 415/05, Kadi v. 
Commission, [2008] ECR I-635; and J.H.H. Weiler, 'Journey to an Unknown Destination: A 
Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration'; and 
Frederick Van Den Berghe, 'The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solution to more 
Acute Problems?', European Law Journal, 16/2 (2010), 112-157. 
146 Damian Chalmers, 'The unconfined power of European Union Law',  at 412-413. 
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commodities in the constitutional structure of the internal market, i.e. they hold 
political power in the view that their choices matter and affect the ‘policy 
making’. Drawing on this factor it illustrates how private actors are 
responsibilized and shaped through EU internal market law qua positions. In this 
respect, the counter-culture and the rights culture alike put private actors in 
charge of matters relating to a certain sector in the internal market. This 
responsibilization is reflected in the recognition of them as legal subjects in EU 
internal market law. Private actors are managed and assembled by EU internal 
market law. The difference to the rights culture is that the economic activity of 
actors is required to be exercised in a specific manner.  
 
A clear line can be drawn between the counter-culture and the legal responses by 
EU internal market law and the antitrust framework that is within EU internal 
market law, normally considered to be the legal framework that imposes 
constraints on private actors.147 Although both paradigms relate to situations of 
power asymmetry between private actors, they are distinct. Competition, as 
protected under EU competition law, is the ‘decision-making force’ in the 
market process148 and it addresses situations of power where the relative strength 
is used for benefit through the use of unfair competitive practices. Thus, the 
abuse of power relates to the competitive process itself vis-à-vis another 
competitor. The counter-culture is functionally different. The counter-culture 
relates to misuse of power in relation to the ‘constitutional structure’ of a certain 
market context. For example, EU free movement law and EU discrimination law 
are, within their scope of application, about the construction of the internal 
market (i.e. designing the framework within which competition takes place). The 
private power addressed in these contexts is more about power similar to 																																																								
147 For example see Sophie Robin-Olivier, 'The evolution of direct effect in the EU: Stocktaking, 
problems, projections', I CON, 12/1 (2014), 165-188 at 176. 
148 Article 101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In terms of similarity 
that different strengths and powers are balanced consider Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM (I), [1974] 
ECR 52; and Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409; and Julio Baquero Cruz, 'Between 
competition and free movement : the economic constitutional law of the European Community' (Hart, 
Oxford, 2002); and Bruno De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Primacy, and the nature of the Legal Order',  at 334; 
and N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state'; and Colin Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory 
State', Journal of Law and Society, 27/1 (March 2000), 38. In this sense, competition functions as 
an accountability mechanism. This idea of accountability is deeply imbedded in the market as an 
alternative decision-making process. Once a producer offers a product on the market and enters 
into competition with other producers consumers decide according to their interests and 
preference which product to buy. The producer is held accountable on the basis of consumer 
choices. Consumer choice determines what characteristics a product should have. The demand 
created by consumer’s signals to the producer what to produce or not. The idea is that through 
arbitrage and innovation product quality increases and adapts the demands of consumer. 
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regulatory authority and strength. The exercise of power does not affect another 
competitor.  
 
In a wider context, this power to affect, by whatever means, has an effect on the 
market as a whole, as it affects the exercise of economic interests in a specific 
case. The social function the exercise of this economic interest has in terms of its 
outward effect on society as a whole is restricted. This effect is well captured by 
the butterfly-effect. In Chaos Theory the butterfly-effect refers to the sensitive 
dependency of conditions in which even the ‘slightest, seemingly non-related 
event can have a huge difference on the outcome of another.’ The reference to 
butterfly-effect was derived from Edward Lorenz’s metaphorical example of, 
 
the details of a hurricane (exact time of formation, exact path 
taken) being influenced by minor perturbations such as the 
flapping of the wings of a distant butterfly several weeks earlier.149 
 
 
3.1 All about vested positions 
EU internal market law organises the internal market and ensures the 
functioning of the market process through positions and by governing the 
relationships that emerge in a certain context. This notion of vested position can 
be identified in each legal sector referred to above within the counter-culture.150 
A decisive factor is that those positions addressed represent part of the core 
economic interests in a context governed by EU internal market law. Each 
market context comes with a predetermined set of interests occupying the centre 
of organisation. This is the economic relationship on which basis supply and 
demand are determined. The recognition of vested positions is not natural, but a 
choice made under EU internal market law either through the Court of Justice 
interpreting the treaty provisions or through the legislator regulating a specific 
sector or subject matter. The recognition of vested positions under EU internal 
market law relies on an ideal organisation of a certain market context and the 
relationship, which should determine the dynamics (supply and demand) in this 
sector. For example, in the labour market this is the employer and the employee, 																																																								
149 E. N. Lorenz, The essence of chaos, University of Washington Press (1993). 
150 For the idea of vested positions see Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Opinion of Advocate 
General MADURO,  at 37-40. 
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or in consumer protection it is the producer and the consumer. Only where the 
‘equal participation’ of both interests to the relationship in the relevant context 
is assured, does the market process function efficiently. 
 
 
3.2 The structural organisation of responsibility 
The nature of the internal market creates a web of actors that are involved in the 
shaping and construction of policy-making environments in the internal market. 
In this web of actors different actors have different functions with regard to the 
attainment of a social objective in a defined context. The responsibility of private 
actors in relation to the counter-culture is placed in a framework of shared 
responsibilities, where the holder to correlating rights and economic interests 
constitutes another important part. This relationship between actors 
representing economic interests occupies the centre of organisation in a specific 
legal context and it is imbedded in a wider institutional framework consisting of 
national legislative authorities, EU institutions, and national courts or specialised 
agencies. Each of which is entrusted with a responsibility (i.e. function) relating 
to the attainment of the objective in a specific context. The EU legal framework 
in relation to a specific context is intended to coordinate the activities of the 
different actors involved. The objective, which is intended to be attained in a 
specific legal context, is reached through this coordination of shared 
responsibilities.  
 
The following illustration of roles is not conclusive or normative. Depending on 
specific markets more actors may emerge—simply because they are part of an 
effective policy-making environment. The organisational approach adopted 
under EU internal market law is special because functions and powers are 
allocated in terms of specialisation. The responsibility different actors have 
relates to activities in which the actors have some form of expertise or the actor 
is best equipped to do. Member States are in charge of legislative activities in 
terms of transposing EU legal requirements into national law. Courts are in 
charge of adjudication. Agencies are set up with a clear supportive function in a 
specific context, which may be to monitor activities or to provide information. 
Private actors are only required to act according to their own economic interests.  
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Figure 1 System of shared responsibilities 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the different kinds of actors that may occupy 
roles and positions in a certain policy-making environment.151 Each of which is 
equipped with different functions in relation to the objective to be attained. The 
coordination of the roles and relationships is carried out through legal means and 
is a technique through which EU internal market law intends to attain certain 
policy objectives. 152 For example, EU data protection law, i.e. the legal context, 
structures the roles and positions of actors, i.e. the socio-political context, that 
are supposed to contribute and engage for the attainment of data protection, i.e. 
the social objective, in the internal market.  
 
 
3.2.1 The centre of organisation 
Private actors are responsibilized as legal subjects. EU internal market law 
instrumentalises private actors by putting them in ‘charge’ for making choices on 
their own economic interests. In this regard, every policy objective is driven by at 																																																								
151 This model is far from being exhaustive or normative. Rather it should be considered as an 
attempt to provide some clarification to the structure and institutionalisation EU law intends to 
develop and implement through legal means.  
152 Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, 2/3 (1957:July), 201 at 201. 
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least two competing economic interests. These are the actors that occupy the 
positions that determine the supply and demand sides. The fact that this power 
relationship and the dynamics between the economic actors involved occupy the 
centre of organisation constitutes the key element through which the market 
process functions i.e. employer and employee in the labour market. The multiple 
transactions between competing economic interests ultimately produces optimal 
outcomes. A certain form of imbalance of power between the actors representing 
the different economic interests is required to an extent that it stimulates the 
supply and demand sides of the economic relationship and therefor ensures the 
functioning of the internal market as decision-making process. The intention to 
influence other actors in the market is to make our voice heard, or interests 
represented, and our intentions communicated. This involves some form of 
hierarchy and to have actual power individuals must be in a position that their acts 
may have actual consequences—positive or negative—for others. 153 To a certain 
extent, private actors must be mutually capable of affecting or steering the 
thinking or action of other actors in a certain relationship. 154  The core 
characteristic of social power is the potential to influence  personal, social, or 
structural conditions of the other actor in the social relationship. Social power is 
any opportunity to enforce one’s own will, even against the unwillingness and 
reluctance of acceptance by other actors in a social relationship.155 As Robert Dahl 
says, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.”156  
 
Michel Foucault describes this structural relationship of power in a social setting 
as a “structural expression of a complex strategic situation in a given social setting 
that requires both constraint and enablement.”157 Yet, economic strength is not 
necessarily the only decisive criterion, in some situations, the mere position in a 
specific economic relationship can be sufficient to inaugurate ‘power.’ 																																																								
153 Guzzini, rightly describes that “power, as a dispositional concept, is neither a thing (a resource 
or a vehicle) nor an event (an exercise of power): it is a capacity”. It is a capacity to “effect”. To 
this effect see: Stefano Guzzini, 'The Concept of Power: A constructivist analysis', Millenium - Journal 
of International Studies, 33 (2005), 495-522 at 14; and Case C-270/13 Haralambidis, Opinion of 
Advocate General WAHL,  at 55-58. 
154 For example see Dian-Marie Hosking and Ian E. Morley, 'A social psychology of organizing – 
people, processes and contexts' (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Loughborough, 1991). 
155 Wallace C. Peterson, 'Market Power',  at 381. 
156 Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power'. 
157 To this effect see Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, 'Power/knowledge : selected interviews and 
other writings, 1972-1977' (Pantheon Books, New York, 1980). 
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Functionally speaking, the relationship is not horizontal in terms of competitors 
but vertical in terms of effect. Therefore the vertical relation is characterised by 
subordination and dominance in a mutual exchange of input.158 This might be a 
way to look at expansion of ‘public obligations’ under the treaty provisions for 
private actors. If we consider the relationship concerned as a vertical one, than 
we may look at the concept of ‘public’ not on the basis of formal criteria and 
factors but in terms of relationship. Public actors are any actors that are capable 
of affecting the environment for other actors competing in the market. This 
concerns a simple terminological twist: the perspective on how to perceive and 
view the public/private divide is changed. EU internal market law does not rely 
on the same public/private distinction as national constitutional law does. The 
line is drawn on the basis of function/effect. Thus, private activities would be 
considered those that take place within the process of competition–while public 
activities are those that have an effect on the process of competition. The thesis 
relates to the latter. 
 
 
3.2.2 The periphery  
Private actors and their relationship are placed into a framework of shared 
responsibilities. This refers to an institutional organisation that is intended to 
organise power in a decentralised manner. EU internal market law coordinates 
this system of shared responsibilities through specific legal frameworks and the 
regulation of specific sectors. This form of organisation and coordination of 
power reflects a “neo-liberal matrix of authority.”159 EU internal market law intends 
to organise authority in relation to specific objectives in a manner that is less 
legalistic and centralised. The preference reflected in the approach under EU 
internal market law is for a reflexive, horizontal, and self-sustaining environment. 
This environment of shared responsibilities,  
 
is modelled to follow the logic of competitive market relations 
whereby multiple formally equal actors (acting as or aspiring to act 
as sources of authority) consult, trade and compete over the 																																																								
158 Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen, 'Private Law Beyond the State?', The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 54 (2006), 843 at 849. 
159 Ronen Shamir, 'The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality',  at 3-4. 
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deployment of various instruments of authority (laws, regulations, 
codes, guidelines, standards, labels, etc.) both intrinsically and in 
their relations with each other.160 
 
Specialised Agencies for example may influence the decisions of private actors by 
providing additional information. The reliance on specialised agencies in 
regulatory frameworks of EU internal market law is prominent. EU internal 
market law and regulators seem to prefer specialised actors in situations where 
specific information, guidance, or monitoring is needed. Impartiality and 
independence of these agencies from national or European regulatory interests is 
the asset that these institutions add to the regulatory framework. The European 
Food Safety Authority, for example, shall provide private actors and consumers 
with information concerning food safety and healthy nutrition.161 This is a way to 
influence consumer choices and consumer demands for safer and healthier food. 
In the case of data protection authorities, although they oversee data protection 
compliance in national contexts, they are required to act independently from 
national regulatory interests and authorities.  
 
Courts occupy a key function with regard to the legal framework in which private 
actors are supposed to engage. The emphasis on individualism and rights results 
in the judicial branch gaining importance. Courts provide the forum for dispute 
resolution, in particular where rights of market participants collide.162 National 
courts occupy a special position because a large part of the law that ‘regulates’ the 
internal market is national law.163 Thus, it is national courts that must ensure that 
EU internal market law is applied effectively in national contexts.164 The Court 
of Justice becomes the ultimate arbiter to ensure the effectiveness of EU internal 
																																																								
160 Ibid. 
161 For this see Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional 
Ways of Life', The Modern Law Review, 66/4 (Jul. 2003), 532. 
162 Giandomenico Majone, 'From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
Changes in the Mode of Governance',  at 155; and Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, 'Law as ouroboros'; 
and Neil Komesar, 'A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a massive and complex 
society'. 
163 Loic Azoulai, 'The force and forms of European Legal Integration'. 
164 For example see Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
Sabena, [1976] ECR 455 at 24; and Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631 at 30; and Case 
41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, [1974] ECR 01337 at 12; and Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and 
Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 01891 at 28. 
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market law and the internal market.165 In Defrenne II, the Court of Justice 
clarified that national courts are under a duty to protect directly enforceable 
rights in national proceedings.166 The principle of consistent interpretation167 or 
the requirement to not apply national law168 where there is a conflict with EU 
internal market law are just other examples that define the function of the 
judiciary in the context of EU internal market law.  
 
The role of Member States in the internal market is often neglected. The internal 
market is comprised of national markets that are regulated and shaped by 
national laws. This does not change in the context of EU internal market law. 
However, the role of the Member State is reduced to that of a facilitator. The 
role of Member States relates to the maintenance of the “infrastructure of law 
and order.”169 With regard to the internal market and EU internal market law, 
Member States are entrusted with the task of ensuring that the rights and 
principles of EU internal market law are effectively protected within the national 
environment.170  
 
The role of European legislative institutions also increases. Under EU internal 
market law, the power to regulate sectors of the market or specific objectives 
relating to the market is vested in EU institutions. EU Institutions are equipped 
with the power to regulate upon the market in order to enhance the efficiency. 
This is reflected in a specific legal basis and in the power to approximate national 
																																																								
165  For example see Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist 
internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 
1405; and Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317; and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We 
the court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution'. 
166Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 24. Rights become the forum to determine substance and not political deliberation in the 
member states. Interesting to see is that with increase of power of individuals the role of courts 
increased, which is in my opinion a logical consequence as courts provide a forum for private 
actors to solve problems concerning their rights. 
167 On consistent interpretation see Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 01891. 
168 See Case C-194/94, CIA Security, [1996]ECR I-2201. 
169 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history'; and Nikolas S. Rose, 
'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 139; and Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality',  
at 41. 
170 See Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] 
ECR 455 at 24; and Case C-397/11, Jōrös, [2013] ECR 340 at 50. 
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laws.171 The power to harmonise national laws is a special power by which EU 
institutions affect private relationships. Harmonisation in fact transfers the 
power on substantial matters to EU internal market law. The harmonised 
approach adopted at EU level reflects some form of reorganisation of roles and 
legal contexts intended to improve the efficiency in a specific sector. 
 
 
3.3 The problem space—the emergence of the counter-culture 
The inborn conflict in the internal market context emerges between, on the one 
hand, the creation of individualism and the exercise of individual power and, on 
the other hand, the objective of EU internal market law to ensure the 
functioning of the internal market through the protection of equality of 
opportunity and participation of interests. The open market policy, which is the 
Grundnorm of the internal market, requires that the internal market is accessible 
for everyone under equal and fair terms of competition.172 It is to ensure the 
equal participation of private actors in the market in practice and not only in 
theory, which determines the effectiveness of the internal market process. This is 
why the principle of equality of opportunity is central to EU internal market law 
and the internal market. It is the principle on which the internal market is 
assessed in terms of functioning:  
 
The idea of liberty is, primarily, a negative one, the removal of 
restraints upon doing what one wishes. Such restraints may be 
imposed by the actions of other persons or may be due to natural 
obstacles. Social liberty refers to the removal of restraints by other 
persons.173 
 
Through openness, EU internal market law ensures diversity and competition in 
the internal market (or the specific sectors concerned). This idea of structural 
organisation considers “competition and diversity…as a means for continuous 																																																								
171 For example see Article 194 TFEU on energy or Article 195 TFEU on tourism. In addition, 
Article 114 TFEU empowers the EU Institutions to harmonise national laws on whatever subject 
matter if this is necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal market.  
172  This is a constitutionally protected market economy based on freedom of movement, non-
discrimination and competition. Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond [1978] ECR 2347 at 57; and 
COM(2001)428 final 2; and N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state',  at Chapter 3; and 
François Ewald, 'A Concept of Social Law',  at 71.  
173 D. D. Raphael, 'Justice and liberty' (Athlone Press, 1980),  at 52. 
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change and improvement.”174 The open market policy functions as a catalyst for 
the internal market process and is a means to protect the diversity and equal 
participation of interests in the internal market. 
 
Equality of opportunity does not refer to creating equals.175 Instead the emphasis 
is on equality in terms of participation in the internal market. Equality of 
opportunity relates to equal opportunities between competitors and not among 
individuals as such. The more diversity there is in the market, the more efficient 
it functions in terms of ‘producing social outcomes.’ In GB INNO the Court of 
Justice emphasised the necessity of equality of opportunities holding that:  
 
25. A system of undistorted competition, as laid down in the 
Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured 
as between the various economic operators.176 
 
Alternatively, in Boussac the Court of Justice held that “the equality of 
opportunity of Community nationals is affected whenever a set of rules leads to 
nationals of one Member State being placed in a better position than nationals of 
the other Member States.”177 In ERT, the Court of Justice referred to a “system 
of equality of opportunity as between broadcasters.” 178  Advocate General 
Colomer in i-21 Germany emphasised the importance of equality of opportunities:  
 
103. During the transition from a stage characterised by a closed 
market governed by exclusive and special rights for certain 
companies to another stage characterised by efforts to establish a 
competitive market open to all, any curb on the incorporation of new 
operators consolidates the status quo and restricts competition, 
particularly if it involves discrimination.179 
 																																																								
174 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 98. 
175 Case 147/79, René Hochstrass, [1980] ECR 3005 at 7. 
176 Emphasis added. See Case C-18/88, GB-Inno, [1991] ECR I-5941 at 25; and Case C-462/09, 
Connect Austria, [2003] ECR I-5197 at 83; and Case C-202/88, Commission v. France, [1991] ECR I-
1223 at 51. 
177 Case 22/80, Boussac Saint-Frères SA, [1980] ECR 3427. 
178 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 
179 Emphasis added. See Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany GmbH, Opinion of 
Advocate General RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER,  at 103. 
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The concept of equality of opportunity is at the core of EU internal market 
law. 180  The functioning of the internal market depends on the equality of 
opportunities that exist in a specific sector.181  
 
The problem with social power is that the market as a form of organisation 
fosters social inequality. The forces of individualism and liberalism are dynamics 
that seek to promote solutions of an individual rather than collective nature. EU 
internal market law and the internal market promote and protect individual 
freedoms as a precondition for the market process to function.182 Inevitably, this 
creates a space where unequal power exists or emerges.183 Unequal social power 
places private actors in a position to affect the market in favour of their own 
interests. David Raphael captures this problem. He notes that:  
 
Men are unequal in their natural powers; freedom to use unequal 
powers results in unequal achievement, which in turn increases the 
inequality of power. The goal of equality requires some restriction 
of the freedom of those who have superior power. In such 
circumstances equality conflicts with freedom because freedom 
nourishes natural inequality.184 
 
The problem with inequality of power is that it is capable of affecting the 
construction and the functioning of the internal market. Private actors are 
capable of restricting the effectiveness of economic freedoms that are conferred 
to other private actors under EU internal market law. Giuliano Amato argues that 
the biggest challenge to a free market economy is to prevent private power from 
becoming a threat to the freedom of others.185 The point of departure is an 
inequality of power in various sectors of the internal market. For example, where 
one private party is in a position to steer the behaviour of another even though 
																																																								
180  Christopher Mccrudden and Sacha Prechal, 'The Concepts of Equality and Non-
Discrimination in Europe', European Commission DG Employment (2009) at 17-18. 
181 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 232. 
182 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 93-94. 
183 Ronald Coase on the nature of the firm and the possibility to organise to increase efficiency. 
See Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 16/4 (1937), 386. 
184 David D. Raphael, 'Justice and liberty',  at 57. 
185 Giuliano Amato, 'Antitrust and the bounds of power : the dilemma of liberal democracy in the history of 
the market' (Hart, Oxford, 1997),  at 3. 
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he has the freedom to act differently.186 We can call this market failure, but at 
least these inequalities of power distort the market because they are capable of 
steering the market process and affecting others in their rights to participate 
under equal terms.187 In terms of the functioning of the market process, positions 
that can affect other actors (i.e. conditions) are able to affect the market as a 
process and the outcomes it produces. The capacity to affect the market process 
and the outcomes it produces is described by Neil Komesar: 
 
Some involve parties so large that they can significantly affect or 
determine market outcomes. These parties operate with an 
awareness of their impact on aggregate results. They have some 
appreciable amount of monopolistic or oligopolistic power. …As 
with the political process, the extent to which the market process 
produces efficiency, justness, fairness, or any other goal is largely 
determined by the pattern of participation.188 
 
 
3.3.1 Factors affecting the power relationship 
The asymmetry of power between private actors is assessed always in relation to 
something. Asymmetry of power between actors may emerge in relation to 
personal, social, or structural factors. For example, in relation to data protection 
law the factor that triggers the asymmetry of power is structural. Mere access to 
personal information in a private relationship is considered to give rise to an 
asymmetry of power between private actors that triggers legal intervention when 
this is assessed in the context of the objective of data protection. This is because 
data subjects, in relation to the internal market, are not considered in the 
position vis-à-vis data controller to have adequate control over their personal 
data through normal market dynamics. Alternatively, in EU free movement law 
social and structural factors affect the power relationship between economic 
actors. Economic actors in a national environment are influenced by social 																																																								
186 See for example Erik Claes, Antony Duff, and Serge Gutwirth, 'Privacy and the criminal law' 
(Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2006),  at 73. 
187 Bronwen Morgan, 'The Economization of Politics', Social & Legal Studies, 12 (2003), 489 at 510. 
“The welfare states protective obligations of integrity towards vulnerable citizen were translated 
into the resolution of market failures in respect of information asymmetries that denied 
consumers the precondition of fully informed and autonomous choices necessary to participate in 
the market for migration advice.” 
188 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 99. 
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factors such as the attitudes and behaviours that are common in a national 
environment.  
 
The creation of the internal market adds a structural element, which has a direct 
impact on the assessment of the social power vis-à-vis migrant workers. The 
combination of these factors gives rise to an asymmetry of power in the internal 
market between economic actors occupying vested positions in a national 
context and those economic actors that want to move and compete in the market 
of another Member State. The personal factor may give rise to an asymmetry of 
power in relation to EU discrimination law. Age, gender, racial origin, or 
disability, are just some examples of personal factors that give rise to an 
asymmetry of power in a specific context. For example, in the labour market 
elderly people or disabled people are considered as economically weak 
workforces, which consequently may have weaker positions in terms of 
negotiation of labour contracts. The consequence is an asymmetry of power 
between employer and employee based on personal factors. Power in the 
constitutional structure of the internal market is seen as the ability to produce 
change.189 If there is no equality of opportunity, the market process is distorted. 
As mentioned before, “the extent to which the market process produces 
efficiency, justness, fairness, or any other goal is largely determined by the 
pattern of participation.”190 
 
Given that power is not innate, to acquire power private actors must be in 
possession or in control of a form of “power currency” i.e. they must be 
recognised as legal subjects within the internal market. Power is a contextual 
concept and accordingly, the meaning of power is determined within a certain 
legal context of EU internal market law.  
 
For example, in Data Protection law power relates to an idea of control over 
personal data and the competing interests involved.191 The mere possession of 
personal data bestows a relative strength data that the controller has over data 
subjects. Data subjects are dependent on the activities of the data controller that, 																																																								
189 John Hyman, 'Action, knowledge, and will',  at 26. 
190 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 99. 
191 Concerning the power over personal data see Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 6 and 7. Further see 
Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 32-33; and Case C-279/12 Fish Legal, 
Opinion of Advocate General CRUZ VILLALÓN,  at 110. 
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they comply with the right to privacy. 192  Alternatively, under the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, social power relates to a 
form of regulatory power capable of restricting free movement.193 In the Ferlini 
case, the Court of Justice was concerned with the power of an insurance 
company to determine the conditions of insurance for employees of international 
organisations. In relation to the capacity to affect the position of other actors, 
which was assessed under the general prohibition of discrimination, the Court of 
Justice argued that the:  
 
50. First paragraph of Article 6 also applies in cases where a group 
or organization such as the EHL exercises a certain power over 
individuals and is in a position to impose on them conditions, 
which adversely affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms194 
 
Wouters is another example concerning the relationship of power and context. In 
Wouters the power to regulate the profession of lawyers and notaries is 
considered as a power to affect others: 
 
210. The Court is therefore called upon to lay down criteria which 
will make it possible to strike a balance between, on the one hand, 
the need to allow the professions a certain power of self-regulation 
and, on the other, the need to avoid the risks of anti-competitive 
conduct inherent in the granting of such power195 
 
 
4. The specific function of the counter-culture  
The purpose of the counter-culture is to mitigate between the different interests 
and powers in a certain relationship between private actors. The counter-culture 
only emerges in situations where EU internal market law considers the 
relationship concerned to be one of competing (i.e. economic) interests. This is 																																																								
192 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 83.The Court of Justice held that 
data controller must “ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that 
that procession meets the requirements of Directive 95/46, in order that the guarantees laid down 
by the directive may have full effect”. Further see Case C-279/12 Fish Legal, Opinion of Advocate 
General CRUZ VILLALÓN,  at 110. 
193 Likewise cases as Bosman, Walrave and Koch or Viking and Laval relate to regulatory power.  
194 Case C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg, [2000] ECR I-08081 at 50. 
195 Case C-309/99 Wouters, Opinion of Advocate General LÉGER,  at 210. 
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the case where the private actors (as legal subjects) occupy the central positions 
in a defined legal context. For example, this is the case where the interests of the 
private actors correlate, i.e. worker and employer in the labour market. In this 
regard it is the Court of Justice that ultimately determines if an actor ‘belongs’ to 
a specific market. The problem encountered with the identification of those 
vested positions is that EU internal market law does not always articulate these 
positions.  
 
This is relatively clear in secondary law instruments because EU internal market 
law defines the key positions in a very specific legal context. Where the concept 
of responsibility emerges under primary law this is less clear because the treaty 
provisions do not specify what economic actors are supposed to come within the 
scope of valid economic interests. For example, the Court of Justice refused to 
recognise the concept of responsibility under the free movement of goods. This 
may be explained through a distinction made between the actual social power 
and the legal social power. The private actors in the cases of Commission v. France 
and Schmidberger had actual social power.196 This was reflected in the position 
they held, which enabled them to affect the free movement rights of others. The 
choice not to recognise this strength as a source of regulatory authority in the 
internal market, implies that those actors have no legal power within the meaning 
of the internal market. In the view of the Court of Justice, the private actors 
concerned did not represent an economic interest (i.e. social power) within the 
ideal organisation of the internal market for goods. 
 
 
4.1 An alternative form of governance 
Where there is a distortion to the functioning of the internal market caused by 
an asymmetry of power between private actors that are recognised as legal 
subjects in the context of the internal market EU internal market law intervenes 
to correct the imbalance. This may take place through the direct allocation of 
rights or obligations, but likewise through secondary law instruments providing a 
harmonised legal framework in which private actors may act. Since power 
operates relationally, the preferred solution is the ‘balancing’ of power between 
the parties to a specific relationship through legal means. Rights and obligations 																																																								
196 See Case C-265/95, Commission v. French Republic (Strawberries), [1997] ECR I-6959; and Case C-
112/00, Eugen Schmidberger v. Republic of Austria [2003] ECR I-5956.  
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are the primary legal instruments (i.e. tools) for restoring an environment of 
balanced power. This balanced power is intended to ensure a level playing field 
between the power on which basis economic activities and the engagement in 
economic transactions can take place under fair conditions.  
 
In this function, EU internal market law intends to provide an ‘efficient’ legal 
framework in which market dynamics produce policy objectives. The counter-
culture emerges as an “alternative to hierarchical regulation:” as a tool to deal 
with an asymmetry of power between private actors.197 The fact that the concept 
of responsibilization emerges as a tool for governance is found in the nature to 
control and steer the behaviour and the exercise of powers of private actors in 
specific contexts.198 However, the concept of responsibility must be understood 
as a more reflexive form of governing through law. 199  In this respect, the 
allocation of obligations is understood as a framework within which private 
actors remain free to make economic choices. The obligation intervenes in the 
exercise of economic freedoms only to the extent that is necessary to restore a 
balance of powers between the private actors concerned. This approach is 
characterised by a cautious and responsive development of control. The intention 
is to ensure a minimum level of protection of weaker parties that is needed for 
the market process to function and to not interfere with economic activities, i.e. 
to require other behaviour, which is not needed for the functioning of the market 
process.  
 
The allocation of rights and obligations in the counter-culture is intended to 
balance the powers in a relationship reflecting economic interests where the 
relationship is qualified by an asymmetry of power. In this way EU internal 
market law defines how the ‘power’ that private actors hold is to be exercised. As 
Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel emphasise: 
 
it is evident that if society is to be stable people must generally fit 
the role slots they are going to fill; actual behaviour must generally 
																																																								
197 Maria Weimer, 'Democratic legitimacy though European conflicts-law?: the case of EU administrative 
governance of GMOs',  at 96. 
198 COM(2001)428 final ; and Mario Monti, 'A New Strategy for the Single Market'. 
199 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 16-17. 
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conform to the expected patterns of behaviour defined by societies 
major social institutions.200 
 
This function of EU internal market law applies to any sector or discipline 
covered by EU internal market law. Only through the legal coordination of 
behaviour in every legal context can EU internal market law create stability in a 
policy environment in which private actors can engage without distortions caused 
by asymmetries of power. The allocation of obligations is a tool under EU 
internal market law to ensure that private actors in a specific legal context act in 
conformity within the roles they must occupy and the activities they must engage 
in within this context. 201  Unwittingly, private actors have an active role in 
attaining social objectives. This is reflected in the task to internalise obligations. 
The outward effects of economic activities that comply with the legal 
requirements under EU internal market law directly contribute to the objective 
of EU internal market law in this specific sector. In this way, economic activities 
exercised within legal limits produce social outcomes at the same time. This 
capacity to affect the market creates a form of hybridity.202 Private actors are 
exercising public functions or tasks. It is private actors that, due to their position 
in a specific context, hold a position that is bound up with a public function or 
task. It is public, because exercising the power affects the functioning of the 
internal market. EU internal market law is the source of this power. More 
importantly, EU internal market law is the source of this development, thus it is 
a phenomenon that relates to the construction and functioning of the internal 
market. 
 
 
4.2 The counter-culture as an EU legal phenomenon 
The counter-culture emerges where an asymmetry of power between private 
actors that occupy the centre of organisation of a certain context distorts the 
functioning of the internal market in this sector. This assumes that one side of 
the relationship is equipped with so much power that it is considered as another 
source of regulatory authority within the internal market and as such competes 																																																								
200 Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, 'Unorthodox Marxism',  at 107. 
201 Ibid., at 138. 
202 On the concept of hybridity see Kaarlo Tuori, 'Transnational Law', in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo 
Tuori, and Suvi Sankari (eds.), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking 
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with EU internal market law as an institutional alternative providing ‘better 
solutions’ in a certain environment. The responsibilization as legal subjects in 
terms of allocation of obligations relates to an assessment of power.203 Although the 
conflict is one between private actors, in fact the distortion stems from and 
relates to national law, either directly or indirectly. In other words, the conflict 
remains to be one between national and EU internal market law and the place 
where choices about the construction of the internal market should be made.204 
 
The distortions in the internal market caused by asymmetries of power between 
private actors relate to national law. Considering national law as a source of 
distortion one situation from which distortions can emerge are situations of 
private autonomy. National law grants a space for self-organisation. Private 
autonomy and private law principles guide the activities and set the limits of 
private power and private relationships. The asymmetry of power in this case 
emerges from the construction of the internal market. This is especially the case 
in relation to the objectives of economic and social integration of the internal 
market. In a purely national context, the asymmetry of power would be within 
the realm of private law and in principle free from state intervention. EU internal 
market law and the introduction of the internal market change this set-up. 
Private actors occupying vested positions in national law are now Europeanised 
and considered as occupying vested positions in the internal market context. EU 
internal market law adds a regulatory layer in which the roles and powers of 
private actors are assessed in light of the objectives of EU internal market law. 
The problem in terms of asymmetry of power emerges because positions of 
private power under national law are capable of distorting and restricting the 
objectives of EU internal market law in terms of economic and social integration. 
The problem is that national law, per se is deficient in dealing with transnational 
situations. Thus, even in the case where national law sets the limits on private 
activities (i.e. private autonomy) this is not so as to ensure compliance with EU 
internal market law and consequently the attainment of the objectives of EU 
internal market law in constructing the internal market.  
 
																																																								
203 As Rose puts it, “freedom has come to define the problem space within which contemporary 
rationalities of government compete”. Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political 
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A second source of distortion emerges where national law already controls and 
deals with asymmetries of power between private actors. This emerges in 
situations where national authorities protect common interests, fundamental 
rights, or specific groups in society. Intrinsic to this choice is that national law 
determined that private actors are subject to the national legal frameworks that 
guarantees protection. In terms of responsibility, it is important to note the 
difference in the source of distortion. Although the source of distortion to the 
construction and functioning of the internal market is national law, what gave 
rise to the emergence of national law in a specific context is an asymmetry of 
power between private actors. 
 
 
4.3 Responsibilization in terms of justice 
Besides the very practical purpose of ensuring the functioning of the internal 
market process, the counter-culture is also crucial for political and social reasons. 
In social terms, it contributes to the notion of social justice within the internal 
market. Social justice is understood in terms of fairness of the system and is a 
“primary virtue of a social system.”205 A legal system, which is unjust, starts to 
lose legitimacy for its existence and power.206 Fairness in the internal market 
means that every individual has an inviolable right to welfare and to generate 
welfare for himself, which even the welfare of society cannot override. In terms 
of EU internal market law this is the equality of opportunity in terms of 
participation.  
 
With the inherent social injustice in the market process in terms of natural 
inequality between private actors, it becomes evident why the shaping and 
regulating of policy-making environments is so important under EU internal 
market law. It ensures that equality of opportunities with regard to participation 
in the market process exists. It relates to the question of how EU internal market 
law can ensure the functioning of the internal market while at the same time not 
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shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 213. 
	 67 
negating “the very freedoms it ought to protect.”207 The quest for EU internal 
market law is “respecting the autonomy of certain ‘private’ zones, and shaping 
their conduct in ways conductive to particular conceptions of collective and 
individual well-being.”208 The constraining of private actors is always assessed 
with regard to the overall functioning of the internal market in this specific 
policy-making environment. This is where this new, 
 
more organic individualism combines the ideas of individual value 
and individual debt, and includes both a concept of freedom that is 
neither anarchistic nor self-centred and a reference to rationalism 
that does not demand the impossible, while at the same time it 
calls for the creative use of the imagination and initiative rather 
than conformity to a preordained pattern.209 
 
This is the reason why some private actors have to consider their position and 
their effects in a transnational context and not in the national context in which 
their power emerged. This is the place where counter-culture emerges. The 
constraining of some private actors is a trade-off in light of the benefit for the 
disadvantage actors. In terms of social justice, it improves the overall condition 
of fairness in the internal market. John Rawls refers to this compromise as the 
difference principle, which allows the restriction of freedom of some for the benefit 
of the least advantaged, stating that:  
 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) 
They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.210  
 
The assessment of the relative power in the relationship concerned triggers the 
legal responses under EU internal market law. The emergence of the counter-
culture and the allocation of legal constraints takes into account the power 
structure in the relationship between private economic actors in a defined 																																																								
207 Giuliano Amato, 'Antitrust and the bounds of power : the dilemma of liberal democracy in the history of 
the market',  at 3. 
208 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 48-49.rose p. 48-49 
209 Roland J. Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility',  at 18. 
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context. It reflects the idea of constraining some for the benefit of the weaker 
parties. The intention of EU internal market law is not to attain a level of equal 
power, but to balance power to a level that the market dynamics in terms of 
competition are can function efficiently. This is so when the private actors can 
engage based on the dynamics of supply and demand, which constitute the kernel 
of economic considerations and choices.  
 
 
5. Responsibility of private actors 
The counter-culture is a specific form of responsibilization of private actors in 
the EU legal culture. The responsibilization of these actors is a form of 
Europeanisation where EU internal market law instrumentalises private actors 
qua legal subjects within the internal market to attain its own policy objectives. 
The positions concerned and addressed under the counter-culture occupy a 
central position in the organisation of a certain context governed by EU internal 
market law. This is reflected in the underlying economic interest the actor 
represents and how EU internal market law considers the need for the interest to 
be represented in a specific context. For example, this includes the following: 
associations representing collective interests under free movement law, data 
controllers under data protection law, and employers in the labour market.  
 
The specific expression of the counter-culture, i.e. who is in charge for what, 
always relates to a certain legal context: EU free movement law, data protection 
law, consumer law, and food law. Each of which comes with an objective (i.e. 
economic integration, data protection, food safety, consumer protection) and its 
own power relationship at the centre of organisation in which choices shall be 
made. This is the relationship between the actors representing the correlating 
and competing interests. For example, in EU data protection law this is the 
interest to process personal data, i.e. vested in the data controller, which 
competes with the interest to have personal data protected, i.e. the interest of 
the data subject. 
 
The underlying problem is an asymmetry of power that emerges between the two 
correlating economic interests in a specific context. The consequence of this 
asymmetry of power is that one party of the relationship is in a position to affect 
the possibility of the other party to engage in economic activities and in the 
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internal market in general. This is a problem about legal positions in the context 
of the internal market where private actors hold power (i.e. in a defined context). 
Each sector of EU internal market law creates a different context in which power 
must be assessed and understood. Power is contextual and the characteristics of a 
specific situation inaugurate ‘power.’ The meaning of power relates to an 
organic/structural approach. For example, under free movement law collective 
organisation is considered to reflect a source of regulatory power within the 
meaning of free movement. In data protection law and labour law this is 
different. In these contexts the mere access to a ‘good’ or ‘information’ 
inaugurates power over the other party. This is reflected in a monopoly over 
personal information by the data controller under data protection law and the 
monopoly of the employer of access to labour in the labour market. The control 
over personal data or the access to labour automatically constitutes power that is 
capable of affecting other economic actors representing the correlating interests. 
This becomes clearer when considering the relationship between employer and 
worker in the labour market. While both actors and the positions they represent 
are vital for the internal market for labour to function they are not competitors. 
Rather their relationship reflects the natural relationship of economic (competing) 
interests in the labour market. It is their interests that determine supply and 
demand in the labour market. The asymmetry of power referred to emerges 
between employer and the worker because the employer has a monopoly on 
labour. Thus, any choices with regard to eligibility for employment have a 
regulatory effect on the employer and potentially restrict the opportunities of 
workers. 
 
The question that emerges in relation to the asymmetry of power is ‘how to deal 
with it?’ Due to the fact that an asymmetry of power affects the functioning of 
the internal market, EU internal market law provides the forum within which 
this distortion is to be dealt with. The approach adopted under EU internal 
market law is reflexive. It requires the private actor having relative strength over 
another actor to comply with legal requirements.  
 
Under the counter-culture the problem is not one of power only, but a problem 
where the power of private actors goes beyond the powers resulting from the 
normal rules applicable between individuals and where this may result in 
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distortions to the market process.211 The allocation of obligations is not intended 
to eliminate the asymmetry of power between the economic interests 
representing the supply and demand sides. On the contrary a certain asymmetry 
of power is needed to ensure the mutual stimulating effect of the supply and 
demand sides under market dynamics. Competition and diversity are the factors 
that ensure constant improvement in the market context. Thus, some diversity in 
terms of power between certain actors in the market process is required to 
ensure the functioning of the market process. In EU internal market law and 
especially in the counter-culture this level of power is confined by the allocation 
of obligations to private actors. The legal constraints function as a belt for the 
activities and the behaviour of specific actors in order to ensure that the 
environment for competition and diversity is maintained.  
 
Moreover, this power, which is held by actors in vested positions, is recognised as 
a ‘legal’ form of power in the constitutional structure of a specific market—it is a 
source of authority that may lawfully affect parts of the internal market. The 
outcome is that those private actors actively contribute to the attainment of 
policy objectives–they are transformed into ‘competent authorities’. This refers 
to the capacity to affect certain parts of the internal market. Private actors are 
recognised as another source of regulatory authority within the internal market. 
This is reflected in capacities to set up associations or in the power of self-
organisation as identified in Wouters, Bosman or Viking and Laval.  
 
Under the counter-culture the transformation of private actors into competent 
authorities is bound up with a change in identity. In this regard EU internal 
market law changes the attitude and behaviour of private actors when acting 
within the realm of the internal market. Part of this assemblage is the allocation 
of obligations, which is intended to control power and steer actors in a defined 
legal context. The allocation of the obligation must however, be considered in a 
wider context of organisation of powers and roles. While rights create a space for 
voluntary action, obligations require compliance and therefore a specific 
behaviour. This factor of being under a legal obligation to comply with certain 																																																								
211 For example in the Unfair Terms Directive Article 3(1) states that contractual terms that have 
not been individually negotiated are considered as unfair where they cause a significant imbalance 
between the rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. 
The notion of ‘balance’ and fairness is evident here. The counter-culture emerges as a tool to deal 
with this kind of imbalance. It is intended to restore an environment where the market process 
can function efficient. Council Directive 93/13/EEC,  Article 3(1). 
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requirements turns private actors into active agents in attaining certain 
objectives. This is reflected in the outward effect the allocation of obligations 
creates. This contribution to the attainment of social objectives emerges when 
the actors engage, in compliance with the applicable legal framework, in 
economic activities. The internalisation of the legal requirements and the 
compliance therewith prevents distortions to the internal market to occur. 
Through the ‘steered’ economic activities private actors produce social objectives 
in the long-term. Thus, the allocation of constraints goes hand in hand with a 
form of legal empowerment. The empowerment of these private actors is 
reflected in the recognition of the capacity to affect others (although subject to 
legal constraints) and in the capacity to justify the conduct in cases of non-
compliance. Private actors under the counter-culture may deviate from the legal 
requirements imposed by EU internal market law for overriding reasons.212 From 
this perspective, private actors under the counter-culture are treated similar to 
public authorities. Put differently, under the counter-culture EU internal market 
law delegates forms of public power to private actors that occupy legal positions 
in a defined context. 
 
In summary, the rights culture and the counter-culture both relate to positions 
and roles of private actors within the internal market. Under the counter-culture 
the new individualism is no longer only about the exercise of self-interests. 
Rather, this form of the new individualism comes with a requirement to give 
account to the interests of other actors within the internal market. 
 
 
5.1 Challenges relating to the responsibilization of private actors 
The core challenge for both the Court of Justice and the EU legislator as actors 
that impose constraints on private actors is to find the right balance to limit 
powers of certain private actors while at the same time maintaining an 
appropriate level of autonomy and individualism which is needed for the market 
process to function. Distortions caused by private autonomy are primarily 
considered under primary law and the treaty provisions on free movement and 																																																								
212 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177 at 38; and Case C-
415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 85-86; and Case C-438/05, International Transport 
Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] 
ECR I-10779 at 77; and Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade, [1999] ECR I-8453; and 
Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni, [2001] ECR I-2189. 
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the prohibition of discrimination. The key actor is the Court of Justice. The 
simple reason for this is that EU internal market law has no competence to 
harmonise national laws, the framework of which protects private autonomy and 
private powers in private relationships.  
 
The biggest challenge under primary law for the Court of Justice is to identify 
positions of legal power. While this is a relatively easy task when it concerns 
public authorities, it is difficult when it concerns private actors. While many 
authors argue that treaty provisions apply to public authorities only, the Court of 
Justice developed criteria on which basis the distinction is made between private 
actors that are bound and those that are not. For example, under free movement 
law the Court of Justice held that collective entities come within the scope of the 
free movement provisions.213 In this respect, the Court of Justice recognises that 
the actors have characteristics and power under national law which, when 
exercised in areas governed by EU internal market law is functionally equivalent 
to ‘public power’ that triggers the application of EU free movement law. The 
functional approach developed by the Court recognises that public authorities 
are not the only sources of regulatory power in the territories of Member States. 
There is no such thing as a single internal market. Rather the approach adopted 
under primary law emphasises the existence of multiple markets being existent in 
national context each of which comes with its own organisation, positions and 
relationships. These submarkets are not necessarily dominated or regulated upon 
by public organisations, but by forms of self-organisation or no organisation at all. 
The personal scope of EU primary law is assessed in relation to each of these 
markets and accordingly organises and structures the social powers in these 
national submarkets if needed.  
 
In this capacity, the concept of responsibility fills a gap between national law and 
EU internal market law. National law is per se deficient in dealing with 
transnational situations and situations of exclusion of outsiders. In this context 
the Court of Justice Europeanises positions and social powers framed in national 
law and puts the exercise of social power under the control of EU free movement 
law and discrimination law. The concept of responsibility in EU free movement 																																																								
213 To this effect see Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist 
internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 
1405; and Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; and Case C-438/05, International Transport 
Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] 
ECR I-10779. 
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law and discrimination law is used to coordinate positions of social power of 
private actors between different Member States in order to ensure economic and 
social integration of the internal market. This is substantially different from the 
second context in which responsibility emerges.  
 
In the context of harmonisation a key feature is that EU internal market law 
imposes a new institutional organisation of powers and roles. Harmonisation 
requires having as its genuine objective the improvement “of the conditions for 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market”.214 Harmonisation is a 
choice towards an alternative—more effective—regulatory framework that 
replaces national laws. The new organisation reduces the risk of distortion caused 
by dispersed forms of organisation and prefers the coordination of shared 
responsibilities through the EU legal framework. The “multiparty involvement is 
understood as a way of creating norms” in an allocative efficient manner.215 The 
concept of responsibility of private actors emerges in the context of 
reorganisation. Thus, the allocative choice in terms of identifying vested 
positions is made in the drafting process. 
 
The end product is that private actors are placed in a framework of shared 
responsibilities that eventually leads to attaining specific objectives within the 
internal market more efficiently. An inherent idea in these systems is that the 
organisation will ensure durability through the legal framework: it manifests roles 
and positions and the functions actors have in this specific context. In this 
regard, the underlying idea is that the ‘new organisation’ is keen to adapt to 
changes in the environment. Responsibilization under harmonised law 
implements an objective into a power relationship that did not previously exist. 
For example, in simple terms data protection is attained through the power 
relationship of data controller and data subject as defined by EU data protection 
law. The attainment of data protection through the engagement of the data 
controller and the data subject is not natural but a choice of the EU legislator 
considering the attainment of data protection through this form of ‘private 
organisation’ as more efficient than regulation at Member State level. 
 																																																								
214 To this effect see Case C-376/98, Tobacco Advertising, [2000] ECR I-8419 at 84. 
215 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought',  at 374. 
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The different functions of the different concepts of responsibility— emerging in 
case-law and in secondary law originates from the different actors involved, which 
occupy different positions structurally. The Court of Justice is equipped with 
powers and in the EU legal and institutional framework it is the key arbitrator in 
terms of specific conflicts, i.e. where uncertainties emerge about the application 
and scope of EU internal market law. The preliminary ruling procedure is central 
to this function where the Court of Justice is confronted with specific conflicts 
and problems relating to the effectiveness of EU internal market law. The 
problem with the Court of Justice relates to the fact that it is required to 
determine the scope of EU internal market law not only in this specific case, but 
it must also take into account the wider effects of its decisions. Thus, a case has 
always a narrow and a wide application. It solves the case presented before the 
judges and at the same time must take into account any eventual and potential 
structural problems in the regulation of the internal market. This problem to 
cover up eventual structural deficits in the decision-making is reflected, for 
example, in the wide scope of the obligations the Court of Justice applied to 
private actors under primary law, potentially keeping the door open to review 
similar situations. This is the case where conflicts emerge between rights EU 
internal market law confers on private actors and forms of distortion, for 
example. The source of distortion is irrelevant in the first place. What triggers a 
review under the Court of Justice is a distortion of EU internal market law.  
 
This situation is different with the EU legislator and the function of the concept 
of responsibility under secondary law instruments. The EU legislator is placed 
structurally in a position to correct on a larger scale structural deficits or 
distortions. The EU legislator is empowered to regulate upon and structure the 
internal market through specific policies in order to improve the efficiency of the 
market process. Harmonisation is addressed to Member States and public 
authorities as regulators. Thus, the relationship concerned is fundamentally 
different than the relationship considered before the Court of Justice. The EU 
legislator is intended to correct market failures and distortions through 
regulatory means such as harmonisation. The objective is to provide “market 
participants and citizens with a legal environment in which production, trade, 
consumption, and all other sorts of activities are made secure and effective.”216 
Harmonised law,  																																																								
216 Loic Azoulai, 'The Complex Weave of Harmonisation',  at 609. 
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is not supposed to directly involve or target private actors and 
relations. Market participants and citizens are supposed to enjoy 
the benefits of the internal market and to trust the effective 
collaboration of EU and national regulatory authorities.217 
 
Being in charge for something assumes that the actor concerned actually has the 
capacity to act according to his duties, i.e. the capacity to act accordingly, the 
capacity of understanding, and the power to carry out his duties. It does not, 
however, require willingness, as this is something relating to voluntariness. Being 
in charge requires power to fulfil the tasks or awaited requirements. Choices 
about allocation must take into account the capacities to comply with legal 
requirements and it must assess the position actors have in a socio-economic 
context. What are the interests involved? What are the powers an actor holds? 
What are the factors, in a specific context, that inaugurate power? Are there 
structural deficits and how can this be dealt with most efficiently? 
 
Another issue developing in relation to the emergence of the counter-culture 
relates to the legal context and legal certainty. Under harmonisation measures, 
the responsibility of private actors is clearly defined. Specific provisions address 
obligations and elaborate on eventual exceptions to the rule. Under the approach 
developed by the Court of Justice, the responsibility is reflected in the allocation 
of an obligation only under the treaty. This affects legal certainty especially with 
regard to exceptions and issues of liability. Are private actors treated like public 
actors in this context? To what extent does the Court of Justice allow for 
deviations in terms of justification and liability? 
 
 
6. Remarks 
Within the internal market, the role of some private actors has been significantly 
shaped by EU internal market law and the on-going process on integration 
intended to construct and maintain the functioning of the internal market. 
Choices that were formerly made in national environments by Member States are 
now transferred to the internal market. Political power is dispersed and shared 
among multiple actors acting within a specific policy-making environment. 																																																								
217 Ibid. 
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While private actors occupy a central position in this new environment, they are 
imbedded in an institutional framework that shapes the environment in which 
private actors are to engage and compete. It is in this regulatory function of the 
environment in which private actors are to compete that the counter-culture 
emerges. Private actors are recognised as competent authorities in the specific 
context and recognised as actors that may affect the policy-making environment 
they are acting in. The consequence of which is that private actors are confined 
by legal requirements.  
 
In the EU legal culture, rights and obligations as legal instruments have a dual 
function. First they function as a tool to identify private actors qua legal subjects 
to occupy certain positions in the social organisation that is governed by EU 
internal market law. The second function relates to the overall objective EU 
internal market law wants to attain in this particular area of law. Rights and 
obligations thus function as instruments to ‘steer’ the behaviour in terms of 
structuring the power relationship between the actors recognised by EU internal 
market law. In this way the counter-culture responds to a specific problem in the 
context of the internal market: how to deal with situations of private power in 
terms of regulatory authority, which is likely to affect the functioning of the 
internal market. Rights empower actors and encourage a certain activity being 
legally protected. Obligations have the opposite result, constraining freedom of 
action and limiting powers of certain actors. In this regard, rights and obligations 
that are allocated under EU internal market law to certain private actors always 
relate to the position and function EU institutions ‘intend’ for those actors to be 
in their interpretation of EU internal market law and the attainment of certain 
policy objectives.   
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Responsibility of Private Actors in EU Free 
Movement Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The principle of free movement holds a central position in the construction of 
the internal market. Free movement is the means through which the internal 
market is constructed. With regard to the construction of the internal market, 
free movement law constitutes the basic principles for the economic integration 
and unification of national markets.218 This implies “that to the free movement of 
goods within the customs union219 is added the free movement of the factors of 
production, i.e. labour, capital and enterprise.”220  
 
With the free movement approach, EU internal market law responds to the very 
structure of the internal market, which is a market based on highly regulated 
national markets. Free movement law is the meta-script to attain unity and the 
fusion of national markets.221 The abolition and elimination of restrictions and 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers are the 
key objectives of the activities of the Community and the EU institutions. 222 
This is why EU internal market law empowers and protects actors that want to 																																																								
218 Dennis Swann, 'The economics of the Common Market',  at 11-12. 
219 For example see Henri Spaak, 'The Brussels Report on The General Common Market (Spaak 
Report)', Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration of June 26 1956 (1956). 
220 Dennis Swann, 'The economics of the Common Market',  at 11-12; and Gareth Davies, 'The Process 
and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare States', Jean Monnet Working Paper, 02/06 
(2006) at 12. 
221 Henri Spaak, 'The Brussels Report on The General Common Market (Spaak Report)',  at 7 and 
14; and Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  
at. 
222 Article 3 TEU and further see Joseph H. H. Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe'; and Miguel 
Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution'. 
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move to another market and compete there under market conditions—fair 
competition and non-discrimination. 223  Julio Baquero Cruz emphasises the 
importance of free movement stating that, “free movement and competition 
constitute the kernel of economic constitutional law.”224  
 
The essential purpose of the Treaty is to provide a plan “to unite national 
markets into a single market.”225 The internal market can only function if free 
movement and the opening up of national markets are ensured. 226  As a 
consequence of free movement, national markets are merged into a internal 
market. For this reason the principle of free movement is designed to deal with 
the deficiency that is inherent in these highly regulated national markets. The 
objective of which is to create a transnational environment where all economic 
actors having an interest can “operate under equal competitive conditions, and 
across which goods, persons and services could be exchanged unhindered.”227 This 
takes into account the interests of competitors outside the scope of the national 
market. Free movement is intended to ensure the transition of actors from one 
national market to another national market. Only under conditions of free 
movement, fair competition and non-discrimination will the market function as a 
tool to “promote a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous 
and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it”.228  
 																																																								
223 Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, [1974] ECR 153 at 11; and Case C-237/94, O'Flynn v. 
Adjudication Officer, [1996]  ECR I-2617 at 17; and Michael Dougan, 'Minimum Harmonization and 
the Internal Market',  at 860. 
224 Julio Baquero Cruz, 'Between competition and free movement : the economic constitutional law of the 
European Community',  at 86. This is why the Court of Justice commonly refers to the “four 
freedoms”: the free movement of goods, workers, establishment and the provision of services and 
capital as “mandatory”, “fundamental freedoms” or “fundamental objectives” Free movement is 
essential in creating “an area without internal frontiers”. Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. 
Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion 
Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 16-17. Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two Competitions: An 
enquiry into the contradictions of free movement law', Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 
13 (2010-2011), 365 at 369-370. Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 
[2000] ECR I-4139 at 33-35. 
225 Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] ECR 489 at 12. 
226 For example see Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'Europe and the Consitution: what if this is as good as it 
gets?'. 
227 Michael Dougan, 'Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market',  at 860. 
228 Here reference is made to Article 2 EEC which is using a different terminology than Article 3 
TEU presently. The objectives set out are not something that is attained at a certain point of 
time, but it is a constant process striving for more efficiency in attaining its objectives. And the 
range of Community objectives as widened significantly until today. 
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The picture presented is a transnational market economy where, “economic 
decisions should not be distorted by regulatory considerations.” 229  The 
underlying paradigm of economic integration reflects an idea of regulatory 
competition. The principle of free movement and free movement law addresses 
situations of regulatory power that affect the transition from one national market to 
another national market. 230  This may be the transition of goods lawfully 
produced in another Member State or the transition of workers to the labour 
market in another Member State. This is regulatory power imbedded in a 
national context or environment. Economic integration is attained through 
negative integration, which is the control of regulatory power in national 
contexts. Gareth Davies describes this well, arguing that:  
 
free movement law only intervenes where a national measure is restricting 
market access for foreign economic actors. Such an effect inevitably – a few 
extreme and atypical situations apart – benefits (other) market incumbents 
who are protected from competition. A measure that reduces market 
access therefore always has a protectionist effect. The trigger for 
the application of the Treaty articles is the existence of this 
inequality or market distortion.231 
 
There is no such thing as a single national market, but there are different markets 
within a national context, e.g. markets for goods, labour, and services. Even 
within these different meta-markets there are submarkets, e.g. for food, 																																																								
229 Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two Competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free movement 
law',  at 371. 
230 For this see Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; and Case 120/78, Rewe-
Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649; and Case 178/84, 
Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227; and Case 75/63, Hoekstra, [1964] 
ECR 177; and Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, [1982] ECR 1035. This is something 
literature refers to as a free movement test: Jukka Snell, 'Private Parties and the Free Movement of 
Goods and Services', in Mads Andenas and Wulf-Henning Roth (eds.), Services and Free Movement in 
EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002); and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of 
Justice and the European Economic Constitution'. Moreover, the free movement provisions have been 
expanded to function as a sword against any obstacle to the free movement “even if it applies 
without regard to the nationality” of the actor concerned so called distinctively measures or 
technical barriers to trade. Case C-10/90, Maria Masgio, [1991] ECR I-1119 at 18-19; and Case C-
415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 96 and 102-104; and Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two 
Competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free movement law',  at 381-382.  
231 Emphasis added. See Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of 
Contract',  at 810-811. Also see: Gareth Davies, 'The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of 
European Welfare States',  at 13; and Loic Azoulai, 'The force and forms of European Legal Integration'; 
and Daniela Caruso, 'The Missing View of the Cathedral:  The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration', European Law Journal, 3/1 (1997), 3; and Pierre Pescatore, 'The Law of Integration'; and 
William Wallace and Royal Institute of International Affairs., 'The Dynamics of European 
integration'. 
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television products, professional football players, lawyers, or posting of 
construction workers. Each of these come with their own organisations and 
forms of regulation. Some may be subject to ‘public’ regulation in the sense that 
the Member State structures the conditions of competition, while other 
submarkets may be subject to forms of self-organisation or no organisation of 
competition at all.  
 
This is regulatory power imbedded in some national context or environment. 
While free movement law seeks to achieve the unity of the internal market, free 
movement law “only intervenes where a national measure is restricting market 
access for foreign economic actors.” This is characterised by some situations 
where the exercise of regulatory power “benefits (other) market incumbents the 
result of which is that these actors are protected from competition.”232  
 
 
1. EU Free movement law in the internal market 
Free movement law emerged from the treaty provisions implementing the 
principle of free movement for the four core markets of the internal market, i.e. 
the internal markets for goods, workers, services, and capital. We must draw a 
line, however, between the objective purpose of the concept of free movement in 
the process of economic integration, the function as a meta-script and the direct 
application as subjective rights to practical cases, as a consequence of the direct 
effect doctrine.  
 
These principles turned into a practical and subjective free movement law—a 
form of applied constitutional law—through the doctrine of direct effect set out 
in the Court of Justice’s decision in van Gend en Loos.233 The facts and the legal 
reasoning of the Court of Justice are well known and will not be discussed here. 
What is of relevance is that the decision to turn the principles set out in the 
treaties into subjective rights turned the objective order of values and principles 
into practical law that is applicable in virtually any relationship to which the 
principle of free movement applies. In line with direct effect jurisprudence, free 
movement law emerged into a doctrine of subjective EU internal market law on 																																																								
232 For both quotations in this paragraph see Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal 
Effect, and Freedom of Contract',  at 810-811. 
233 Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12. 
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which private actors can rely before national courts and which have a radiating 
effect towards any restriction and distortion–a universal character. The creation 
of subjective (i.e. fundamental) rights, paired with judicial review ensures that all 
law, including private, becomes subject to judicial scrutiny and to the test of 
incompatibility with the principles of free movement and undistorted 
competition within the internal market.234 The trigger for the application of free 
movement law under the treaties is this inequality of power that affects 
competition in the market or leads to a market distortion. Put differently, any 
law that might be in conflict with the rights created under the Treaty “becomes 
applied constitutional law and therefore potentially public” and subject to review 
by the Court of Justice.235  
 
What is decisive for our purpose is that the doctrine of direct effect placed the 
Court of Justice “in a pivotal position to influence the pace and direction of legal 
integration on matters of economic and social regulation.”236 The consequence of 
which is an unprecedented Court-led economic integration of the internal 
market. The technique used by the Court of Justice has been,  
 
to bring an ever wider body of rules and regulation under the scope 
of its review, while at the same time expanding, through its case 
law the range of potential excuses or justification which member 
states can put forward in defence of the rules which are under 
attack.237 
 
For this review, the Court of Justice developed broad-effects based tests, which 
were, “used to determine when regulatory laws could be deemed to interfere with 
the circulation of economic resources within the internal market.” 238 																																																								
234 Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, 'Law as ouroboros',  at 129; and Simon Deakin, 'Regulatory 
Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law', ESRC Centre for Business Research 
Working Paper, University of Cambridge No. 163 (2000), 1; and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the 
court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution',  at 7. 
235 Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, 'Law as ouroboros',  at 129.“Public because the treaties are 
considered as public law“ 
236 Simon Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law',  at 14. 
237 Ibid., at 12-13. Broad obligations provide legal uncertainty, because they cover a potential wider 
scope of cases and characteristics, which may come under judicial review. Within this uncertainty 
of “EU legal requirements” lies shift of power to initiate a review with the Court of Justice. 
238 Ibid., at 13; and Barend Van Leeuwen, 'Private Regulation and Public Responsibility in the Internal 
Market'.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the fact that the Court of Justice 
recognised the possibility for regulatory activities in specific sectors to exist. This 
regulatory power, however, must be exercised in a way compatible with the 
Treaty. This is possible because the Court of Justice recognised the possibility to 
justify the incompatibility of regulatory rules with internal market requirements. 
In this realm, the measure may be upheld if it seeks to “achieve a legitimate aim 
in this context and the measure is proportionate to the aim being pursued.”239 
This possibility to avail is reflected in the power to justify regulatory measures on 
the basis of public interests, public policies, or other representative interests. 
 
Although the Court of Justice in the framework of free movement law 
empowered private actors in the internal market, there is hardly any area of EU 
internal market law where the role of private actors has been more contested 
than in the area of free movement law.240 In particular, this is because the Court 
of Justice, with the decision in Walrave and Koch, expanded the legal obligations 
emerging from the treaties to private actors directly. The consequence being that 
the treaties provide the basis for legal obligations and constraints applied to the 
autonomy of private actors in the internal market.241 Private actors are deprived 
of the freedoms guaranteed under national law and the principle of private 
autonomy through the Court-led development of free movement law.  
 
If one departs from a public law perspective arguing that obligations that emerge 
from the treaties are only applicable to public entities because the treaties 
constitute public law this move of the Court of Justice may give rise to criticism. 
The problem in free movement law is that: 
 
we are faced with a gap in the circle of addressees of the relevant 
norm. The usual solutions given by the Court have opted for an 																																																								
239 Simon Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law',  at 14-15. 
240 For a list of commentaries see Nuno Ferreira, Joanna Krzeminska-Vamvaka, and Teresa 
Russo, 'The horizontal effect of fundamental rights and freedoms in European Union Law',  at; and Mirjam 
De Mol, 'The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-
Discrimination', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 18/1-2 (2011), 109-135; and 
Christoph Krenn, 'A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect "Jigsaw": Horizontal Direct Effect and the 
Free Movement of Goods', Common Market Law Review, 49/1 (2012), 177-216; and Eleanor 
Sharpston, 'The Shock Troops Arrive in Force: Horizontal Direct Effect of a Treaty Provision and 
Temporal Limitation of Judgments Join the Armoury of EC Law', in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic 
Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2010); and Bruno De Witte, 'The 
crumbling public/private divide: horizontality in European anti-discrimination law'. 
241 Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, Van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern, [1984] ECR 1797 at 11-12. 
	 83 
objective interpretation of the norms, in which the nature of the 
activity becomes decisive, irrespective of the actor. While this 
solution has the advantage of enhancing the effectiveness of 
Community law and bridging the gap in hand, it also blurs the line 
between the respective personal scopes of free movement law.242 
 
Free movement law relates to the cross-border dimension of the internal market. 
The legal framework constructed by EU free movement law provides legal 
solutions for distortions or restrictions of cross-border economic activities. In 
other words, where the transition of one national market to the other is affected, 
restricted or distorted, EU free movement law is triggered. Free movement law 
has a clear dimension and sphere of application. 
 
 
1.1 Expansion of free movement law 
The counter-culture is reflected in free movement law by the expansion of the 
‘public obligations’ emerging from the treaties to ‘private’ actors. In this regard, 
the distortion to the free movement principle emerges in a private relationship. 
Clearly, the problem addressed by the counter-culture in the context of EU free 
movement law is situations where private actors are in a position to affect the 
transition of other private actors from one Member State market to another 
Member State market. This power to distort the transition in cross-border 
situations gave rise to a continual expansion of obligations under primary law to 
private actors raising many legal and practical issues.  
 
Starting with Walrave and Koch, the Court of Justice expanded the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality to organisations that regulate “in a 
collective manner gainful employment and the provision of services.”243 This was 
justified by the famous reasoning of the Court of Justice that referred to the 
fundamental objectives of the Community having the aim to abolish obstacles to 
freedom of movement of persons, services, and capital. The fundamental 
objectives,  
 																																																								
242 Julio Baquero Cruz, 'Between competition and free movement : the economic constitutional law of the 
European Community',  at 85. 
243 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 17. 
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would be compromised if the abolition of barriers of national 
origin could be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the exercise 
of their legal autonomy by associations or organizations which do 
not come under public law.244 
 
In order to create an area without internal frontiers the Court of Justice focussed 
on the neutralisation of obstacles. This functional approach permeates 
throughout the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice when determining if private 
actors come within the scope of free movement law or not. For example, in 
Bosman, the Court of Justice clarified that collective actors are obliged to not 
impair free movement law. The Court of Justice held that the transfer rules for 
professional football players “constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for 
workers prohibited in principle by Article 48 of the Treaty.”245 Put differently, 
any obstacle that affects the free movement of workers emerging from rules 
adopted by collective bodies, associations or organisations, is subject to scrutiny 
under free movement law.  
 
Viking246 and Laval247 are cases that relate to the activities of trade unions. This is 
interesting because their activities differ from the entities addressed in Walrave 
and Koch and Bosman where the regulatory power was evident. Trade unions 
represent collective interests, and organisation of workers on the basis of 
collective interests is understood as a means to enhance their power in the labour 
market. The objective is to conclude an agreement, which is meant to regulate the 
work of employees collectively with employers or representatives of employers. This 
regulatory power of trade unions is recognised by the Court of Justice:  
 
64 It must be added that, contrary to the claims, in particular, of 																																																								
244 Ibid., at 18. We find a similar reasoning and justifications to expand the obligations to private 
actors for example in Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. 
FRBSB [2000]ECR I-0268; and Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; and Case C-325/08, 
Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177; and Case C-438/05, International 
Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 
[2007] ECR I-10779; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767. 
245 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 104. 
246 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779. 
247  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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ITF, it does not follow from the case-law of the Court referred to 
in paragraph 57 of the present judgment that that interpretation 
applies only to quasi-public organisations or to associations 
exercising a regulatory task and having quasi-legislative powers. 
 
65 There is no indication in that case law that could validly support 
the view that it applies only to associations or to organisations 
exercising a regulatory task or having quasi-legislative powers. 
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, in exercising their 
autonomous power, pursuant to their trade union rights, to 
negotiate with employers or professional organisations the 
conditions of employment and pay of workers, trade unions 
participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate 
paid work collectively.248 
 
While the Court of Justice has expanded legal obligations to private regulatory 
power under the free movement of workers and the free movement of services, 
this did not occur under the free movement of goods. Commission v. France249 and 
Schmidberger250 involved collective activities of private groups that distorted the free 
movement of goods. The Court of Justice did not expand the obligation flowing 
from the free movement of goods to these actors.  
 
The most contested expansion of legal obligations to private actors is found with 
regard to employers under the free movement of workers provision. Angonese 
concerned the employment application of Roman Angonese for a position at the 
Cassa di Risparmio, a bank in the region of Bolzano. His application was refused 
on the basis that he was not in possession of a specific certificate on bilingualism 
although he was fluent in the languages (Italian and German) that were the 
required for the post.251 The Court of Justice declared that the requirement to be 
in possession of the specific certificate on bilingualism was in violation of EU 
internal market law due to its discriminatory character against those applicants 
that were not in a position to obtain the certificate, which was only granted in 																																																								
248 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 60 and 64-65. 
249 Case C-265/95, Commission v. French Republic (Strawberries), [1997] ECR I-6959. 
250 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger v. Republic of Austria [2003] ECR I-5956  
251 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139 at 5. 
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the region of Bolzano.252 The Court of Justice held that:  
 
40. … the obligation to obtain the requisite Certificate puts 
nationals of other Member States at a disadvantage by comparison 
with residents of the province.253 
 
Angonese is a striking case because the Court of Justice expanded the obligation 
to not discriminate on grounds of nationality emerging from the Treaty 
provision, in the context of the freedom of movement of workers, to the 
employer.254 As a consequence of this expansion, the notion of regulatory power 
as addressed under EU free movement law needs some reconsideration.255 This 
development assumes that regulatory power is not defined in a ‘national’ context, 
but in a situational functional context. However, this comes with different 
problems: What is public? What is private? Why are some actors addressed 
directly and others not?  
 
 
1.2 Conceptual uncertainty 
The problem with the expansion of the treaty provisions to directly bind private 
actors is the uncertainty of the personal scope of the treaty provisions on free 
movement. The issue to which the concept of responsibility of private actors 
relates in relation to EU free movement law is one of a horizontal effect on the 
treaty provisions. The problem is one of social roles and positions and, in terms 
of EU free movement law, the legal requirements that are attached to these 
positions. The treaty provisions on free movement do not define personal scopes. 																																																								
252 Ibid., at 35. 
253 See ibid., at 40. 
254 Case C-317/14, Commission v. Belgium, of 5 February 2015 (not yet reported) at 19 and 27-31.  
255 Many scholars aimed at addressing this phenomenon through the concept of horizontal effect. 
The problem with the concept of horizontal effect is that it only addresses and tries to explain 
the consequences of the expansion of the obligations emerging from the treaty provisions. This is 
the direct application of the treaty to private (horizontal) relationships. For example see: Case 
36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405. Case 13/76, Gaetano 
Dona v Mario Mantero, [1976] ECR 1333 at 6; and Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631. 
Marek Safjan and Przemyslaw Miklaszewicz, 'Horizontal Effect of the General Principles of EU Law in 
the Sphere of Private Law', European Review of Private Law, 18/3 (2010), 475-486 at 477; and Eric 
Engle, 'Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights', Hanse Law Review, 5/2 (2009), 165-173 at 165; and 
Robert Alexy, 'A Theory of Constitutional Rights' (Oxford: OUP 2010),  at 356; and Nuno Ferreira, 
Joanna Krzeminska-Vamvaka, and Teresa Russo, 'The horizontal effect of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in European Union Law',  at 8; and Arthur Hartkamp, 'The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private 
Law: On Direct and Indirect Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law',  at 529 and 546. 
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Rather, the Court of Justice on a case-to-case basis determines the scope of the 
treaty provisions for which methodological and dogmatic considerations are 
missing.  
 
In reviewing the counter-culture as it emerged in the context of EU free 
movement law this section intends to shed light on the Court of Justice’s 
motivation in expanding the scope of the treaty provisions to private actors. The 
argument put forward is simple; the expansion of obligations to private actors is 
not arbitrary but reflects a vision on how a specific internal market for goods, 
labour, services, or capital is organised in terms of economic interests and 
powers, i.e. regulatory authority. The consequence of which is that the Court of 
Justice recognises forms of private regulatory power where these actors occupy 
vested positions in a specific market (e.g. a submarket to the labour market) that 
is organised in a national context.  
 
 
2. The effective attainment of economic integration under EU internal 
market law 
EU free movement was set up with a clear objective: the unification of national 
markets. In functional terms, free movement law is a legal instrument to ensure 
economic integration. This relates to the specific nature of the internal market 
and the problem of national markets that are considered as closed and internally 
organised systems. The objective of EU internal market law is to economically 
integrate different national markets being subject to different regulatory forces. 
Free movement provisions are, in their specific context of application, a means to 
counter the nationalistic and protectionist regulatory measures that affect the 
unification of the market and accordingly the equality of opportunities of private 
actors. This is why free movement law addresses situations of regulatory power 
(effective power vis-à-vis other actors in the context of free movement activities) 
that affect the transition of one market to another. The classic form of regulatory 
power in a national environment is the state and its organs.256 There is no debate about 
the fact that Member States are constrained in their regulatory powers by free 
																																																								
256 Case C-447/09, Reinhard Prigge, [2011] ECR I-8003 at 27. Also consider the views expressed in 
Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private Distinction'; and Alf Ross, 'On the Concepts 
"State" and "State Organs" in Constitutional Law', Scandinavian Studies in Law 113, 5 (1961), 113. 
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movement law. Ever since the decision in van Gend en Loos,257 free movement law 
has been applied to Member States activities so as to prevent an arbitrary 
partitioning of the internal market. In this regard free movement law did not 
replace or amend national law, but required that free movement be ensured.258 
 
The problem with free movement law as it emerged under the treaties is that it 
does not specify ‘positions’ or class of actors, which are considered to hold 
regulatory power in the context of EU free movement law. Put differently, it can 
be asked, ‘when do private actors hold regulatory powers within the meaning of 
free movement law?’ 
 
The expansion of obligations is a legal consequence of actors that are recognised 
as occupying vested positions within the framework of EU internal market law. 
In other words, private actors are other sources of authority (i.e. forms of 
governance) within a certain market context that is governed by EU free 
movement law. In this regard they relate to and compete with EU internal 
market law as systems of governance for a specific sector/part of the internal 
market. The legal constraints imposed on these actors determine the relationship 
they have with EU internal market law and the position they have in the internal 
market. They are recognised as legal subjects within a certain context and are 
legally empowered to affect others, unless this distorts the rights of others. 
Nevertheless, deviation from the legal requirements imposed by EU free 
movement law may be justified for overriding reasons. The underlying objective 
of the allocation of obligations to these actors is to ensure that economic 
integration is not distorted. 
 
Regulatory power within the meaning of free movement law relates to the power 
to hinder the transition from one Member State market to another. The test 
adopted by the Court of Justice is effects-based and of a functional nature. The 																																																								
257 See Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12. “The Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become 
part of their legal heritage.” 
258 Simon Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law',  at 14. 
“Where the Court rules that a particular body of regulation is contrary to the principle of free 
movement it limits the autonomy of the member States and thereby restricted the scope for 
differentiation and experimentation at state level.” 
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focus of the Court of Justice is on the effects that activities by private actors have 
on the objective of economic integration in relation to a specific market context 
(i.e. does it have an effect on transition). The public or private nature of actors is 
irrelevant for the scope of application of the treaty provisions. Thus, the focus is 
on relative strength between competing economic interests. As a tool to ensure 
an effective functioning of the internal market in terms of economic integration, 
the obligation is allocated to positions of power under national law that are 
capable of hindering the transition of other actors from one market to another. 
This addresses an asymmetry of power between an economic actor occupying a 
position of power under national law and an economic actor that wants to have 
access to a specific national market. 
 
Similarly, the Court of Justice’s approach reflects a view or a philosophy about 
the internal market and the effective integration thereof. National markets are 
far from being closed systems. Within Member States, different forms of 
regulatory power have emerged. For example, parts of the economy are regulated 
through laws and regulations adopted by public authorities. However, other parts 
are regulated free from public intervention. This emerged as a consequence of 
the increasing demand for state-free interaction between private actors to engage 
in economic activities.259 Private law and private autonomy are the key concepts 
in relation to this form of self-organisation of the economy. The freedom to 
associate and the freedom of contract are concepts from which regulatory power 
emerges in a market context, they are not public in nature.260 In the labour 
market especially, private regulatory activities negotiated between social partners 
are an important technique to structure the labour markets, wages, and 
employment-related issues.261 The question is ‘to what extent do these forms of 
private regulatory power come within the scope of EU internal market law?’  
 
The Court of Justice acknowledges this diversity and fragmentation in terms of 
potential private regulatory power that emerged under the umbrella of private 
autonomy as a source of distortion to the objectives of EU free movement law. 																																																								
259 In this regard the emergence of space for private interaction can also be construed as a form of 
delegation of public power to private actors. 
260 See Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private Distinction'; and Gareth Davies, 
'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract'. 
261 For example see Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
Sabena, [1976] ECR 455; and Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 
[2000] ECR I-4139. 
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The technique developed by the Court of Justice assumes that economic 
integration and the reconciliation with positions under national law must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and for every market context individually.  
 
 
3. Forms of private regulatory power  
The idea that private actors can occupy positions bound up with regulatory 
power in free movement law is not new and did not emerge with the cases cited 
above. The Treaty itself recognised private regulatory power in the context of 
free movement of goods. Although specified in the form of an exception to the 
free movement of goods, the treaty sets out that:  
 
the provisions of Article 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions 
or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on 
grounds of … the protection of industrial or commercial property. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States.262 
 
The idea of regulatory power is reflected in the power to restrict the marketing 
of products that are protected under national industrial and commercial property 
rights in a specific national market. It is a specific legal position (i.e. defined by 
the property right) under national law for which EU internal market law 
recognises the capacity of the right-holder to affect the free movement rights of 
others. This effect was referred to in Deutsche Grammophon. Although the Treaty, 
 
permits prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of 
products, which are justified for the purpose of protecting 
industrial and commercial property, Article 36 only admits 
derogations from that freedom to the extent to which they are 
justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights, which constitute 
the specific subject matter of such property.263 
 
																																																								
262 See Article 36 TFEU emphasis added. 
263 Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] ECR 489 at 12. 
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Consequently, the exercise of this right is subject to review under EU internal 
market law and the Court of Justice determined that a national trademark, in the 
absence of EU wide harmonisation, may be needed in order to protect industrial and 
commercial property.264 For the time being there is no EU wide harmonisation 
and EU internal market law accepts the national property rights. The exercise of 
these rights, however, must be compatible “with the observance of the conditions 
of competition and unity of the market which are so essential to the Internal 
market.”265  
 
A similar approach is found in Regulation 1612/68/EEC with regard to the free 
movement of workers where “collective and individual agreements” have an 
impact on the effectiveness of EU free movement law. Article 7(4) of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC recognises that collective and individual agreements have some 
regulatory power with regard to employment and occupation. The consequence 
of which is that all collective or individual agreement or of any other collective 
regulation concerning eligibility for employment, employment remuneration and 
other conditions of work or dismissal may not discriminate on grounds of 
nationality. The situation of free movement law is special. With the exception of 
Regulation 1612/68/EEC and the industrial and commercial property exception, 
EU internal market law does not define roles or positions that are bound up with 
regulatory power and are ‘accepted’ in the context of free movement law. 
However, the allocation of obligations to private actors assumes that these actors 
hold regulatory power in the meaning of EU free movement law. For example, in 
the case of Walrave and Koch, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) was 
constrained in their activities by the legal obligation to not discriminate on 
grounds of nationality when it regulates the conditions for participating at world 
cycling competitions.266 Allowing discriminatory treatment in a closed private 
system of self-regulation would compromise the fundamental objectives of the 
EU, which is to create an internal market without internal frontiers.267 At the 																																																								
264 Robert Alexy, 'A Theory of Constitutional Rights',  at 355; and Sibo Banda, 'Taking Indirect 
Horizontality Seriously in Ireland: A Time to Magnify the Nuance', Dublin University Law Journal, 16/1 
(2009) at 2; and Christoph Herrmann and Chiara Perfumi, 'France', in Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia 
Colombi Ciacchi, and Giovanni Comande (eds.), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the 
European Union Vol.1 (Cambridge: CUP, 2010),  at 206. 
265 Case 40/70, Sirena v. EDA, [1971] ECR 69 at 10; and Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 
[1971] ECR 489 at 12. 
266 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 16f. 
267 Ibid., at 18. 
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same time although not explicitly, the obligation recognises the competence of 
the UCI to regulate collectively the gainful employment or provision of services in 
relation to professional cycling. This is reflected in the fact that the Court of 
Justice does not prohibit the regulatory function, but confines it. The UCI is free 
to regulate the conditions of employment and services for professional cyclists, 
but may not impose discriminatory requirements, which would uphold the 
partitioning of the internal market. In this case the obligation pursues a dual 
function: the allocation of legal obligations is a technique to recognise and define 
regulatory power at the same time. 
 
 
3.1 Regulatory power of private actors in free movement law 
The majority of cases discussed above address collective forms of power.268 The 
regulatory power of these entities is evident. By their very nature they are set up 
to regulate a common interest. The idea of collective power implies a form of 
organisation and in this regard, private regulatory power is to be distinguished 
from public regulatory power in terms of expertise. The organisation of private 
entities always relates to a specific objective or common interest. This is when 
individuals group together or set up entities that have, in terms of power, more 
strength in the market due to their organisation than single individual actors. 
The Court of Justice recognised this type of regulatory power to constitute a 
legal form of private power within the meaning of EU free movement law. The 
allocation of a legal obligation under the treaty implies that the recipient of the 
obligation fulfils specific institutional criteria, for example to represent a 
collective interest, which qualifies the actor to exercise regulatory power in the 
context of the internal market. Decisively, it is not that the exercise of this 
power must actually result in a distortion of the free movement, although this is 
likely to be the case when it is brought before the Court of Justice, but that a 
private activity has the potential to distort the transition from one Member State 
market to another.269  
 
																																																								
268 For example see Stephan Van De Bogaert, 'Horizontality: The Court Attacks', in Catherine 
Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market, Unpacking the Premises 
(Hart, 2002). 
269 On this effect see for example Case 251/83, Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, [1984] 
ECR 4277. 
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One type of collective regulatory power relates to the creation of associations or 
organisations having a mandate to regulate a specific sector. This is the classical 
example of private regulatory entities. Power flows from the mandate to organise 
the sector and to affect the members of the association or organisation. Private 
bodies are set up with clear purposes or functions in a very specific sector. 
 
The second type of collective regulatory power emerges in relation to the 
organisation of individual power. This is the case when groups of actors organise 
themselves so as to protect common interests. Power thereby relates to some 
representative mechanism or, put differently, an institutionalisation of individual 
power. Individual power is merged, into single or representative entities, in order 
to have stronger bargaining power in the market process.  
 
 
3.1.1 Self-organisation  
The first case where EU internal market law recognised forms of self-
organisation as a valid form to regulate upon parts of the internal market was 
Walrave and Koch. Walrave and Koch concerned regulations of the UCI for the 
organisation of competitions in cycling. The case at hand concerned nationality 
requirements for teams, pacemaker, and stayer, to be of the same nationality if 
they want to compete in competitions organised by the UCI.270 The Court of 
Justice held that:  
 
17. prohibition of such discrimination does not only apply to the 
action of public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any 
other nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful 
employment and the provision of services.271 
 
Allowing discriminatory treatment in a closed private system of self-regulation 
would compromise the fundamental objectives of the EU, which is to create a 
internal market without internal frontiers.272 It would lead to inequality between 																																																								
270 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch, Opinion of Advocate General WARNER,  at 1422; and Case 36/74, 
B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 2-3.  
271 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 17. Emphasis added. 
272 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 18. 
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those actors subject to UCI rules and those that were not. The possibility to 
make use of EU internal market law, in terms of economic freedoms, would be 
severely impaired. Economic opportunities would be solely determined by the 
rules to form teams “of same nationality” as specified by the UCI.  
 
What is drawn from Walrave and Koch is that collective regulation in terms of 
self-organisation for a specific market is ‘accepted’ in the internal market for 
labour and services. A factor that is relevant here is the notion of collective. It 
assumes that the regulatory power is somehow legitimated and limited to a 
specific context (i.e. representing the collective interests). A form of legitimation 
is institutionalisation or organisation that is set up to decide for the organisation 
of a specific profession. An authority or an organisation bestowed with regulatory 
powers is set up to organise the rules and regulations relating to the profession 
itself through a central organisation. The recognition of regulatory power in the 
internal market then involves an institutional element. The recognition of 
regulatory power in terms of self-organisation has very practical effects with 
regard to the market. This is referred to in Wouters where the Court of Justice 
recognised the regulatory power of the national bar association to regulate on the 
profession of lawyers so as to ensure the functioning of the profession in a 
specific national context:  
 
210. The Court is therefore called upon to lay down criteria which 
will make it possible to strike a balance between, on the one hand, 
the need to allow the professions a certain power of self-regulation and, on 
the other, the need to avoid the risks of anti-competitive conduct 
inherent in the granting of such power273 
 
Self-regulation may be a means to organise and structure a specific sector or 
profession in the market context. This comes with advantages such as the fact 
that the organisations may set quality standards or ensure codes of conduct. Self-
regulation is a means to create an environment where competition may take 
place, which may also enhance competition on a transnational scale, particularly 
where competition emerges between different private regulatory bodies in 
different Member States (i.e. a form of regulatory competition between private 
entities). Those subject to private regulation may move to other Member States 																																																								
273 Case C-309/99 Wouters, Opinion of Advocate General LÉGER,  at 210. 
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and exercise their profession under the rules in force of the host state. This is not 
the case, however, when the regulations adopted are discriminatory or hinder 
other market participants in the transition from one market to another. 
 
 
3.1.2 Collective bargaining 
Another form of collective power emerged in the organisation of groups. This 
power is different from the power just described because the regulatory authority 
emerges from the organisation to represent collective interests. Whereas in the 
form of self-organisation regulatory power emerges from some institution set up, 
with collective bargaining the regulatory power emerges from the mere number 
of actors supporting the action. Viking and Laval are the central cases here.274 
Regulatory power relates to what can be described as bargaining power. 
Individuals having the same interests group together so as to form strong 
alliances against competing interests.275 Collective power thereby is more of a 
representative nature.  
 
65. There is no indication in that case law that could validly 
support the view that it applies only to associations or to 
organisations exercising a regulatory task or having quasi-legislative 
powers. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, in exercising 
their autonomous power, pursuant to their trade union rights, to 
negotiate with employers or professional organisations the 
conditions of employment and pay of workers, trade unions 
participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate paid work 
collectively.276 
 																																																								
274 Also see Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Sabine Hennigs, [2011] ECR I-7965 at 67-68. 
“Where the right of collective bargaining proclaimed in Article 28 of the Charter is covered by 
provisions of European Union law, it must, within the scope of that law, be exercised in 
compliance with that law. Consequently, when they adopt measures falling within the scope of 
Directive 2000/78, which gives specific expression in the field of employment and occupation to 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners must comply with that 
directive.” Concerning the protection of workers see Case C-127/92, Enderby, [1993] ECR I-5535 at 
22; and Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert, [2008] ECR I-1989; and Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, 
[1990] ECR I-1417. 
275 Neil Maccormick, 'Taking Responsibility Seriously',  at 171. 
276 Emphasis added. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 65; and Alicia Hinarejos, 
'Laval and Viking: The Right to Collective Action versus EU Fundamental Freedoms', Human Rights 
Law Review, 8/4 (2008), 714-729. 
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The power vested in collective entities is thus different than in the cases of 
Walrave and Koch, Bosman etc. Viking and Laval reflect an idea of power that is 
related to strengthening the economic interests of a specific group in the market 
context.277 It is a means to attain a stronger position in the market context and in 
negotiations with other economic actors.278 Regulatory power of trade unions 
emerges from the power to force other actors to engage in rule-making. For 
example, the power to require the entering of negotiations concerning conditions 
of labour is a regulatory power that has a clear regulatory effect on the market 
concerned.279 The only difference to self-organisation is that rules affecting the 
market emerge from negotiations between two parties.  
 
Erny concerns the regulatory effects that collective agreements have on the free 
movement of workers, particularly if collective agreements are the basis for 
employment contracts. 280  Erny emerged with regard to such a collective 
agreement, which formed the basis for his working contract. Mr Erny was a 
cross-border worker and as a part-time worker he was eligible for a top-up 
benefit during the period in preparation for retirement. However, the calculation 
for the top-up benefit did not take into account individual tax liabilities.281 
Consequently, Mr Erny claimed to be de facto subject to double taxation on the 
same top-up benefit, which results in discrimination.282 The Court of Justice 
recognised the regulatory power and autonomy of social partners to conclude 
collective agreements and continued that the, 
 
right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, 
to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate 
																																																								
277 77. In that regard, it must be observed that the right to take collective action for the 
protection of workers is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of one of 
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and that the protection of workers is one of 
the overriding reasons of public interest recognised by the Court. Case C-438/05, International 
Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 
[2007] ECR I-10779 at 77. Further see Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade, [1999] ECR 
I-8453 at 36; and Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni, [2001] ECR I-2189 at 27. 
278 Wallace C. Peterson, 'Market Power',  at 381. 
279 Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] ECR 489 at 11. 
280 Case C-172/11, Georges Erny, of 27 February 2014 (not yet published) at 22. Also see Case C-
400/02, Gerard Merida, [2004] I-8471 at 26. 
281 Case C-172/11, Georges Erny, of 27 February 2014 (not yet published) at 22. 
282 Ibid., at 23. 
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levels must be exercised in accordance with European Union law 
and, consequently, with the principle of non-discrimination.283  
 
The acceptance of this collective power—in terms of representative power—is 
necessary to ensure “improved living and working conditions” and a proper social 
protection that is ensured through dialogue between management and labour.284 It is 
thus a way to regulate and ensure fair terms of competition on the basis of 
private initiatives. The right to collective action is a means for workers, through 
organisation, to balance the power of the employer. This idea of organisation 
reflects the market mechanism: this is to self-organise in order to improve the 
efficiency.285 Thus, the asymmetry power in the labour relationship is balanced by 
purely internal market means and not through external correction or 
intervention. 
 
 
3.1.3 Capacity to justify 
An important consequence of the recognition of regulatory power in the context 
of free movement law is that private entities may exercise this regulatory power. 
Private actors remain in charge for the organisation of a specific sector or for the 
representation of a specific interest in the internal market. The exercise of this 
power recognised under free movement law must be in compliance with the 
treaties. In case of competing interests, balancing of interests is the means to 
find the regulatory equilibrium between the objectives of self-organisation and 
the objectives of free movement law. EU internal market law recognises that self-
organisation is bound up with the right to act for collective interests, even if this 
restricts the rights of others. The Court of Justice recognised the possibility for 
private actors to invoke justifications and exceptions to deviate from the legal 
requirements set out in the Treaty. In Bosman, the Court of Justice held that: 
 
86. … there is nothing to preclude individuals from relying on 
justifications on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health. 																																																								
283 Ibid., at 50. 
284 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 79. 
285 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought',  at 369. 
	98 
 
Bosman concerned, amongst others, the transfer rules for professional football 
players. Olympique Lyonnaise dealt with rules on compensation for transfers of 
youth players in relation to their first professional contract. The power to 
regulate in the name of the collective interest is recognised in both cases.286 Both 
sets of rules did not involve discriminatory elements. At stake were rules that 
affected the possibility of footballers to transfer to other clubs. In both cases the 
conflict was an internal one, between the interests of the individual and the 
interests represented by the organisation. So there may be the restriction of some 
interests for the benefit of the common good. In order to balance the competing 
interests, the Court of Justice analysed the legitimate aim invoked by the 
collective body and the requirements of proportionality on whether the rules on 
compensation for the education of youth football players may be justified. The 
Court of Justice clarified that:  
 
38. [a] measure which constitutes an obstacle to freedom of 
movement for workers can be accepted only if it pursues a 
legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest. Even if that were so, 
application of that measure would still have to be such as to ensure 
achievement of the objective in question and not go beyond what is 
necessary for that purpose.287 
 
The proportionality test is applied if there is an obstacle to free movement law. 
This is likely if there is a discriminatory measure; but if there is only an obstacle, 
this must make movement unlikely.288 As a last step there is the test of whether 
the measure may be objectively justified, i.e. if it pursues a legitimate aim and if 
the measure adopted is proportionate to this aim.289 This entails the capacity of 
the private entity to invoke some common interests as legitimate grounds for the 
restriction of free movement rights of other individuals. Nevertheless, the 
material side of justifications, which is the scope of legitimate reasons that may 																																																								
286 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177 at 38; and Case C-
415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 85-86. 
287 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, [2010] ECR I-2177 at 38. 
288 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-
0268 at 49; and Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
289 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-
0268 at 51f. 
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be invoked, is limited. Collective entities are set up for specific reasons and their 
regulatory power within EU free movement law is limited to these objectives for 
practical reasons. If the scope of potential legitimate reasons was not limited, 
private entities could invoke any kind of justification for regulatory activities. 
Accordingly, the scope of legitimate interests that may be invoked is assessed 
against the interests and objectives that the collective entity represents. This is 
different to public authorities, for example, which enjoy a wider scope of 
‘legitimate aims’ that may be invoked.  
 
In Viking the Court of Justice held that collective bargaining might be accepted 
in the context of free movement of establishment, “only if it pursues a legitimate 
aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest”.290 The Court of Justice found that:  
 
77. the right to take collective action for the protection of workers 
is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of 
one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and 
that the protection of workers is one of the overriding reasons of 
public interest recognised by the Court.291 
 
Similarly in Wouters, the Court of Justice recognised that within the power to 
regulate the law profession is the power to restrict free movement if legitimately 
justified. The Court of Justice recognised that the restriction to free movement 
is justified in light of the bar associations function to ensure the proper practice 
of the legal profession, as organised in the country concerned.292  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that a different level of scrutiny is applied between 
private power in terms of self-organisation and private power in terms of 
collective bargaining. The Court of Justice developed a strict approach in 
reviewing the exercise of the collective power held by trade unions. Although, in 																																																								
290 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 75; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and 
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
291 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 77; and Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, 
Arblade, [1999] ECR I-8453; and Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni, [2001] ECR I-2189. 
292 Case C-309/99, Wouters and Others, [2002] ECR I-1653 at 122-123. 
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principle the Court of Justice recognises the power of trade unions to protect the 
interests of its members, in Viking this power had been severely restricted. A 
reason for this stricter review of regulatory power exercised by trade unions may 
be found in the nature of the power concerned. Both reflect a form of insider 
systems, which place a strong emphasis on stakeholder representation. Private 
power in terms of self-organisation may relate to either a strengthening of the 
inside in the form of self-regulation or of the outside in the form of 
strengthening one’s own position in response to other ‘powerful’ actors. The 
difference is found in the interests involved. While self-regulation assumes the 
giving-up of self-interests for the collective organisation where one’s own 
interests are secondary, collective bargaining aims to strengthen and to bundle 
self-interests vis-à-vis other economic actors. The openness to interests of 
outsiders varies accordingly. Therefore, in Viking the Court of Justice held that in 
relation to the use of collective action for the implementation of the flag of 
convenience policy, that:  
 
88 … in relation to the collective action seeking to ensure the 
implementation of the policy in question pursued by ITF, it must 
be emphasised that, to the extent that that policy results in ship-
owners being prevented from registering their vessels in a State 
other than that of which the beneficial owners of those vessels are 
nationals, the restrictions on freedom of establishment resulting 
from such action cannot be objectively justified.293 
 
Although the collective action may be for legitimate interests it may not be 
exercised in a way that denies the holder of a vessel to negotiate terms of 
employment with social partners in other Member States. A policy like the flag 
of convenience policy of the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) 
would deny the competition between Member States and workforces in these 
states, which is not accepted in light of free movement law.294  
 
 
																																																								
293 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 86-88. 
294 See ibid., at 89. 
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3.2 Actual and legal regulatory power of private actors 
The similarity of these forms of collective private power and public regulatory 
power is evident, which also found its way into the legal literature referring to the 
collective entities as quasi-public actors in the internal market. The private actors 
concerned have a representative function and exercise some form of regulatory 
power, which is functionally similar to what public authorities do when they 
regulate (i.e. representing the interests of society). The power that is vested in 
the private entities emerges from the willingness of private actors to organise for 
collective interests. In economic terms, this is a technique to increase efficiency. 
For example, Ronald Coase refers to forms of organisation as an instrument to 
bundle resources and increase the internal effectiveness of competition.295 The 
reason for the recognition of collective entities to hold a form of regulatory 
power within the meaning of the free movement of workers and services takes 
into account the ideal organisation in the relevant markets. Private organisation, 
private autonomy, freedom of contract, bargaining, and collective organisation 
are natural elements of the labour market and the market for services. The 
importance of the possibility to organise in the market economy is touched upon 
in Bosman.296 
 
79. As regards the arguments based on the principle of freedom of 
association, it must be recognized that this principle, … is one of 
the fundamental rights which, as the Court has consistently held … 
are protected in the Community legal order.297 
 
Similarly, in Viking the Court of Justice recognised the importance of 
organisation of private power in relation to attaining social objectives. 298 
Collective or representative mechanisms relate to the representation of common 
interests in order to minimise costs for participation in the market or to ensure a 
system of fair competition among the members of the organisation or profession 
being regulated. Collective bargaining does so by uniting forces and associations 																																																								
295 For example see Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm'. 
296 Also see Case C-309/99, Wouters and Others, [2002] ECR I-1653 at 122-123.where the Court of 
Justice accepted that self-organization “could reasonably be considered to be necessary for the 
proper practice of the legal profession, as organised in the country concerned”. 
297 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 79-80. 
298 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 77. 
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through a harmonisation of standards with which all members must comply. It is 
a means to reduce costs and to make the functioning of a profession more 
efficient.299  
 
A final point to be made concerns the existence of actual regulatory power and legal 
regulatory power. Actual regulatory power relates to the power capacity to affect 
others, while legal regulatory power is an ‘accepted’ kind of regulatory power 
within the context of EU internal market law, i.e. where private actors holding 
regulatory power are recognised as legal subjects in the constitutional structure of 
a certain market. In this respect, the Court of Justice interprets EU free 
movement law and determines what form of private power is considered an 
alternative form of governance within the internal market. Legal constraints and 
the possibility to justify and deviate from the requirements of EU free movement 
law are the consequence thereof. Ultimately, it is the Court of Justice and EU 
internal market law that determine what kind of private power is an integral part 
of the organisation of a certain market context and what kind of power is not. 
What is decisive is not the relative strengths, equal or unequal, stable or subject 
to periodic change of private actors, but the recognition of this private regulatory 
power to be a legal source of regulation in a certain context of the internal 
market. While the recognition of collective entities as holding a legal regulatory 
power in terms of EU free movement law is straightforwardly recognised, two 
exceptions emerged in the context of the free movement of workers and the free 
movement of goods that emphasise the distinction made between actual and legal 
power in a certain context governed by EU free movement law.  
 
 
3.2.1 Exceptions to the collective power paradigm 
In light of the Court of Justice’s case-law it seems that collective organisation in 
general triggers the review of the exercise of regulatory power under EU free 
movement law, however, two exceptions have emerged. Firstly, the employer 
occupies a special position in the internal market for labour. The special position 
is, in the line of the argument put forward here, qualified by a regulatory power 
vested in the employer. This regulatory power has its basis in the contractual 
freedom and the private autonomy employers hold under national law in 																																																								
299 For example think about the idea of organisation in a firm as proposed in Ronald Coase, 'The 
Nature of the Firm'; and Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 98. 
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constituting the conditions of employment. The question is ‘why are employers 
treated similar to collective entities?’ Why do they hold legal regulatory power? 
Secondly, the Court of Justice, thus far, refused to expand the free movement of 
goods to private actors. A conceptual and methodological explanation for this is 
lacking. Thus, what is the difference between free movement of goods and the 
other freedoms? How can this adjudicative approach be reconciled in terms of 
the consistency of EU free movement law? 
 
 
3.2.2 Legal regulatory power of the employer 
The position of the employer within the context of EU free movement law is 
special. Like collective entities, the employer is addressed by obligations 
emerging from the treaties. The regulatory power does not emerge from some 
collective organisation, but it emerges from the position the employer holds in 
the national labour market. This refers to the fact that the employer has a 
monopoly on labour within a national context. EU internal market law, by 
establishing the internal market, creates an asymmetry of power between migrant 
workers on the one hand and employers on the other. This asymmetry is 
reflected in the power employers hold under national law—freedom of contract. 
The regulatory power of the employer emerges from the position of being able to 
affect the labour market by making choices on what labour and what work forces 
he desires.300 The monopoly the employer has with regard to labour in a national 
context provides the basis for regulatory power. Choices of the employer with 
regard to employment and occupation have the power to affect the transition of 
migrant workers from one Member State to another directly.301 
 
Actual regulatory power is turned into legal regulatory power because the 
employer is a vital component of the internal market for labour. The employer 
provides labour to the labour market, which is taken up by workforces. The 
problem in terms of the free movement of workers emerges where the employer 																																																								
300 Offering a contract for employment has a regulatory effects, because it determines conditions 
‘regulating’ the access to employment – the skills a worker must provide to qualify for the job. 
301 Power to make choices in relation to what skills workers should have. In this sense, any 
decision or requirement imposed by an employer is understood as a regulatory activity in terms of 
the market. Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought'; and Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and 
Freedom of Contract',  at 810-811. Also reflected in Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di 
Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139. 
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imposes conditions or requirements on vacancies that have a detrimental effect 
on migrant workers. This is why EU internal market law confers special rights on 
migrant workers in order to ensure equal treatment in relation to access and 
conditions of employment.302 More importantly, this is the reason why employers 
are subject to legal obligations under the treaty. The ‘public’ position of the 
employer, which is reflected in the regulatory power to determine the conditions 
for competition of workforces, emerged as a consequence of the creation of an 
internal market for labour. The underlying idea is that workers should at least 
have the possibility to compete for positions in the internal market for labour. 
Competition is understood as the accountability mechanism in the context of the 
internal market for labour, and choices should be made on the basis of skills and 
suitability for the position rather than aspects relating to origin and nationality. 
The employer must be as objective as possible when advertising positions.  
 
The Angonese case concerned the eligibility requirements that were set for the 
vacancy advertised by the Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano. Having recognised the 
special position the employer has in the context of the common labour market, 
the Court of Justice held that choices in the labour market should be made on 
the basis of economic criteria.303 As the Court of Justice clarified, Article 45 
TFEU is designed “to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour 
market.”304 This is why obtaining a specific language certificate was considered as 
discriminatory on grounds of nationality. The Court of Justice did not rule out 
the possibility of imposing language requirements for specific positions, but the 
evidence for having an equivalent level of knowledge of bilingualism should be 
verifiable by objective means. Making the acceptance of bilingualism dependent 
on a specific certificate that can only be obtained in a specific region is de facto 
regulating the access to employment on a discriminatory basis.305  
 
The scope of activities that are reviewed by the Court of Justice are limited to 
discriminatory measures. Although collective actors and employers are 
recognised as holding valid sources of regulatory power in the internal market for 
labour, the standard of review is different. The employer is only bound by the 																																																								
302 Case C-172/11, Georges Erny, of 27 February 2014 (not yet published) at 37. 
303 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139 at 35. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid., at 40-41; and Case C-317/14, Commission v. Belgium, of 5 February 2015 (not yet reported) 
at 19. 
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requirement to not discriminate on grounds of nationality. Collective entities are 
subject to a standard of review that goes beyond discriminatory requirements 
since the Court of Justice’s decision in Bosman. Ever since, any obstacle imposed 
on private actors to move from one Member State to another triggers the review 
under the freedom of movement of workers.306 Thus, it seems that the regulatory 
powers of private actors are assessed with regard to the partitioning effects for 
the internal market.307 While the reach of the regulatory power of the employer 
is relatively restricted in terms of partitioning of the internal market for labour, 
the reach of regulatory power of collective entities is wide. Consequently, the 
measures adopted and the activities exercised are subject to a wider review 
 
 
3.2.3 Actual power in the free movement of goods 
In contrast to the free movement of workers and the free movement of services, 
an expansion of legal obligations under the treaty to private actors in the context 
of the free movement of goods is barely noticeable.308 This is not due to the fact 
that the Court of Justice had no chance to deal with this issue, but rather that it 
decided to follow a different path. The most well-known relevant cases are 
Commission v. France, and Schmidberger. Both cases concerned private regulatory 
power in the context of the free movement of goods, because their actions were 
capable of affecting the transition of goods from one Member State to another. 
  
In Commission v. France, the power of a farmers organisation, the ‘coordination 
rurale,’ was at stake. The ‘coordination rurale’ organised riots to block the import of 
Spanish strawberries onto the French market.309 In this sense, they were claiming 
to act in the interests of groups of farmers to protect their products. The Court 
of Justice found the ‘coordination rurale’ actions came within the scope of the law 
for the free movement for goods and that their conduct was prohibited 
thereunder. However, reaching this decision, the Court of Justice followed a 																																																								
306 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 85. 
307 Case C-438/05 Viking Opinion of Advocate General MADURO,  at 49.“The Court of Justice may 
apply different levels of scrutiny, depending on the source and seriousness of the impediment to 
the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, and on the force and validity of competing 
claims of private autonomy.” 
308 For example see Kamil Mortelmans, 'Towards convergence in the application of the rules on free 
movement and on competition?', Common Market Law Review, 38 (2001), 613; and Christoph Krenn, 
'A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect "Jigsaw": Horizontal Direct Effect and the Free Movement of 
Goods', ibid.49/1 (2012), 177-216.  
309 Case C-265/95, Commission v. French Republic (Strawberries), [1997] ECR I-6959 at 3. 
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different route; it created a positive obligation for the French authorities under 
Article 34 TFEU to prevent these kinds of distortions in the internal market for 
goods.310  
 
Schmidberger confirmed the Commission v. France doctrine and clarified that it is 
the Court of Justice that is the ultimate authority in determining the validity of 
restrictions to free movement law caused by private actors. Schmidberger 
concerned protests for the protection of the environment in Austria, which 
involved the blocking of the Brenner Autobahn for a couple of hours.311 The 
environmental group in charge of the protests clearly had the power to restrict 
the free movement of goods and did so with the permission of the national 
competent authorities.312 Following Commission v. France, the Court of Justice put 
the state authorities in charge of ensuring the free movement of goods, or 
alternatively of allowing restrictions where justified for overriding reasons.313  
 
In the absence of EU-wide regulation, the Court of Justice makes its decisions on 
the basis of its interpretation of the treaties. The decisions of the Court of 
Justice are normally understood as an invitation for the EU legislator to act and 
put the matter dealt with by the Court of Justice beyond doubt.314  Although this 
is problematic as it requires the agreement of Member States this is exactly what 
happened shortly after the Court’s decision in Commission v. France when 
Regulation (EC) 2679/98 was adopted. The Regulation clarifies that the only 
competent authorities in terms of regulatory power in the context of the free 
movement of goods are the Member States and the Commission.315 With regard 
to distortion caused by forms of private power it is the Member States that 
should “take all necessary and proportionate measures with a view to facilitating 
the free movement of goods in their territory.”316 
 																																																								
310 This is commonly referred to as indirect horizontal effect in academic literature. It is indirect, 
because the obligation is channelled through the public authorities and national regulatory 
activities intended to comply with EU internal market law.  
311 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger v. Republic of Austria [2003] ECR I-5956  
312 Ibid., at 2. 
313 Ibid., at 38-39. 
314 Simon Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law',  at 15. 
315 Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98, on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free 
movement of goods among the Member State, (OJ 1998/L 337/8) at Article 1(2) and Article 5(1). 
316 Ibid., at recital 3. 
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In Commission v. France and Schmidberger, the actual power to affect the internal 
market for goods is not relevant. This is striking, because in Viking and Laval  the 
same type of private power was recognised. The actual power held by the 
organisations in Commission v. France and Schmidberger is not recognised or 
accepted as a legal power within the context of the free movement of goods. The 
recent case of Fra.Bo adds some clarity to the legal framework of the free 
movement of goods and to the role of private actors in this context. The Italian 
company Fra.Bo wanted to import copper fittings into the German market and 
sought certification from the Deutschen Verein des Gas- und Wasserfaches 
(DVGW), a private certification body. The power to certify the products and 
decide on matters affecting the entry of the product onto the German market 
reflects a form of regulatory power vested in the DVGW.317 The remaining 
problem with this case is the uncertainty as to whether the certification body 
should be treated as a real private actor or as an emanation of the state by the 
Court of Justice in the context of the free movement of goods. This uncertainty 
follows from the Court of Justice’s concluding remarks, stating:  
 
32. … that Article 28 EU must be interpreted as meaning that it 
applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-
law body, where the national legislation considers the products 
certified by that body to be compliant with national law and that 
has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are 
not certified by that body.318  
 
Despite the fact that the DVGW is a private law body, 319  and as such 
independent from public authorities in financial and regulatory terms, it seems 
that the empowerment through national law as a standardisation and 
certification body is the trigger for a review of its activities under the free 
movement of goods. Fra.Bo might be construed in a way that would support the 
idea that the Court of Justice would develop an approach à la Walrave and Koch in 
the context of the free movement of goods. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice in 
Fra.Bo recognises that the regulatory power of the DVGW is backed by national 
legislation. Thus, the real ‘private’ status of the DVGW is unclear and may give 																																																								
317 Case 171/11, Fra.Bo Spa v. DVGW, [2012] ECR 00000 at 31. 
318 Ibid., at 32. 
319 Ibid. 
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rise for dispute. Similar to Fra.Bo the Court of Justice held in the Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain that:  
 
15 It should be stated that measures adopted by a professional body 
on which national legislation has conferred powers of that nature 
may, if they are capable of affecting trade between Member States, 
constitute 'measures' within the meaning of Article 30 of the 
Treaty.320 
 
Again, the link to the national legislation is made. It remains to be seen if this 
doctrine is further followed and clarified by the Court of Justice. From this 
perspective it seems that Fra.Bo does not reverse the doctrine set in Commission v. 
France, and Schmidberger, but upholds and defines it. In terms of the horizontal 
effect of the free movement of goods the story continues.  
 
Another point to be raised, in favour of no horizontal application on the free 
movement of goods is found in Foster. In Foster the Court of Justice had to decide 
on issues relating to the scope of application of Directives in the case of non-
transposition, which excludes the horizontal effect. The Court of Justice 
considered that some private actors could come directly within the scope of 
Directives if they can be considered as an emanation of the state. The Court of 
Justice defined an emanation of the state as:  
 
a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public 
service under the control of the state and has for that purpose 
special powers beyond that which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between individuals.321 
 
In Fra.Bo and the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, the Court of Justice 
explicitly referred to the national legislation that confers power on private actors. 
When reading the cases referred to above in the light of Foster, technically these 
bodies can qualify as emanations of the state because they have “been made 
responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state.” This would confirm the 																																																								
320 Case 266/87, Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, [1989] ECR 1295 at 14-15. 
321 Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313 at 20. 
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picture presented earlier, that the free movement of goods has no horizontal 
application.  
 
 
4. On unity, sectors, and EU free movement law 
Much has been said about the unity of free movement law and unity in terms of 
consistency in the expansion of legal obligations to private actors is far from what 
has been shown in this chapter. While I can see the point in arguing and 
demanding conceptual and legal consistency and coherence of free movement 
law, my claim is that there cannot be such a thing as unity between the legal 
expressions of the principle of free movement simply because free movement law 
relates to different contexts. Additionally, the legal solutions and techniques to 
deal with situations of regulatory power emerge in a strictly contextual 
environment. If unity is of importance then this unity is found in the purpose of 
free movement law and how this deals with situations of private power and not in 
conceptual or methodological coherence among the different legal expressions of 
the different freedoms. In this respect, it must be clarified that free movement 
law relates to different sectors, each of which comes with its own ideal form of 
organisation of powers.  
 
The best way to illustrate this contextual diversity is to think of the internal 
market as a package of four submarkets: the internal market for goods, labour, 
services, and capital. The combination of these ‘four’ markets constitutes the 
internal market. The legal context concerned—the free movement of goods, 
workers, services, or capital—matters for the decision to recognise private actors 
as holding legal regulatory power or not. The position that is assumed by private 
actors that hold legal regulatory power under EU free movement law is not 
natural, but rather a choice of the Court of Justice. The natural habitat of these 
entities that provides the basis for this power is national law. The choice to 
recognise private power as a legal power in the context of free movement law 
does not only relate to the position held in national law, but also to the context 
of EU free movement in which the position and power of private actors is 
assessed. The Court of Justice transforms a power held by private actors under 
national law, into a power in the context of the internal market and EU free 
movement law. The consequence of this power is that the actors concerned may 
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legally exercise this regulatory power in the internal market context, subject to 
the limits set by free movement law. 
 
 
4.1 Different sectors 
Free movement law is the legal expression of the principle of free movement. 
The four freedoms of free movement of goods, workers, services, and capital 
turned into a legal framework for the four different markets. 322   Figure 1 
illustrates this development and the material difference between the four core 
markets. Although we commonly refer to the four freedoms as ‘EU free 
movement law’ this does not mean that the four freedoms follow similar 
dogmatic and methodological considerations. Each sector of free movement law 
implements the idea of free movement into a specific market: the internal 
market for goods, labour, services, or capital. In other words, free movement law is 
contextual. Free movement law responds to the dynamics and needs of each sector 
individually. It creates an internal market environment, which reflects the 
optimal organisation of political power in this specific market context. 
 
 
Figure 2 Layout of the different markets to which the principle of free movement 
applies 																																																								
322 Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12; and Loic Azoulai, 'The force and forms of European 
Legal Integration',  at 3. 
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The principle of free movement permeates each market context. However, the 
economic interests that the principle of free movement relates to differ between 
the four markets. Economic interests in relation to labour are different than 
those in relation to goods. The consequence is that different actors and different 
regulatory activities are reviewed in each sector.  
 
Each freedom under free movement law provides the legal framework for a 
different sector or a different internal market. It is important to understand that 
EU free movement law relates to the organisation of different markets. This is 
made clear in Sacchi, for example, where the Court of Justice was concerned with 
the possibility of restrictions to different markets concerning goods and services. 
The Sacchi case questioned whether an exclusive right granted by a Member State 
to a limited company to make all kinds of television transmissions violates the 
free movement of goods. For our purpose, this case is interesting because the 
Court of Justice distinguished between the different material scopes of the free 
movement provisions concerned:  
 
6. In the absence of express provision to the contrary in the Treaty, 
a television signal must, by reason of its nature be regarded as 
provision of services. 323 
 
7. On the other hand, trade in material, sound recordings, films, 
apparatus and other products used for the diffusion of television 
signals are subject to the rules relating to freedom of movement for 
goods. 324  
 
If we look at the case law concerning the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, this difference is elucidated. Free movement is the way 
through which the prohibition of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is 
implemented in EU internal market law.325 In Dona v. Mantero, the Court of 
Justice held that:  																																																								
323 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405. 
324 Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409 at 6. 
325 According to the Court of Justice the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is 
what “Article 7, 48, 59 [have] in common in their respective spheres of application”; see for 
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6. Article 7 of the Treaty provides that within the scope of 
application of the Treaty, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited. As regards employed persons and persons 
providing services, this rule has been implemented by articles 48 to 51 and 59 
to 66 of the treaty respectively and by measures of the community 
institutions adopted on the basis of those provisions.326  
 
Or in Commission v. Greece, the Court of Justice held that:  
 
12. … it should be pointed out first that the general prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 7 of 
the Treaty has been implemented, in regard to their several domains, 
by Articles 48, 52 and 59 of the Treaty. Consequently, any rules 
incompatible with those provisions are also incompatible with 
Article 7.327 
 
These examples are intended to clearly show that the different free movement 
provisions apply to different material contexts.328 These different contexts come 
with different ‘internal logics’ and different ideal organisations of regulatory 
power, even where multiple sources of regulatory authority exist in the same 
market. Each market—goods, workers, services, or capital—comes with its own 
ideal organisation. In this context, the recognition of legal regulatory power 
emerges and it reflects a choice that private actors may occupy positions in the 
internal market that are bound up with the exercise of regulatory power.  
 
The development of the horizontal effect of the treaty provision through the 
Court of Justice reflects a philosophy underlying the different ideal organisations 																																																																																																																																																														
example Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 16; and 
Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB [2000]ECR I-0268 
at 37-38; and Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-
4139 at 35; and Case C-179/90 Merci [1991] ECR 1-5889 at 11; and Case C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v 
Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg, [2000] ECR I-08081 at 39. 
326 Emphasis added. See Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409 at 7; and Case 90/76 van 
Ameyde v UCI [1977] ECR 1091. 
327 Emphasis added. See Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 1461 at 12. 
328 One sees a similar distinction made by the Court of Justice with regard to the different scope 
of different free movement provisions in Case 251/83, Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, 
[1984] ECR 4277; and Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films, [1980] ECR 881. 
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of the internal market for goods, workers, services, and capital. Collective 
organisations of private power were recognised as forms of legal regulatory power 
in the internal market. The approach adopted under EU internal market law 
reflects a preference for self-regulation and self-organisation, instead of 
regulatory intervention to enhance the efficiency in the context of the free 
movement of workers and services. This refers to the advantages of self-
regulation and self-organisation over regulatory intervention. Whenever a group 
of private actors organises this originates in a common interest. The benefit of 
private organisation is that it directly reflects the interests of the individuals. The 
proximity to individual interests is higher than under statutory regulation. Private 
collective power is a valid source of influence for market dynamics. The 
advantage of this approach is the expertise and knowledge that private actors 
have in regulating a specific aspect of a sector. For example, the advantage of an 
agreement concluded between management and labour is that both parties 
concluded it.329  It is an agreement reached between the core actors in the 
market, the employer and the worker (i.e. through the social partner). Thus, both 
parties were involved in the negotiations and reached an agreement concluded by 
both. 
 
Therefore, the direct allocation of obligations to private actors treats them as 
another source of normative authority within a national context. The problem 
with labour markets and service markets is the diversity of their organisation in 
different Member States. Each Member State adopts regulations ensuring 
compliance with free movement law in relation to the specificities of their 
national markets. This in turn increases the risk of distortions to economic 
integration due to the differences between national regulations. On the other 
hand, the direct binding of private actors holding regulatory power creates a level 
playing field at the EU level. All private entities fulfilling the criteria of collective 
entities or employer are bound by the same criteria. It even creates a field for 
competition between these actors. The technique adopted by the Court is the 
allocation of broad obligations. The legal uncertainty created gives a constant 
impetus to judicial review and in particular the assessment of the legitimate aims 
pursued.  
 																																																								
329 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 79. 
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This approach is different for the free movement of goods, where the Court of 
Justice prefers centralised organisation in terms of statutory regulatory power. 
The rationale reflected in Commission v. France, and Schmidberger follows the idea 
of the internal market that the Court set out in Cassis de Dijon. This is an internal 
market for food based on free movement and mutual recognition.330 Food is 
treated as a good and as such is subject to the free movement of goods 
rationality. Once products are lawfully marketed in one Member State they are 
free to circulate in the internal market.331 The choices relating to products are 
made through consumers only. In this regard, the individual interests of 
consumers matter and the choices of consumers function as the accountability 
mechanism in the internal market for goods. The acceptance of collective or 
individual actors to make representative choices in the internal market for goods 
would deprive the consumers of making their own choices. The consequence of 
which would be that the market process in relation to goods would not function 
efficiently. The only alternative regulatory power in the internal market for goods 
are public authorities or the EU Commission, when engaging in harmonising 
activities such as the regulation of food safety.  
 
 
5. Liability 
The consequence of the recognition of private regulatory power is that the role 
of national courts with regard to reviewing the regulatory activities of private 
actors increases. The regulatory nature of private actors is imbedded in national 
law. Accordingly, the limits of the rights on which the freedom of association or 
the rights of trade unions are based are determined in a national context. This is 
referred to in Viking where the Court of Justice clarified that: 
 
85. it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction 
to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to 
determine whether and to what extent such collective action meets 
those requirements.332 																																																								
330 See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
331 Ibid., at 13-14. 
332 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 85; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and 
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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Under free movement law and EU discrimination law no general framework for 
liability is evident. Where private actors exercising public functions under EU 
internal market law violate the provisions of EU free movement law or EU 
discrimination law, this makes them subject to scrutiny by the Court of Justice. 
The Court of Justice does not, however, assess liability or impose specific 
coercive measures in cases of violation. The assessment of liability is done under 
national law by national courts. This is evident in Viking, for example. 
Concerning the legality of the collective actions organised by the Finnish Seaman 
Union (FSU) the Court of Justice held that:  
 
85 ... even if it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole 
jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, 
to determine whether and to what extent such collective action 
meets those requirements, the Court of Justice, which is called on 
to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide 
guidance, based on the file in the main proceedings and on the 
written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in 
order to enable the national court to give judgment. 
 
87 As regards the question of whether or not the collective action 
at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objective pursued, it is for the national court to 
examine, in particular, on the one hand, whether, under the 
national rules and collective agreement law applicable to that 
action, FSU did not have other means at its disposal which were 
less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a 
successful conclusion the collective negotiations entered into with 
Viking, and, on the other, whether that trade union had exhausted 
those means before initiating such action.333 
 
With regard to liability, two issues follow: (1) The national court has sole 
jurisdiction to determine the liability of the entities exercising ‘legal regulatory 
power’ within the meaning of EU internal market law and (2) the Court of Justice 																																																								
333 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 85 and 87. 
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is to provide an interpretation which should guide the national court in finding 
its judgment. It must enable the national court to balance an action protected 
under a national right against a right protected under EU internal market law. 
EU internal market law may incur liability if the national court in its assessment 
finds a violation of the EU internal market law. This is clear from Laval. Laval 
concerned the possible restriction of the freedom to provide services through 
collective measures. The Court of Justice found the restrictive effects of blocking 
premises in order to force the provider of services to enter into negotiations 
concerning employment conditions to be unjustifiable.334 The Swedish Labour 
Court followed this view and awarded damages against the trade unions for a 
violation of the freedom to provide services.335  
 
Reasons for this cautious approach of the Court of Justice relate to the nature of 
both EU free movement law and EU discrimination law. Both disciplines address 
situations of power that have their basis in national law. In other words, national 
law is the basis for the power that the private actors have. These are the national 
rights of trade unions, national rights of association, or with regard to employers 
the national rights under the freedom of contract. From this perspective it seems 
reasonable to leave choices on liability to the national courts. It is a more 
efficient solution simply because national courts are better equipped to decide 
cases that emerged within their jurisdiction: they have better knowledge of facts, 
contexts, habits or practices. 336 
 
 
6. Remarks 
The picture we get from this analysis is that private actors are recognised as 
alternative sources of regulatory authority in the internal market. This assumes 
that within the internal market and under the control of EU free movement law 
(and the Court of Justice) private actors occupying specific positions (e.g. the 																																																								
334  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 
at 108f. 
335 The Labour Court Judgment, Judgment No. 89/09 2009-12-02, , Case No. A 268/04, unofficial 
English translation: 
http://arbetsratt.juridicum.su.se/Filer/PDF/ErikSjoedin/AD%202009%20nr%2089%20Laval%20
English.pdf. 
336 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 at 14; and Case C- 45/09, Rosenbladt, [2010] 
ECR I-9391 at 52. 
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employer, associations or trade unions) in certain markets are recognised as 
competent authorities holding some regulatory power in the internal market. 
This is reflected in the power to affect the structure of a certain market. The 
consequence of this status as legal subjects in the internal market is a review—
similar to state actors—under the free movement provisions. However, it seems 
that different standards of review apply among the different strengths of 
regulatory power as observed in relation to the employer and collective entities. 
The position they occupy in a national context is Europeanised and confined by 
legal obligations. Free movement rights have the same legal force against public 
and private entities. 
 
The construction of regulatory power within the meaning of EU free movement 
law as an ‘actor neutral concept’ within the internal market has very practical 
effects. The counter-culture, which emerged due to the functional application of 
the effects-test applied to regulatory power, filled a gap in national law. The gap 
relates to national law and situations where national law created spaces for 
private organisation or private power in certain contexts that are governed by EU 
free movement law (i.e. labour market, services market, goods market and capital 
market). National law always relates to national interests. Even private law and 
spaces for private economic action are framed in an overall national context and 
the national interests and objectives. In these spaces, self-organisation and 
actions based on private autonomy and freedom of contract were the central 
elements of the organisation of the national markets. From a free movement 
perspective these forms of private autonomy generated power that qualified 
these actors to distort the free movement rights of other economic actors in the 
transition between two markets.  
 
This is seen in the labour markets where Member States delegated large parts of 
the organisation of labour (e.g. safety, payment, working hours or securities) to 
the social partners. The consequence is the emergence of a preference for forms 
of self-organisation in the labour market. The organisations holding powers in 
the national markets are representative bodies of the national workers, for 
example. Their understanding about possible effects in relation to transnational 
situations is relatively low. With the creation of the internal market, economic 
actors are no longer acting in national contexts only, but their activities also have 
effects for foreigners. The Court of Justice now also reviews private activities in 
light of the principles of free movement. The allocation of obligations implies an 
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educative purpose, which is intended to make those actors that hold regulatory 
power to take into account the interests of outsiders. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Responsibility of Private Actors in EU 
Discrimination Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
EU internal market law and the treaties are the key instruments that structure 
the economic and social integration of the internal market. For economic and 
social integration, EU internal market law provides different legal and social 
contexts. Economic integration is driven by the principle of free movement. The 
intention is to legally protect the access to foreign markets through which an 
optimal allocation of resources throughout the EU as a whole can be attained.337 
The function and the objective of social integration are different. EU 
discrimination law, which implements EU social policy, ensures the social 
integration of individuals in the internal market for labour. It is concerned with 
the access to the labour market for individuals that are underprivileged for non-
economic reasons. The dynamics of the market relationships would always search 
for the best and fittest competitor to occupy a specific position.338 Therefore, 
some actors would be excluded from the benefits of the market economy, or 
access to the market is particularly difficult for non-economic reasons.339 In a 
labour market based on contractual freedom elderly people, women, foreigners, 
or people having different sexual orientations are likely to be treated less 
favourably than others in the workforce. The underlying assumption is that their 
personal characteristics impose additional costs for the employer, therefore they 
are less attractive as potential employees. 																																																								
337 Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, 'EU Law',  at 605. 
338 Consider Walter Eucken, 'Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie' (8 edn.: Springer, Berlin, 1965). 
“Richtig verstandene Sozialpolitik ist für Eucken in einer Ordnungspolitik aufgehoben, die den 
individuen Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe ermöglicht”. 
339 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 102. 
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The EU social policy accompanies the economic freedoms and complements the 
“ideal of the internal market.”340 The ideal of the internal market is an open 
market policy. This assumes that the internal market shall be open to any entity 
seeking employment or occupation under fair and equal conditions of 
employment. It is reflected in EU free movement law that ensures the transition 
from one market to another, and in EU discrimination law that seeks to legally 
structure access to the labour market for economically disadvantaged individuals. 
The objective of EU discrimination law is to implement the principle of equal 
treatment in employment or occupation.341  
 
Both economic and social integration are essential for the functioning of the 
internal market. In the context of EU internal market law social exclusion of 
specific groups of individuals is considered as a distortion to the functioning of 
the internal market for labour. The importance of the social objective was 
emphasised by the Court of Justice stating that: 
 
9. ... in the light of the different stages of the development of social 
legislation in the various Member States, the aim of Article 119 is 
to avoid a situation in which undertakings established in States 
which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay suffer a 
competitive disadvantage in intra-Community competition as 
compared with undertakings established in States which have not 
yet eliminated discrimination against women workers as regards 
pay. 
 
10 Secondly, this provision forms part of the social objectives of 
the Community, which is not merely an economic union, but is at 
the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social 
progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and 
																																																								
340  With regard to social integration as a social ideal underlying the internal market see 
COM(93)551 final on European Social Policy, of 17 November 1993,  23. On the dual objective of 
social policy see Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 
[1976] ECR 455 at 7-9. Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening', in Paul 
Craig and Grainne De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU law (Oxford: OUP, 2011),  at 612; and Case 
80/70 Defrenne (I), Opinion of Advocate General DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE,  at 455. 
341 Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, (OJ L 303 , 02/12/2000 P. 0016),  Article 1. 
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working conditions of their peoples, as is emphasized by the 
Preamble to the Treaty.342 
 
Similar to the free movement provisions, the principle of non-discrimination has 
constitutional status. However, the objective relates to the social objectives of 
the economic constitution. In this respect, the principle of non-discrimination is 
a means to compensate for the inherent deficits of the market economy with 
regard to the principle of equality. EU discrimination law provides a harmonised 
approach to deal with situations of social exclusion. 
 
 
1. EU social policy 
Equality in the labour market does not relate to the idea of formal equality, but 
to the idea of equality of opportunity.343 Every individual should have access to 
the same opportunities. The problem with regard to equality of opportunity is 
the deficit of the market economy and the economic process to deliver equality 
in practice. A labour market based on individual choice accommodates individual 
preferences and as such provides a basis for discriminatory treatment and the 
exclusion of certain groups of people, particularly economically ‘inefficient’ 
actors.  
 
The problem addressed under EU social policy relates to the labour market and 
its deficiency in providing equal opportunities for all private actors. The central 
question in terms of social equality and social justice is how to deal with this 
problem of social exclusion, which is inherent in the market process. The 
predominant solution in Member States is to compensate the actors being 
disadvantaged by the market economy through public schemes. Early retirement 
schemes or social security schemes were intended to compensate, through public 
funds, those excluded from the economy and market. The role of public 
authorities in attaining social equality is central and reflects a compensatory 
approach whereby those disadvantaged by the economy are compensated by the 
public authorities. One problem with this system is that it produces immense 
costs for the public sphere and reduces costs for the private sphere, which, for 																																																								
342 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 9-10. 
343 Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marshall, [1997] ECR I-6363 at 29-30. Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal 
Treatment: Widening and Deepening',  at 632-633. 
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example, does not need to carry the potential costs of hiring elderly or disabled 
people (i.e. higher costs due to special measures needed to accommodate these 
workers in the workplace). 
 
The internal market is based on an alternative approach for dealing with social 
exclusion: the open market policy.344 This assumes that the labour market shall 
be open to any entity seeking employment or occupation under fair and equal 
conditions. EU discrimination law legally protects this open market policy. The 
prohibition of discrimination turns into the primary Ordnungsprinzip of the labour 
market that is governed by EU internal market law. Social integration is attained 
through a complex legal framework that empowers private actors (that are likely 
be excluded) to participate in the labour market through the allocation of rights 
to equal treatment. At the same time, legal constraints are imposed on employers 
in the form of legal obligations to not discriminate on grounds of age, gender, 
religion, disability, race, sexual orientation, and belief. Under the new approach, 
social equality is attained by legally protecting equal opportunities to participate 
in the labour market for actors that are likely to be disadvantaged.  
 
This ‘new approach’ to attain social justice—from compensation to 
participation—has had a significant impact on the role of employers in the 
context of the labour market. First through the Court of Justice and later 
through a detailed regulatory framework, the role of the employer qua legal 
subject in the internal market has been legally defined. EU internal market law 
changes the attitudes of employers, which had previously enjoyed much 
discretion about choosing employees under the principle of contractual freedom 
in national laws. Social aspects were within the public domain and statutory 
solution. EU internal market law changes this and defines a more active role for 
employers in attaining social integration of individuals into the internal market 
for labour and as a consequence thereof in relation to the attainment of social 
justice.  
 																																																								
344 The EU Commission refers to the importance of the EU social policy in relation to the 
internal market for labour. “If the aim of social policy is to assist individuals to take care of 
themselves and, as far as possible, to perform a useful role in society, only new and innovative 
combinations of work and welfare are likely to achieve that goal for vulnerable people at risk. 
There is a consensus in Europe that all citizens should have a guarantee of resources but social 
policies now have to take on the more ambitious objective of helping people to find a place in 
society. The main route, but not the only one, is paid work – and this is why employment policies 
and social policies should be more closely linked.” See COM(93)551 final 21. 
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The internal market for labour not only provides for the benefit of employees but 
also simultaneously benefits the economies of the Member States. This is 
because the internal market for labour creates an environment where workers can 
move freely and seek employment. This reorganisation relates to an idea of 
economic efficiency.345 Inclusion of marginalised groups into the labour market 
increases competition among the workforce and relaxes the social expenses for 
Member States.  
 
 
1.1 The idea of a internal market for labour 
The labour market, like any other market, functions on the basis of supply and 
demand.346 The importance of the employment relationship is vested in the fact 
that employer and employee, through their activities, determine the supply and 
demand curves of the market. Employer and employee reflect the correlating 
economic interests underlying the labour market. It is through their choices that 
supply and demand in the labour market are shaped. For example, lets consider a 
company owner that intends to expand his company. As an employer he needs to 
find new employees; he creates a demand for a workforce.347 Workers can supply 
labour in return for payment. In this equation supply and demand are correlative. 
If there is little demand for workers and a high supply of workers the salary 
might decrease because the workers have to compete for the few positions 
available, i.e. they might offer their services for less payment. Equally, if there are 
few workers and a high demand for workforces, this might benefit the workers as 
the value of the workforce increases. Other factors, for example, skills required, 
experience, and education might also affect this market. 
 
Labour has an important status under EU internal market law. Not only does 
labour constitute one of the four core markets of EU internal market law, but in 
more practical terms, in the EU labour and gainful employment is a means 
through which individuals can improve their economic and social positions in 
society. Participation in the labour market is seen as a mechanism for individuals 																																																								
345 Directive 2000/78/EC,  recital 8. Further see COM(89) 568 final,  51, Becker, The Economics of 
Discrimination  at 19. 
346 To this effect see Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives'. 
347 This could also be the other way around – work in terms of supply and workforce in demand 
for labour. However, in any way there is an asymmetric and interdependent relationship between 
employer and employee. 
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“to improve their position.”348 Gainful employment and the opportunities to find 
work,  
 
must be one of the means by which workers are guaranteed the 
possibility of improving their living and working conditions and 
promoting their social advancement, while helping to satisfy the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States. The right of 
all workers in the Member States to pursue the activity of their 
choice within the Union should be affirmed.349 
 
The problem with social exclusion is evident here. Social inclusion is the means 
through which individuals can improve their living and working conditions and 
advance in social life. It recognises that “every individual is of equal worth and 
should have fair access to the opportunities of life.”350 
 
EU discrimination law deals with the specific problem of the social exclusion of 
outsiders in the internal market for labour, which in turn distorts the functioning 
of the labour market in terms of allocative efficiency.351 The internal market for 
labour can only function efficiently, in terms of efficient allocation of resources, 
where it is characterised by equal access. One side is economic freedoms, which 
are intended to ensure the optimal allocation of economic resources among 
different Member States. The other side of the internal market for labour relates 
to the social objectives and social inclusion. This deals with the inclusion of 
resources into the internal market for labour that were treated less favourably 
before.  
 
 																																																								
348 COM(93)551 final 21. 
349 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 
on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 1–12),  recital 4. 
350 COM(2008)420 final, Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment, 
of 2 July 2008,  2. 
351 “Whether the rich get richer or the just are rewarded in the market process depends on the 
parameters of market participation. The costs of participation include the unwillingness of others 
to deal with individuals due to racial, ethnic, or gender differences. These costs are also related to 
education and experience gained from prior exposure to market activity and, therefore, to 
individual or family wealth. To the extent that per capita stakes and the costs of market 
participation vary according to such individual characteristics as wealth, income, education, sex, 
race, and birth, the analysis of participation provides important insight into the role of the 
market process in determining the whole range of goals.” See Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect 
alternatives',  at 104. 
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1.2 The problem space in the internal market for labour 
The problem of social exclusion goes back to the idea that the employment 
relationship is vested in national law and the idea of contractual freedom. 352 The 
relevant contracting parties negotiate the conditions of employment. 353  EU 
discrimination law considers the problem of social exclusion to be caused, partly, 
by an asymmetry of power between the employer and potential employees. It is the 
freedom to choose workforces held by the employer and personal and structural 
factors in which employees are considered that affect the power relationship 
between the employer and employees. Age, gender, racial origin, and disability 
are just some examples of personal factors on which basis the position of 
potential employees is weakened in the labour market. In the labour market, for 
example, elderly people or disabled people are considered as economically weak 
employees for which reason they may have weaker positions in terms of 
negotiating labour contracts. The employer on the other hand holds a natural 
monopoly over labour. Private autonomy and freedom of contract is the place 
where stereotypes and national habits operate in a manner that disadvantage 
specific groups of society—for example women, elderly, disabled, and ethnic 
groups—with regard to the labour market.354 Women are typically paid less or 
occupy jobs where lower wages are paid on a systemic basis. Younger people are 
generally preferred over disabled and elderly people, who might need further 
training or support in the workplace. Also, cultural prejudices might form the 
basis for not entering an employment contract with ethnic groups, for example.355 
																																																								
352 COM(93)551 final 21.”The causes of exclusion are multiple: persistent unemployment and 
especially long-term unemployment; the impact of industrial change on poorly skilled workers; 
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desperation and disruptive behaviour such as violence or drugs. Insecurity generates fear of the 
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behaviour and political and social extremism.” 
353 Ulrich K. Preuss, 'The Concept of Rights and the Welfare State', in Gunther Teubner (ed.), 
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (De Gruyter, 1988); and Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, 
Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract'. 
354 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I‐9981 at 77. Further see: 
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that women are primarily responsible for home and child care while man are responsible for the 
families economic and financial well-being.” Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening 
and Deepening',  at 633. 
355 Horatia Muir Watt, 'Gender Equality and Social Policy after Defrenne', in Miguel Poiares Maduro 
and Loic Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2010); and Steve Peers, 
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In relation to the internal market, this group of potentially disadvantaged people 
can be expanded. Other personal factors such as nationality or language might 
affect the conclusion of employment contracts in the context of the internal 
market. These choices on criteria determining the access to employment are in 
the market context de facto equivalent to regulatory choices. They regulate the 
access to the market.  
 
The structural factor of being in a position to control the ‘access’ to employment 
gives the employer a certain form of regulatory power. This is reflected in the 
power to determine the criteria that regulate the access to employment.356 The 
employer, under EU discrimination law, is considered as another form of 
governance within the internal market (i.e. by regulating access to employment).  
 
EU discrimination law aims to reconcile the diversities that shape the national 
labour markets and national labour with the objective of ensuring the functioning 
of the internal market for labour. The simple capacity to make choices under the 
freedom of contract about the criteria that regulate the access to employment 
generates power in a market context. These choices regulate the demand side of 
the labour market in terms of what kind of workforce is demanded. Excluding 
parts of the workforce for non-economic reasons distorts the market functioning 
as competition would only take place between some workers. A skewed 
allocation of resources is the result. In this context, conditions that go beyond 
mere economic skills may be required, such as gender or language 
requirements.357 The ‘tastes’ of employers may exclude some groups of employees 
if the preferences of the employer concerning the workforce he wants to employ 
relate to non-objective economic criteria.358 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
'Supremacy, equality and human rights: comment on Kücükdeveci (C-555/07)', European Law Review, 35/6 
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1.3 Constructing an inclusive labour market 
The objective of EU internal market law is to legally structure a transnational 
labour market. Employers may employ workers from other Member States. 
Likewise, workers may seek employment in the labour markets of other Member 
States. With the internal market for labour, EU internal market law legally 
creates a transnational labour market. It creates an environment where the 
demand for workers and the supply of labour may be exchanged beyond the 
national labour markets. It widens the opportunities for employers and 
employees.359 Supply and demand are now created at a European scale. However, 
the advantages the internal market creates come with costs. Paul Craig and 
Grainne de Burca elaborate on this: 
 
Labour is one of the factors of production and may be valued more 
highly in some areas than in others. This is so if, for example, there 
is an excess in supply over demand for labour in southern Italy, and 
an excess of demand over supply in certain parts of Germany. In 
this situation labour is worth more in Germany than it is in Italy.360 
 
In the context of EU internal market law, free movement of workers and 
discrimination law in relation to employment and occupation address the 
problem of discrimination and exclusion in the internal market for labour. The 
legal structure by which EU internal market law constructs the internal market 
assumes that the internal market is per se deficient to deal with two issues:— the 
inclusion of outsiders in terms of nationality (i.e. free movement law counters 
this deficit) and the inclusion of individuals with regard to other non-economic 
factors (i.e. EU discrimination law counters this). The social and economic 
integration of individuals into the labour market is an important element for 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market.361  
 
																																																								
359 COM(2008)420 final,  2; and Mario Monti, 'A New Strategy for the Single Market',  at 
56.Bobbitt refers to the market as a tool to provide opportunities. See: Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield 
of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history'. 
360 Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, 'EU Law',  at 605. 
361  COM(89) 568 final, Communication from the Commission concerning its Action Programme 
relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers., 
of 29 November 1989,  83; and Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation 
Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 455. 
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Free movement law concerning workers and discrimination law relating to 
employment and occupation are two sides of the same coin and relate to the 
creation of a labour market based on the idea of equal treatment, equal 
opportunity, and fair competition. In this sense, the workplace is seen as a new, 
non-geographical frontier to the equality of opportunities of individuals in the 
internal market.362 The objective of EU discrimination law is to open up the 
labour market for actors that have so far been excluded from the opportunities of 
the labour market for non-economic reasons. Opening up the labour markets in 
economic and social terms increases the pool and diversity of skilled workers 
competing in the labour market.363 The fostering of equality in the labour market 
was not just an objective but rather the ideal underlying the organisation of the 
labour market. Labour should be available to everyone and it should be economic 
choices that determine the dynamics of the internal market for labour. 
Underlying this idea is that personal characteristics should not be relevant for the 
selection processes of employers. However, this is only partly so because 
depending on the nature of the vacancy, elderly people or disabled people may 
not be physically capable of carrying out the duties required by the position. 
These exceptional circumstances are taken into account in EU social law. 
 
 
2. The effective attainment of social integration under EU internal 
market law 
The emphasis of EU discrimination law is on the structural problems of the labour 
market “which excludes part of the population from economic and social 
opportunities,”364  and which would give rise to unfair terms of competition 
between Member States.365 Put differently, this social integration relates to the 
uniform approach on how to deal with the exclusion of private actors from the 
benefits of the labour market, for reasons that are not based on grounds of 
nationality. In order to effectively attain social inclusion EU internal market law 
favours a harmonised approach, which brings institutional and conceptual 																																																								
362 COM(93)551 final 23. 
363 Gary S. Becker, 'The economics of discrimination' (Second edn.: Chicago: UCP, 1971). François 
Ewald, 'A Concept of Social Law',  at 46.– the primary objective of a social system is social justice. 
364 For example see Directive 2000/78/EC,  Article 3(2). COM(93)551 final 20. “The problem is not 
only one of disparities between the top and bottom of the social scale, but also between those 
who have a place in society and those who are excluded.” 
365 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
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changes alike to the labour market. The approach reflected in EU discrimination 
law is a process encouraging the inclusion of people into the labour market that 
were hitherto disadvantaged by the dynamics of the labour market. EU 
discrimination law implements a new approach that seeks to ensure social 
equality/social justice in the labour market, through dispersed organisations of 
actors involved in the implementation of social integration. The result is a form 
of shared responsibility of functions of which legal coordination is key for 
delivering social integration in practice.  
 
 
2.1 The evolution of discrimination law 
The idea of an open market policy towards the labour market was shaped by a 
remarkable evolution of the principle of equality with regard to the internal 
market for labour.366 Starting with the Defrenne line of cases, the Court of Justice 
in combination with secondary law measures developed a general “corpus of law 
on equal treatment” seeking to ensure the effective application of the principle of 
equal treatment in the labour market, national law, and the employment 
relationship.367 Mark Bell refers to this process of evolution as the deepening and 
widening of the principle of equal treatment.368 Thus, it is to be noted that it was 
the Court of Justice that first outlined the conceptual and institutional approach 
on how social integration is best attained in the context of the internal market 
for labour.  
 
The original treaties only provided for the principle of equal pay for equal work 
between men and women.369 Mainly inserted due to French pressure, ex Article 
119 EEC found its way into the treaties in order to ensure that other Member 
States or undertakings would not gain competitive advantages by employing 
cheaper female workers.370 This has been described as the economic rationale or 																																																								
366 See Article 157 TFEU and Gillian More, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: From market unifier to 
Fundamental Right', in P. P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The evolution of EU law (Oxford: OUP, 
1999). Case C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 46, 50-51 and 58-59. 
367 Citation from Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening',  at 614-615. 
Further see Joined Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97, Deutsche Post AG v. Elisabeth Sievers, [2000] ECR 
I-929 at 57. 
368 Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening',  at 612. 
369 Article 157 TFEU and Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation 
Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 455. 
370 Now Article 157 TFEU. 
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the regulatory role of the principle of equal pay. Its aim is to prevent situations of 
unfair competition between the Member States.371  In Defrenne III, the case 
concerned an airhostess that was paid less than her male counterparts by the 
airline for which she brought court proceedings. The Court of Justice already 
recognised that the “elimination of sex discrimination is a fundamental principle 
of community law.”372 This status was confirmed through Directive 76/207/EEC, 
which implemented the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working 
conditions.373  
 
In the early years of the internal market, the Court of Justice was very influential 
in the development of EU discrimination law and the reduction of structural 
deficits through the delivering of equality of opportunity. For example, in Jenkins, 
the Court of Justice had to determine if different hourly wages paid to part-time 
and full-time workers fell within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination 
on the grounds of sex.374 The Court of Justice held that different wages do not 
offend female workers in so far as “the difference in pay between part-time work 
and full-time work is attributable to factors which are objectively justified and are 
in no way related to any discrimination based on sex.”375 This would be the case, 
for example, if different wages were used as a means to encourage full-time work 
for economic reasons.376 Moreover, the Court of Justice clarified that:  
 
13. … if it is established that considerably smaller percentage of 
women than of men perform the minimum number of weekly 
working hours required in order to be able to claim the full-time 
hourly rate of pay, the inequality in pay will be contrary to article 
119 of the treaty where, regard being had to the difficulties 
encountered by women in arranging to work that minimum 																																																								
371 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 9; and Gillian More, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: From market unifier to Fundamental 
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372 Case 149/77 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena (Defrenne III) 
[1978] ECR 1365 at 1378. 
373 See Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions (OJ L 039 , 14/02/1976 P. 0040).  
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number of hours per week, the pay policy of the undertaking in 
question cannot be explained by factors other than discrimination 
based on sex.377 
 
In other words, different wages for part-time and full-time workers does not 
amount to discrimination in the meaning of Article 119 EEC, unless it is “in 
reality merely an indirect way of reducing the level of pay of part-time workers on 
the grounds that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly 
of women.” 378  This reflects an approach aimed at substantive equality in 
employment and occupation regarding gender.379  
 
Until the Treaty of Amsterdam, discrimination law was limited to the 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex.380 The then newly inserted 
Article 13 EC381 paved the way for the next generation of discrimination law. 
Eventually, this led to the adoption of Directive 2000/43 combating 
discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin,382 and Directive 2000/78 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.383 As part of ensuring social inclusion in the labour market, the 
Directives set out a general framework putting into effect the principle of equal 
treatment. Today Article 19 TFEU empowers the EU institutions to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age, and sexual orientation.384 EU internal market law now has a legal basis to 
expand and further the social policy and social objectives of the internal 
market.385 The legal framework of EU discrimination law is an active ingredient 
in ensuring the inclusion of individuals that would potentially be subject to 																																																								
377 Ibid., at 13. 
378 Ibid., at 15. 
379 Case C-158/97, Georg Badeck, [2000] ECR I-1875 at 32. 
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differential treatment in relation to employment-related issues on the grounds of 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation. 
 
 
2.2 Regulatory power of the employer 
In a labour market context, the problem of asymmetry of power relates to the 
structural position of the employer, which comes with a regulatory power in 
relation to the access to labour.386 In this respect, the internal market for labour 
comes with an inherent asymmetry of power in the relationship at the centre of 
decision-making, i.e. the relationship between the employer and the employee. 
This is why, for example, under national law rights for collective action or 
bargaining through social partners are an integral part of the labour relationship. 
It is a mechanism recognised through which employees are empowered to 
balance—on their own initiative—the asymmetry of power in the labour 
relationship.387 The regulatory power of the employer already recognised in the 
context of free movement is also evident here. The employer, by merely 
exercising his choices is in a position to affect the structure of the internal 
market for labour because the employer determines what kind of labour force is 
demanded. The consequence is a situation of dependency for workers. 
 
In terms of relative strength, the employer has a power over the employee in 
relation to the determination of the criteria that regulate the access to 
employment. The creation of a market for labour automatically creates a 
monopoly over the supply of labour.388 The “tastes” of employers may exclude 
some groups of employees if the preferences of the employer, concerning the 
workers he wants to employ, relate to non-objective economic criteria.389 As a 
consequence, the relationship between employer and employee is treated as 
vertical in the context of EU internal market law (i.e. in both free movement law 																																																								
386 Regulatory power in terms of making choices in relation to what skills workers should have. In 
this sense, any decision or requirement imposed by an employer for a job vacancy is understood as 
a regulatory activity in terms of the labour market. On the regulatory effects of freedom of 
contract see Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract'; and 
Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought'. 
387 COM(2008)420 final,  3. 
388 Iris Marion Young and Danielle S. Allen, 'Justice and the politics of difference',  at 45. 
389 Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought',  at 378. 
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and discrimination law). The employer has by the very nature of his position in 
the labour market the regulatory power to affect the market process, i.e. the 
allocation of resources, through the choices he makes.  
 
 
2.3 The legal framework ensuring social inclusion 
The fight against discrimination and exclusion cannot be won by legislation 
alone. First and foremost it depends on changing attitudes and behaviour. But there can 
be no doubt that an effective and properly enforced legal framework outlawing 
discrimination and ensuring that its victims can have effective recourse is an 
essential precursor for delivering real change. The Commission is committed to 
ensuring that the existing legal framework is respected, whilst proposing that new 
legislation is needed to extend the scope of legal protection to all forms of 
discrimination in all areas of life.390  
 
The approach implemented by EU discrimination law intends to generate social 
integration at the place where social exclusion emerges in the context of the 
employment relationship. The problem underlying the employment relationship 
in the internal market is an asymmetry of power between employer and 
employee. Contractual freedom, in combination with the automatic monopoly 
employers have over labour, created an asymmetry of power between the 
employer and potential employees. The allocation of rights and obligations to the 
relevant actors does exactly this—it changes attitudes and behaviour. The 
importance being that the allocation does not respond to the nature of the 
actors, which is private, but to their position in the labour market that reflects 
the central economic interests of the labour market. This is why, in relation to 
the attainment of social integration, a central function is ascribed to the 
employment relationship; the technique through which social integration is 
attained is a form of internalisation. The employment relationship has to 
internalise the objective of social integration.  
 
The consequence of the allocation of rights and obligations is that the economic 
powers and dynamics leading to social exclusion in the first place are balanced. 
Firstly, private actors that are likely to be excluded from the labour market are 
encouraged to participate in the labour market through the allocation of rights. 																																																								
390 See COM(2008)420 final,  3. 
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Rights to equal treatment protect potentially vulnerable individuals in seeking 
employment opportunities under equal conditions. Secondly, the obligation 
allocated to employers constrains the economic freedoms of employers and 
requires them not to discriminate on the basis of non-economic factors in the 
course of posting vacant positions.  
 
The objective is to create a form of regulatory neutrality in terms of factors that 
give rise to discrimination.391 EU discrimination law sets a level playing field on 
which competition of potential employees takes place on factors other than 
personal factors. Thus, in principle, EU discrimination law limits the contractual 
freedom of individuals when acting as ‘employer’ in the context of the internal 
market. 
 
 
2.3.1 Allocation of rights 
Within the legal framework of EU discrimination law, potential employees are 
generally protected and covered under the principle of equal treatment. The 
principle of equal treatment requires that employees or candidates for a post 
shall have equal opportunities with regard to any other competitor in a specific 
context. The rights allocated to individuals being discriminated against are 
“directly applicable and may thus give rise to individual rights which the courts 
must protect.”392 At the same time, rights are only for the benefit of groups that 
are discriminated or have suffered structural and systemic disadvantages under 
national law. Groups that come within this definition are those being 
discriminated based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age, or sexual orientation.393  
 
The function of the allocation of rights is to create a power for employees, which 
balances the power that the employer has due to his position in the labour 
market. 394  The allocation of rights implies a responsibility to take up 
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employment in order to improve one’s living conditions.395 In this sense, the 
position of the employee in the context of the labour market is equally 
important. Only if employees make use of the opportunities created through EU 
discrimination law will this increase the welfare overall. Social integration is not 
only about the creation of equality of opportunities, but also about the actual use 
of opportunities.  
 
The technique used to activate individuals is similar to the context of free 
movement law. Rights are allocated as an instrument to empower a potentially 
weaker economic position. The right functions as an incentive and motivates and 
supports the individuals engaging in the economic context. This is paired with 
the allocation of specific obligations, which shall inform and require those actors 
holding power to take into account potentially weaker actors. This might even 
require that positive actions are taken to ensure that competition between 
potential employees can take place on equal footage. 
 
 
2.3.2 Allocation of obligations 
EU discrimination law addresses specific obligations of the employer to abolish 
any form of discriminatory treatment with regard to employment and 
occupation. Under EU discrimination law, the employer is entrusted with the 
task of ensuring that the principle of equal treatment is implemented with regard 
to the following: 
 
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to 
occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, 
whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional 
hierarchy, including promotion; 
 
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, 
vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, 
including practical work experience; 
 																																																								
395 Derrick Wyatt, 'Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Equality after Viking 
and Mangold, and the Implications for Community Competence', Croatian Yearbook of European Law 
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(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and 
pay; 
 
(d) membership of, and involvement in, an organisation of workers 
or employers, or any organisation whose members carry on a 
particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such 
organisations. 396 
 
The approach adopted under EU discrimination law recognises the systemic 
relevance of the power of employers to make choices relating to the labour 
market. This is the power of the employer to make economically relevant choices 
and the power to determine what skills are needed in the labour market. EU 
internal market law recognises that the employer, in regard to the freedom of 
contract, must have some powers in determining what kind of labour is needed. 
However, this power is not recognised unconditionally. In order to ensure an 
effective functioning of the labour market, employers must ensure that the 
principle of equal treatment is observed in activities under their control. Thus, 
individuals shall not be excluded on the basis of arbitrary discrimination. This 
would “undermine the attainment of a high level of employment and social 
protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons.”397 The power 
of the employer, thus, is assessed in terms of arbitrary discrimination: 
 
56. That is, in essence, because the difference between (acceptable) 
differential treatment and (unacceptable) discrimination lies not in 
whether people are treated differently, but in whether society 
accepts as justifiable the criteria whose application results in 
different treatment, or whether, on the contrary, they are 
considered as arbitrary.398 
 
Although the Angonese case was decided under the free movement of workers, the 
case also concerns the issue of discrimination. The case of Roman Angonese 
concerned the requirements that were set in order to be eligible for the vacancy 																																																								
396  Directive 2000/78/EC,  Article 3(1); and Case C-45/09 Gisela Rosenbladt v Oellerking 
Gebäudereinigungs GmbH, Opinion of Advocate General TRSTENJAK,  at 64. 
397 Directive 2000/78/EC,  recital 11. 
398 Case C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 56. 
	 137 
advertised by the Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano. Having recognised the special 
position the employer occupies in the labour market, the Court of justice 
continued and held that choices in the labour market should be made on the 
basis of economic criteria.399 As the Court of Justice clarified, Article 45 TFEU is 
designed “to ensure that there is no arbitrary discrimination [on the grounds of 
nationality] in the labour market.”400 
 
The allocation of the obligation to ensure equal treatment is a means to control 
the power of employer in the labour market. It fills a gap where national law is 
deficient: the control of private actors that are by the nature of their position, i.e. 
employer in the labour market, capable to affect the social integration of the 
internal market for labour. The objective is to ensure that “activities and choices 
of the employer with regard to employment and occupation do not distort 
competition” in the labour market.401 Consequently, choices made in relation to 
employment relationships have to be based on economically acceptable criteria. 
Ultimately the Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter to decide upon acceptable 
criteria. 
 
In the labour market, “objective behaviour is based on considerations of 
productivity alone.”402 EU discrimination law incorporates a pecuniary and skills-
based approach to the labour market. Choices made on the basis of personal 
factors are considered as forms of arbitrary discrimination. With regard to 
objective economic criteria, the employer remains free to determine the demand 
side. The meaning of objective economic criteria in the context of the labour 
market refers to conditions which workers, through training, education, and 
practical experience can attain. For this reason it stands that:  
 
Vocational training is at the forefront of Commission priorities to 
spearhead a new and indispensable effort to invest in people in 
their skills, their creativity and their versatility.403 
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The aim is to create an environment that fosters “access to participate in, or 
advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would 
impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.”404 Only if choices are made 
on economic criteria can workers adapt to the demands of employers and move 
to places where their skills are needed. Criteria or conditions in relation to 
employment and occupation shall not have a closing-off effect in the sense that 
participation in the labour market is linked to factors that workers cannot 
change – such as age, nationality, and sex. In this regard, the organisation of the 
internal market for labour creates a space in which workers can improve their 
skills. In other words individuals can invest in their market value and compete in 
other markets or at other levels of the market. Workers must have the possibility 
to adapt to the needs of the labour market.405 The minimum guarantee the EU 
social policy seeks to ensure is the possibility to compete under fair and equal 
conditions in the labour market. Competition is understood as the accountability 
mechanism in the context of the internal market. Choices should be made on the 
basis of skills and suitability for the position rather then aspects relating to origin 
and nationality. The employer must be as objective as possible when advertising 
positions. 
 
 
2.3.3 Economic limits  
The requirement to ensure equal treatment is not unlimited. There are economic 
limits to the principle of equal treatment.406 The principle of equal treatment 
should not distort the market process in the sense that it requires activities from 
the employer that would be over burdening and impose too high costs on the 
employer. Depending on the context concerned it can be seen that different 
factors affect the balance of what is a disproportionate burden for the employer. 
Directive 2000/78/EC sheds some light on this issue. In the preamble, Directive 
2000/78/EC states that in order,  
 
21. to determine whether the measures in question give rise to a 
disproportionate burden, account should be taken in particular of 																																																								
404 Directive 2000/78/EC,  Article 5. 
405 Ibid., at recital 7. Recital 7 refers to “skilled, trained and adaptable workforce.“ 
406 COM(90)228 final Proposal for a Council Directive supplementing the measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of temporary workers, of 29 June 1990,  542. 
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the financial and other costs entailed, the scale and financial 
resources of the organisation or undertaking and the possibility of 
obtaining public funding or any other assistance. 407 
 
Whereas direct discrimination on the grounds of sex seems to be prohibited in 
general, for example, this is not the case for discrimination on the grounds of 
age.408  Advocate General Sharpston refers to this distinction in her Opinion in 
Bartsch:  
 
63 … Whilst the directive defines what the principle of equal 
treatment shall mean in respect of matters falling within its scope 
and also defines direct and indirect discrimination, it clearly 
envisages that differentiation on the basis of age in the context of 
employment and occupation will not always constitute unlawful 
discrimination. Thus, it distinguishes between ‘differences in 
treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate 
employment policy, labour market and vocational training 
objectives, and discrimination, which must be prohibited’. 
Crucially, therefore, it lays down a series of specific rules that 
establish the parameters of what differential treatment on grounds 
of (inter alia) age is acceptable (and why).409 
 
The possibility to justify discriminatory treatment acknowledges that in some 
situations discriminatory treatment may be needed or legitimate. For example, 
this would be the case where the employer has to make additional efforts to 
make the workplace accessible for elderly or disabled people. The additional 
costs might be a reason to justify different treatment.410  
 
 
 
 																																																								
407 Directive 2000/78/EC,  recital 21. 
408 Case C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 99. 
409 Ibid., at 63. 
410 Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas, Opinion of Advocate General GEELHOED,  at 51 and 55; and 
Case C-45/09 Gisela Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungs GmbH, Opinion of Advocate 
General TRSTENJAK; and Mark Bell, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening',  at 
636. 
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3. The employer as a social actor 
In the context of EU discrimination law, the role of the employer has been 
reconfigured and it is placed in the infrastructure of the legal framework that is 
intended to ensure social integration and social inclusion in the internal market. 
Moreover, the recognition of employers as legal subjects in the internal market 
determines their place in the constitutional structure of the internal market for 
labour and the relationship it has with other EU institutions, i.e. that the 
activities of employer are subject to requirements imposed by EU internal 
market law. The allocation of obligations under EU discrimination law to the 
employer is only the tip of the iceberg. It is the legal consequence of the position 
EU internal market law envisages for the employer in the labour market (and to a 
certain extent that what is expected from the employer in relation to the 
attaining the objectives of social integration). 
 
 
3.1 The employer as a ‘source of authority’ in the labour market 
In the context of the labour market, the employer occupies a special position. 
EU discrimination law transforms the employer into a ‘competent authority’ that 
is partly in charge of delivering ‘social inclusion.’ In order to attain social 
integration of the internal market, EU internal market law creates a legal 
framework that regulates the activities of private actors that engage in the 
internal market qua ‘employer.’ The employer as an actor is still vested and 
closely tied to national law and relies on national contract law to form 
employment relationships. However, the difference is that when acting in the 
capacity of the employer, private actors automatically engage in the internal 
market for labour. Thus, employers must ensure that their activities comply with 
the requirements set out in EU discrimination law. This has a decisive effect on 
national contract law with regard to employment relationships. When it comes 
to contractual freedom in relation to employment issues, EU internal market law 
confines the private autonomy granted under national law. The effect is that 
powers granted and protected under national law are redefined in order to ensure 
social integration and ultimately the construction of the internal market.  
 
The practical consequence of the obligations allocated to the employer is that 
when engaging in economic activities, the employer automatically produces social 
integration. Thus, through the allocation of obligations EU discrimination law 
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turns the potentially negative effects of unbridled regulatory power (i.e. social 
exclusion) into a regulatory power, which is producing social inclusion at the 
same time economic choices are made. The obligations addressed to the 
employer have an outward effect as they are imbedded in a legal and institutional 
framework intended to ensure social integration in the internal market in 
practice. This steering of conduct leads to the inclusion of disadvantaged actors 
in the internal market in a general and wider context. The employment 
relationship becomes the place where social integration is produced and the open 
market policy of the internal market for labour is delivered in practice. 
 
The employer is an agent in mainstreaming the social objectives of the EU. 
Under EU discrimination law the employer is required to implement the 
principle of equal treatment into the workplace and the employment 
relationship. Consequently, it is the employer that ensures equality of 
opportunity as a primary agent. Every economic activity is measured against the 
objectives of EU discrimination law and the requirement imposed on the 
employer thereunder. When acting in the realm of the internal market, the 
employer is now also a social actor that actively contributes to the social 
integration of the internal market when its activities comply with EU 
discrimination law. 
 
Clearly the approach detailed above is intended to provide a more efficient form 
of governance to ensure social integration in the internal market for labour.411 
The underlying approach to social justice is fundamentally different from that of 
the welfare state.412 While the welfare state based social justice on an idea of 
compensation, i.e. compensating those being disadvantaged by the market, EU 
discrimination law implements an approach revolving around ‘active’ actors and 
their participation in the labour market through equal opportunities. This 
creates an environment that includes those having ‘bad luck’ in socio-economic 
terms, into the market process. This new environment had a profound impact on 
national labour markets, national laws, and the relationships between employer 
and employee and the way unemployment was dealt with for example.  
 																																																								
411 Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives',  at 30. 
412 COM(93)551 final 19. “We are in the middle of a realignment of the functions of the State, the 
enterprise and the family.”  
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This approach also involves institutional challenges. Thus, EU internal market 
law is concerned with the challenge to create a system of institutional actors that 
ensures the effective implementation of EU discrimination law. Here, the Court 
of Justice in Defrenne II already noted the unwillingness of national public 
authorities to take care of this. 413 Public actors considered employment-related 
choices to be within the private sphere and only raised issues if the route via 
Member States was an effective approach to ensure social inclusion. The decision 
to expand the obligation to employer was not only a decision to give effect to EU 
discrimination law in private relationships, but it was a decision to not involve 
Member States in the provision of social justice. Today, EU discrimination law 
sets out a detailed framework of shared responsibilities through which social 
integration, i.e. social justice, is delivered in practice. Social justice is produced 
within the labour market and the relationship of employer and employee 
whereby the effectiveness of this approach is ensured through the allocation of 
rights and obligations. 
 
 
3.2 Wider institutional organisation 
Although the employment relationship occupies a central role in the context of 
attaining social integration, it is far from being the only place where social 
integration is ensured. The employment relationship and its function in relation 
to the social integration of individuals in the labour market is surrounded by a 
multiple web of actors, reflecting a framework of shared responsibility. The 
coordination of these actors contributes, within the functions entrusted under 
EU discrimination law, to the attainment of social equality.  
 
 
3.2.1 Shared form of responsibility 
Social partners, trade unions, and other collective entities representing interests 
of labour are likewise bound by the obligation to ensure equal treatment with 
regard to employment and occupation. The right to use collective bargaining 
power is well recognised as part of the labour market and workers rights.414 It is 																																																								
413 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 33. 
414 See Article 28 EUCFR and Case C-172/11, Georges Erny, of 27 February 2014 (not yet published); 
and Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 44; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri 
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another remedy for workers to balance the power of the employer. It may be said 
that this is the ‘natural’ form of balancing the power of employer in labour law. 
The regulatory power emerging from the organisation of workers in collective 
entities representing collective interests (e.g. minimum wage), is capable of 
affecting the labour market.  
 
The asymmetry of power that emerges between the employer and the collective 
entity is similar to the asymmetry of power faced with regard to the employer 
and employee. Asymmetry of power emerges from the strength of collective 
organisations vis-à-vis the employer, i.e. in terms of numbers of employees, and 
the dependency of the employer on the social partner, which is in an 
economically stronger position and may dictate conditions for employment that 
are detrimental to the employer or even discriminatory. The consequence being 
that these social partners are likewise subject to the requirements of EU 
discrimination law. Similarly, EU discrimination law recognises the form of self-
organisation and collective action as a natural form of balancing the power of the 
employer.  
 
In Prigge, the Court of Justice elaborated on the role of social partners. Prigge 
concerned the alleged age-discrimination that emerged from the retirement age 
of 60 years as concluded between Lufthansa and its social partners.415 Having 
recognised the autonomy of social partners and in particular their legislative 
power to “lay down provisions limiting the duration of employment contracts” in 
collective agreements,416 the Court of Justice continued and held that:   
 
47 The right to collective negotiation set out at Article 28 of the 
Charter must, within the scope of EU internal market law, be 
performed in accordance with EU internal market law. 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and 
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 at 91. 
415 Case C-447/09, Reinhard Prigge, [2011] ECR I-8003 at 22-36. 
416 Ibid., at 27. “In application of the principle of autonomy of the social partners and the freedom 
that they have in the carrying out of their legislative power, the social partners may lay down 
provisions limiting the duration of employment contracts by fixing an age limit. However, as that 
normative power is shared with the State, the State has specified that the limitation on the 
duration of employment contracts must be justified by an objective reason. The social partners 
however have a margin of appreciation in the definition of that objective reason.” 
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48 Therefore, where they adopt measures, which fall within the 
scope of the Directive, which gives specific expression, in the 
domain of employment and occupation, to the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners must respect 
the Directive. 
 
49 Thus, it is clearly apparent … that collective agreements must, the 
same as legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions, respect the 
principle implemented by the Directive.417 
 
It seems that this type of regulation of employment law is the preferred option 
under the general framework implemented by Directive 2000/78/EC. 418  In 
exercising this power, collective entities are bound by the limits set out in 
Directive 2000/78/EC.419 The organisation of labour relationships on the basis of 
agreements negotiated between the social partners is a way to organise the 
market only on the basis of powers and mechanisms internal to the labour 
relationship. 
 
 
a) Member States 
In terms of different functions, the employer is not the sole competent authority 
entrusted with the task of ensuring social equality. Yet, while the employer must 
ensure that the social policy is implemented in the workplace and in the 
employment relationship, the Member States must ensure that the legal 
framework on which the employment relationship is based effectively protects 
the principle of equal treatment. The consequences being that the Member 
States are another competent authority acting within the realm of EU social 
policy.  
 
																																																								
417 Ibid., at 47-49. For similar argumentation see Case C-172/11, Georges Erny, of 27 February 2014 
(not yet published). Erny is decided under free movement, however. Emphasis added. 
418 Directive 2000/78/EC,  Article 13. “Member States shall, in accordance with their national 
traditions and practice, take adequate measures to promote dialogue between the social partners 
with a view to fostering equal treatment, including through the monitoring of workplace 
practices, collective agreements, codes of conducts and through research or exchange of 
experiences and good practices.” 
419 Case C-447/09, Reinhard Prigge, [2011] ECR I-8003 at 48.  
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National law, for which Member States are responsible, is still the main source 
for employment relationships. This is because national contract law is still the 
place that forms the basis for the conclusion of employment contracts. Thus, the 
responsibility of the Member States has not diminished but changed. With 
regard to EU discrimination law the role of the Member States is best described 
as being a facilitator. National contract law, employment law, social law, and even 
tort law affect the labour market. The Member State’s primary responsibility is 
to ensure an effective legislative framework at national level that is in compliance 
with the principle of equal treatment.420 For example, in Defrenne II the Court of 
Justice clarified that it is the Member States that must “ensure that the principle 
of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work of equal value is 
applied.”421  Similarly, in Rosenbladt the Court of Justice held that the: 
 
79. … Member States are required to ensure, by means of 
appropriate laws, regulations or administrative provisions, that all 
workers are able to enjoy fully the protection granted to them by 
Directive 2000/78 against discrimination on the grounds of age. 
Article 16(b) of the directive requires Member States to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that ‘any provisions contrary to the 
principle of equal treatment which are included in contracts or 
collective agreements … are, or may be, declared null and void or 
are amended.’422 
 
The Member States enjoy some discretion in terms of compliance.423 The choice 
for a directive as the legal instrument leaves “to the national authorities the 																																																								
420  COM(89) 568 final,  14. “The Commission considers that, in matters of employment and 
remuneration, responsibility and, therefore, initiative lie mainly with the Member States and the 
two sides of industry according to national practices, legislation and agreements.” Directive 
2000/78/EC,  Article 16. Further see COM(89) 568 final; and Ronen Shamir, 'The age of 
responsibilization: on market-embedded morality',  at 51. 
421 For example see Directive 2000/78/EC,  Article 9-11 and 16. Further see Case 43/75 Gabrielle 
Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 455 at 33; and Case 
43/75 Defrenne II, Opinion of the Advocate General TRABUCCHI,  at 485-486; and Case 80/70 
Defrenne (I), Opinion of Advocate General DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE,  at 456. 
422 Case C- 45/09, Rosenbladt, [2010] ECR I-9391 at 79. 
423 Moreover, the choice for directives as legal instruments setting out the general framework on 
equal treatment in relation to employment relationships recognizes the position of the Member 
States in relation to the labour market as being in charge to ensure an effective legal framework in 
national law. For example see Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I‐
9981 at 77; and Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 
[1976] ECR 455 at 30; and Case C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 
91. 
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choice of form and method” and a “greater degree of flexibility.”424 This ensures 
that Member States remain capable of adapting their national systems to the 
Ordnungsprinzip of the internal market for labour. 
 
The omission of an effective transposition into national law, however, does not 
exempt the employer from its legal requirement to ensure equal treatment with 
regard to employment and occupation. Although the employment relationship is 
primarily based on national law, the ‘constitutional status’ of the employer and 
the employment relationship in the context of the internal market requires that 
the employer complies with the ‘mandatory’ requirements of EU discrimination 
law (set out in the treaties or the general principles of EU internal market law).425  
 
 
b) National courts 
As a consequence of the shift of the employment relationship to the centre of 
the internal market for labour, courts become the forum to deal with disputes 
arising under EU discrimination law.426 Already in Defrenne II the Court of 
Justice emphasised the role of national courts in the prevention of discriminatory 
treatment in employment relationships. The Court of Justice held that it is 
national courts that must protect the individual rights emerging from Article 119 
EEC effectively.427  
 
This organisation emerges from the requirement to ensure the functioning of the 
internal market (which is the ensuring of equal treatment in employment 
relationships) whilst acknowledging that national courts occupy a special position 
with regard to the assessment of the employment relationship as they are 
																																																								
424 Case C- 45/09, Rosenbladt, [2010] ECR I-9391 at 64. 
425 For example see Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
Sabena, [1976] ECR 455 at 39. And with regard to general principles and their effect for the 
employer Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I‐9981 at 76-77; and Case 
C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH &Co. KG [2010] at 21-24; and Mirjam De Mol, 
'Kücükdeveci: Mangold Revisited - Horizontal Direct Effect of a General Principle of EU Law', European 
Constitutional Law Review, 6 (2010), 293-308. 
426 Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two Competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free movement 
law',  at 366. 
427 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 24. 
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concluded under national law.428 National courts are best equipped to determine 
the circumstances and facts that give rise to discriminatory treatment regarding 
the special characteristics of the national law.429 The Court of Justice elaborated 
on this in Mangold. The Court of Justice held that it is,  
 
77. … the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of 
non-discrimination in respect of age, to provide, in a case within its 
jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from the 
rules of Community law and to ensure that those rules are fully 
effective, setting aside any provision of national law which may 
conflict with that law.430 
 
In the context of EU discrimination law, national courts are responsible for 
ensuring effective protection.431 This is a matter of assessing the facts of a case in 
light of the national legal framework. National courts provide the forum where 
private actors or parties of an employment relationship can solve their conflict in 
the case of alleged discriminatory treatment.432 This is made clear in Jenkins, 
where the Court of Justice clarified that national courts must decide “each 
individual case whether, regard being had to the facts of the case, its history and 
the employer’s intention, ... the dispute is or is not concerned with 
discriminatory treatment.”433  
 
 
4. Liability 
In relation to potential liability of employer, the Court of Justice held that it is 
“impossible to establish real equality of opportunity without an appropriate 
																																																								
428 See Directive 2000/78/EC,  recital 15; and Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 
at 14; and Case C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 91. 
429 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 at 14. 
430 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I‐9981 at 77. But also see Case 
C-427/06 Bartsch, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 73.: “It was therefore the 
responsibility of the national court to apply the fundamental principle to the case before it, and if 
necessary to set aside a rule of national law in order to guarantee effective protection.” 
431 Directive 2000/78/EC,  29. 
432 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 at 14; and Case C- 45/09, Rosenbladt, [2010] 
ECR I-9391. 
433 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 at 14. 
	148 
system of sanctions”.434 This requirement for effective protection of rights in 
national courts is already emphasised in the Court of Justices decision in Defrenne 
II.435 However, although EU internal market law imposes legal requirements on 
private actors, EU internal market law does not set up a coherent system of legal 
liability in this framework. Rather, the responsibility remains within the national 
laws implementing the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality 
Directive and within the national courts.436 This requirement is reflected in 
Article 9 of Directive 2000/78, for example, requiring that: 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative 
procedures, including where they deem it appropriate conciliation 
procedures, for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive 
are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged by 
failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them, even after 
the relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have 
occurred has ended. 
 
With regard to the effectiveness of measures adopted under national law, the 
Court of Justice clarified that while “full implementation of the Directive does 
not require any specific form of sanction for unlawful discrimination, it does 
entail that that sanction be such as to guarantee real and effective judicial 
protection.”437 The question of enforcement and determination of liability is 
vested in national law and national institutions (i.e. legislators and courts). The 
Court of Justice is reluctant to prescribe forms of liability but prefers to set a 
general obligation to ensure effective judicial protection, understood as access to 
courts and availability of judicial remedies.  
 
Under German law for example, the General Act on Equal Treatment, 
transposing Directive 2000/78, established that the employer is obliged to 
compensate the victim for any damage caused by discriminatory treatment 																																																								
434 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 
01891 at 22. 
435 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455 at 24. 
436 See Oliview De Schutter, 'The liability of legal persons in anti-discrimination law', European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review, 6/7/October 2008 (2008), 33. 
437 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 01891 
at 23. 
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(Article 15(1)).438 With regard to compensation, the Court of Justice clarified in 
Draehmpaehl that:  
 
25. … compensation must be such as to guarantee real and effective 
judicial protection, have a real deterrent effect on the employer and 
must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained. 
Purely nominal compensation would not satisfy the requirements 
of an effective transposition of the Directive.439 
 
This right to compensation is regularly enforced before national labour courts. 
The meaning of ‘adequate compensation’ is not defined by national law, but the 
accompanying commentaries of the General Act on Equal Treatment refer to the 
Court of Justice’s definition of appropriate as having “a real deterrent effect on 
the employer and must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage 
sustained.” Thus, the assessment of an appropriate compensation is made on a 
case-by-case basis by the competent national courts. The consequence being that 
the assessment of violation under the Equal Treatment Directive remains within 
the national domain. Under German law liability is dealt with in the context of 
civil liability, a dispute between private parties, before ordinary labour courts. 
This may be a blessing or a curse depending on the perspective adopted. Clearly, 
a risk inherent in this structure is that national courts do not enforce the 
requirements of the Equal Treatment Directive effectively, which has a direct 
impact on the efficiency of attaining social equality. Alternatively, national courts 
might be best equipped to enforce the legal requirements of EU discrimination 
law simply because they are familiar with national contract law and can easily 
move within the applicable national legal frameworks.  
 
In any case, liability under EU discrimination law takes into account to the 
specific nature of the employment relation, which is still framed under national 
law. EU internal market law solely occupies parts of the employment 
relationship, which is reflected in the prohibition to discriminate. The proximity 
of national courts to national contract law equips national courts with important 
tools to balance the needs of the integrity of the national system on the one hand 																																																								
438 See §15(1) AGG, Allgemeines Gleichgehandlungsgesetz (BGBl. I S. 1897, 1920), of 14 August 
2006.  
439 Case C-180/95, Nils Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immobilienservice OHG, [1997] ECR I-02195 at 25. 
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and the requirement to ensure compliance with EU legal requirements on the 
other. This advantage in terms of expertise and knowledge is acknowledged by 
the Court of Justice and EU discrimination law, which leaves adjudication to the 
national courts.  
 
 
5. Remarks 
The approach developed under EU discrimination law transformed the 
employment relationship into a place where social integration is effectively 
produced. The legal requirements imposed on employers (i.e. not to discriminate) 
and employees (i.e. to make use of powers protected through rights), creates an 
environment that produces social integration. Social integration emerges as a by-
product of the economic activities of employers and employees. While the rights 
and obligations create direct requirements for specific cases and situations, the 
outward effect in the long-term implements an open market policy in terms of 
social inclusion into the internal market.  
 
The approach developed under EU discrimination law to ensure social 
integration reflects a Rawlsian improvement: 440  the constraint for some (i.e. 
employer) is to “the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” 
(i.e. those being discriminated).441 In this sense, EU discrimination law reflects an 
approach that is intended to increase social justice with regard to the internal 
market for labour. The costs for this improvement are allocated to the employer 
(i.e. through obligations), who is nevertheless in a position to benefit from the 
market due to the transnational pool of workers available. Through EU 
discrimination law it is ensured that the benefits and burdens of the internal 
market for labour are “equitably distributed” between employees and employers 
in relation to the attainment of social integration.442  
  
																																																								
440 N. A. Barr, 'The economics of the welfare state',  at Chapter 2 and 3. 
441 John Rawls, 'Political Liberalism Expanded Edition',  at 47. 
442 Ibid.– the primary objective of a social system is social justice. François Ewald, 'A Concept of 
Social Law',  at 46. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Responsibility of Private Actors in EU Food Safety 
Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In some countries food is an important part of the culture. Pasta from Italy, 
sausages from Germany, cheese from France, chocolate from Belgium are just a 
few examples of food products that are affiliated with a specific nation and 
culture. It is hardly surprising that in most of these countries laws exist that 
regulate and protect the requirements of such products. This may include rules 
on production criteria, permitted ingredients, purity requirements, quality 
standards, marketing requirements, storing, and labelling, for example. It makes 
sense that many of the cases that relate to the economic integration of the 
internal market for goods concern these kind of national laws. In light of the 
economic integration of the internal market, the real effect of these 
requirements was that they distorted the cross-border flow of food and therefore 
the functioning of the internal market for goods.443 Moreover, the Court of 
Justice even considered national laws dealing with price fixing,444 import and 
export restrictions, and measures promoting domestic goods.445 
 
In light of the internal market for goods of which the food market is a sub-
category, EU food law emerged. EU Food law did not begin as a self-standing 
well-developed sector of European regulation. Rather food law, or to be precise 																																																								
443 For example see Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; and Case 120/78, 
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649; and Case 178/84, 
Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227; and Case 170/78, Commission v. 
United Kingdom, [1980] ECR 417; and Case 90/86, Criminal Proceedings against Giorgio Zoni, [1988] 
ECR I-4285.  
444 Case 82/77, Openbaar Ministerie v. van Tiggele, [1978] ECR 25 at 12-14. 
445 Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, [1982] ECR 4005. 
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national food laws and their variations, were one of the key areas of law that led 
the Court of Justice to develop its approach for economic integration of the 
internal market for goods. This is simply because the cases and disputes 
concerning issues of food are decided under the treaty provisions regarding the 
free movement of goods.446 In a remarkable line of cases, the Court of Justice 
developed a deregulatory approach in relation to food products that opened up 
national markets for foreign food products. For example Dassonville emerged in 
relation to a conflict concerning the import of whiskey from France to Belgium. 
Alternatively, the decision in Cassis de Dijon, which established the core concept 
of mutual recognition on which the internal market for goods is based, relates to 
the import of alcoholic beverages to Germany.  
 
EU food law regulates this internal market for goods, which in practice relates to 
the development of mechanisms to ensure the free circulation of food in the 
internal market. The basic structure of the internal market for food is reflected 
in the Court of Justices decision in Cassis de Dijon. This is a market environment 
that is based upon free movement, mutual recognition, and regulatory 
competition (i.e. competition on the basis of different national regulations 
concerning food requirements). 447  Member States should not obstruct free 
movement of food and competition because a product does not meet their own 
national food law standards. Once food is lawfully marketed under the laws of a 
Member State, producers are free to export to other Member States and 
compete with similar food products in the markets.448 This approach reveals a lot 
about the role of Member States. Although Member States remain free to 
regulate issues concerning food, they may not do so in a way that de facto 
interferes with the free movement of goods, unless it is for overriding reasons 																																																								
446 For this see Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm',  at 387 and 398. Free movement of food is 
based on the idea of an exchange economy. Exchange takes place in terms of products for money, 
where the pricing mechanism coordinates demand and supply in the food market. 
447 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 14; 
and Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227 at 25; and 
Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two Competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free movement law'. 
448Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 12. 
For example see the requirement for information on food products that is intended to support 
consumer choices referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, (OJ L 304, 
22.11.2011, p. 18–63). Jens-Uwe Franck and Kai Purnhagen, 'Homo economicus, behavioural sciences, 
and economic regulation : on the concept of man in internal market regulation and its normative basis',  at 2. 
Saydé refers to this as a model fostering regulatory competition between different national laws. 
See Alexandre Saydé, 'One Law, Two Competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free movement 
law'. 
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such as food safety or public health. It should not be the Member State that 
determines what the consumer wants but the consumer itself.449 The task of food 
business operators in this context was limited to the lawful marketing of food 
within the Member State of origin and to provide accurate and understandable 
information to consumers about food products.450 Put differently, the only legal 
requirements food business operators have to comply with were those set out in 
national law or EU internal market law intended to harmonise parts of national 
food law (e.g. labelling). 
 
 
1. The new approach to food safety in the internal market 
Food law is interesting because the system on which the food market was 
intended to function was a market based on either regulatory competition 
reflected in the principle of mutual recognition, or, where necessary, through the 
harmonisation of certain aspects relating to food products that intend to improve 
the market. For example, labelling is one of these requirements, where EU 
internal market law harmonised the approach to ensure equal requirements for 
producers.451 The system set up was intended to supplement and increase the 
efficiency of the internal market for food products by prescribing a mandatory 
set of criteria that must be on the label and therefore available to consumers. The 
intention was to create a universal set of information for consumers on which 
basis choices could be made.452  
 
However, the internal market for food does not function on national food law 
and mutual recognition alone. EU food law adds further requirements that should 
steer and ensure the effective functioning of the internal market for goods. In 
addition to mutual recognition of lawfully marketed products, the internal 
market for food relies on correct information for the consumer as a condition for 
																																																								
449 Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227 at 32; and Marco 
Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer'. 
450 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 14; 
and Case C-33/97, Colim NV v Bigg's Continent Noord NV, [1999] ECR I-03175 at 29. 
451 For example see Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd, [2010] ECR 321 at 38. Harmonisation “aims to 
contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market in order to achieve a high level of 
consumer protection and maintain competition among operators of mobile telephone networks.” 
452 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011,  Recital 3 and Article 9; and Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 13. 
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the effective functioning for competition.453 Information, in terms of EU food 
law, is a precondition for the consumer to make correct choices; consequently 
labelling occupies a key position in EU food law. For example,  equal information 
on ingredients, alcohol content, and allergens provides a level playing field for 
competition between the products concerned. Choices shall be made by the 
consumer concerning the effects food can have on their health. The internal 
market for food thus reflects a market already highly harmonised in terms of the 
‘policy-making environment’ created for consumers and producers. 
 
Food safety and food safety regulations were also subject to the same national 
laws. Food safety requirements were regulated, monitored, and enforced at 
national level. The underlying assumption was that a sufficient level of consumer 
protection would be attained through national food safety law, which applied to 
food businesses in combination with the free movement of food and the principle 
of mutual recognition.  
 
However, history has proven this approach to be inefficient in terms of 
guaranteeing a high level of protection of consumer health. The problem 
encountered relates to the Member States being unable to efficiently provide an 
adequate level of protection. The BSE crisis marks the turning point with regard to 
the regulation of food safety in the context of the internal market.454 During the 
BSE crisis, British beef contaminated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE), a neurodegenerative disease, was distributed by British producers 
throughout the internal market, protected by the principle of mutual 
recognition. Scientific evidence revealed that BSE could be transmitted to human 
beings through the consumption of contaminated meat.455 The lack of effective 
safety measures and preventive and protective procedures at national level caused 
a severe loss of consumer confidence in the benefits and functioning of the 
internal market for goods. In particular, this refers to the failure of the Member 																																																								
453 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 13; 
and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : 
an Introduction' (Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2004),  at 140. 
454 Speech by Jacques Santer, Debate on the report by the Committee of Inquiry into BSE, 
SPEECH/97/39; and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis', Journal 
of Consumer Policy, 23 (2000) at 231; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling 
European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 534. 
455 For example see COM(97)176 final, The General Principles of Food Law in the European 
Union. Commission Green Paper., of 30 April 1997; and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in 
the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 232. 
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States to intervene timely and efficiently and the failure of the Commission to 
address the risk emerging from BSE contaminated beef. 456  
 
In light of these institutional failures—including the failure of the system 
developed by the Court of Justice to ensure food safety—the EU Commission, in 
response to pressure from the European Parliament, proposed a new form of 
‘management’ to attain food safety and protect consumer health. 457  The 
regulation and guarantee of food safety is now harmonised and transferred to EU 
level. This new approach is reflected in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.458  
 
With Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, the notion of food safety entered the stage 
of EU food law. Food safety is now attained through a new harmonised and 
Europeanised approach to risk, which fundamentally changed the approach on 
how food safety is attained; this had a direct impact on the role of food business 
operators. The counter-culture emerged in this context of reorganisation. This is 
reflected in the general obligation imposed on food businesses to comply with 
food safety requirements as defined by EU internal market law or national law. 
Furthermore, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 requires that food business operators 
are able to trace the origins of foods or ingredients they intend to use or sell.459 
Food business operators are also in charge of a precautionary duty,460 i.e. they 
shall withdraw food that is unsafe from the market as soon as they become aware 
of it and they shall also inform the public. Thus, it is food businesses that are 
conferred some form of public responsibility in the context of EU food safety 
law. 
 
This latest regime requires that “food shall not be placed on the market if it is 
unsafe.”461 A precondition for the marketing of food in the internal market is 																																																								
456 In particular this refers to the failure of the EU Commission to address the risk emerging from 
BSE contaminated beef. The failure of adequate and timely response by the Commission and 
Member States to the BSE crisis caused a severe loss of consumer confidence in the functioning 
of the internal market. Speech by Jacques Santer. Speech/97/39 and COM(97)176 final. 
457 Further see for example see Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and 
Traditional Ways of Life',  at 535. 
458 This reflects a centralised approach in the sense that it harmonises at the minimum level the 
general principles relating to food law and safety requirements with which all Member States laws 
must comply.  
459 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 18. 
460 Ibid., at Article 19. 
461 Ibid., at Article 14(1); and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and 
Traditional Ways of Life',  at 545. 
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that food does not adversely affect health and is safe for human consumption.462 
With regard to the subject of this thesis, the regulation of food safety is a good 
case-study because we witness an “institutional reform and reform of general objectives 
of food policy,”463 in particular on how food safety is attained. Prior to Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002, food safety was attained through national food law and market 
dynamics in the internal market for goods; this has now changed profoundly.  
 
Food safety is now an integral part of the internal market that is primarily 
concerned with consumer health and the attainment of this objective, while also 
seeking to reconcile this objective with the maintenance of the free movement of 
goods. This offers a fine sample of EU internal market law relying on specific 
private actors—here the food business operator—to attain the objective of food 
safety in the internal market. This latest approach replaces the regime where 
national law and national institutions were solely in charge of guaranteeing and 
ensuring food safety.  
 
 
2. Effective attainment of food safety under EU internal market law 
Regulating food safety concerns the organisation and regulation of risk. 464 This is 
how to ensure the protection of consumers from unsafe food in accordance with 
the functioning and free movement of goods in the internal market. In pre- 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002  systems, food safety was regulated through 
national food law. Member States and national food authorities were entrusted 
with the task of ensuring that only safe food was placed on the market. Risk 
regulation was carried out in a national environment. This level of protection was 
deemed to be sufficient to ensure that only safe food is placed on the market. 
With this organisation of food safety in the internal market for goods, it was 
considered that “consumers may be adequately protected if they are adequately 
informed.”465 Food safety was bound up with the idea that the consumer is 
																																																								
462 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 14(2). 
463 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
536. 
464 Ibid., at 535. 
465 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 13; 
and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : 
an Introduction',  at 140. 
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capable of making choices concerning the safety of food to be consumed.466 This 
approach was overhauled and changed entirely.  
 
The standard of food safety is scientific-based and not determined in a ‘national 
environment’ only. At the centre of the reorganisation is Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002, which sets out the general principles of EU food law and how food 
safety is attained. This set of principles on how to attain food safety is 
supplemented and complemented by other specific food regulations relating to 
labelling, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and food additives, for 
example.467 Private actors must observe this web of ‘food law’ when they act in 
the capacity of food business operators within the meaning of Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002. 
 
 
2.1 The Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 regime 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 harmonises the general principles and requirements 
concerning food law. The legal framework set out by Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002  establishes a level playing field that applies to all food business 
operators equally. This harmonised approach is intended to ensure food safety as 
the basis of the internal market for goods. Food safety is normative in the sense 
that it prescribes a certain standard of products that are placed on the market.468 
This does not mean that EU food law is exclusively responsible for all aspects of 
food safety.469 EU internal market law is the only forum where general concerns 
relating the marketing of safe food can be decided. National laws have to comply 
with the principles established by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.  
 
																																																								
466 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011,  Article 8(4); and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the 
Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 231; and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der Velde, 
'Food Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 140. 
467 For example see Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011; and Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives (OJ L 354, 
31.12.2008, pp. 16-33); and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 1–
23). 
468 Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000 at 29-31. 
469 COM(1999)719 final, White Paper on food safety of 12 January 2000,  6. The new approach 
requires that all aspects of food safety are addressed at EU level. 
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In this regime, food safety became the primary objective of food law.470 A central 
element in the organisation of food safety is found in Article 14 of Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002, which entails that “food shall not be placed on the market if it 
is unsafe.”471 In this case, ‘unsafe’ is defined as any food that is ‘injurious to 
health’ or ‘unfit for human consumption.’472 Food safety relates to the protection 
of health and thus, to the “idea of consumer protection.”473 Food safety becomes 
a mandatory requirement in attaining consumer protection.474  
 
The objective of this latest approach to food safety is to “ensure a high level of 
protection of public health, safety and the consumer [and] to ensure the free 
movement of goods within the internal market.”475 In this latest approach food 
safety is ensured through risk analysis. Risk analysis shall provide a systemic 
method for the “determining of effective, proportionate and targeted measures 
or other actions to protect health.”476 This requires that food products at all 
stages of production be “evaluated for potential risk.”477 Article 6(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002 determines that:  
 
in order to achieve the general objective of a high level of 
protection of human health and life, food law shall be based on risk 
analysis except where this is not appropriate to the circumstances 
or the nature of the measure.478 
 
Risk analysis forms the basis for food safety policies. It is defined as a systemic 
“process consisting of three interconnected components: risk assessment, risk 																																																								
470 Ibid., at 22. 
471 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 14(1). 
472 Ibid., at Article 14(12). Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and 
Traditional Ways of Life',  at 545. 
473 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 1-3 and 32; and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the 
Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 234. 
474  Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 32-33; and 
COM(1999)719 final,  22. 
475 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 17; and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der 
Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 151; and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food 
Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 234-235. 
476  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 17. Recital 17 refers to “having recourse to risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication.” 
477 COM(1999)719 final,  9. 
478 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 6(1). 
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management, and risk communication.”479 In this regard, food policy applying 
this risk analysis process shall be based on scientific evidence.480 For example, the 
general requirement to not place food on the market that is unfit for human 
consumption is not “breached simply because a certain group of people is 
particularly susceptible to be injured by it,” e.g. allergies.481 Only food that is unfit 
for human consumption, based on scientific evidence may not be placed on the 
market. Where food is not in compliance with the EU food legislation it is 
presumed that it is either unfit or injurious to health. 482  Unfit for human 
consumption according to the Court of Justice’s decision in Berger means 
unacceptable for human consumption.483  
 
A consequence of this latest approach on how food safety is attained is that 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002  introduces a new institutional organisation. 484 
This new organisation of actors in charge of attaining food safety reflects a form 
of shared responsibility. 
 
 
2.2 Sharing the responsibility for food safety 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 coordinates the risk analysis process. This is 
reflected in the allocation of different duties and tasks concerning aspects of risk 
analysis to a “disparate number of institutional actors.” 485  In this new 
institutional framework, multiple actors are entrusted with different functions 
under the risk analysis system. The responsibility to ensure that only safe food is 
marketed,  is thus shared among multiple actors—it is decentralised.486 																																																								
479 Ibid., at Article 3(1); and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  
at 239. 
480 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 6(2) and recital 17; and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety 
Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 234-235. 
481 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 14(7). This provision assumes that “food that complies 
with specific Community provisions governing food safety shall be deemed to be safe.” 
482 Ibid., at Article 14(5); and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000 at 35. 
483 Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000 at 35. 
484 Speech by Jacques Santer,  para 10; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling 
European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 536.  
485 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
556. “A feature of such an organisational structure is that it is an adaptive process in which the 
nature of the 'problem' regulated will vary over space and time.“ Different actors are involved in a 
system of shared responsibilities to ensure food safety is delivered to the consumer in practice. 
486 COM(1999)719 final,  8; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks 
and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 542. 
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In this new institutional framework, food safety is produced through a sharing of 
functions under the risk analysis system. Private actors, when acting as food 
business operators, are put in charge for parts of the risk analysis process. 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 refers to this as the primary legal responsibility:  
 
at all stages of production, processing and distribution within the 
businesses under their control to ensure that foods or feeds satisfy 
the requirements of food law which are relevant to their activities 
and shall verify that such requirements are met.487 
 
Although the food business operator is entrusted with the primary legal 
responsibility to ensure compliance with food safety requirements, it acts in a 
framework of institutional actors. In this framework responsibilities are shared. 
The interplay of all these actors ensures a more efficient organisation to 
guarantee that only safe food is placed on the market. The advantage under this 
food safety regime, is that Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 defines the position of 
the food business operator (where private actors are concerned and constrained) 
and the legal consequences of being in this position. 
 
 
a) The European Food Safety Authority 
In the institutional framework in which responsibility is shared, the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) occupies a clear position in the food safety 
governance regime. This is because it “shall provide scientific advice and 
scientific and technical support for the Communities legislation and policies in 
all fields that have direct and indirect impact on food safety.”488 In the context of 
food law, EFSA is the authority that provides technical information on which 
basis policy choices with regard to food safety law are made.489 This scientific 
advice and technical information is important for both Member States acting in 
their capacity as legislators regulating national food law, and food business 
																																																								
487 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 30; and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der 
Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 143. 
488 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 22(2). 
489 In this capacity the EFSA “regulates scientific disputes”. For this see Damian Chalmers, ''Food 
for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 543. 
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operators making choices about food, ingredients, the production of food, and 
the marketing thereof.490 
 
The power and responsibility of EFSA follows from its status as “a point of 
reference.”491 Its relationship to “private operators engaged in the production, 
processing and distribution” is specific and dependent. Operators require 
scientific evidence and technical information to make choices about the safety of 
food or feed in order to place it on the market. 492  EFSA provides this 
information and technical support.  
 
Furthermore, EFSA ensures that consumers are well informed and capable of 
making good choices concerning food safety. In particular information on the 
risks relating to food, ingredients, or nutrition etc., shall be communicated to the 
consumer.493 However, this may also cover information about specific ways and 
means of nutrition. In this way EFSA has a supportive function for the food 
market. It provides guidance on what choices may be good or what choices may 
involve more risk. The tendency for more reasonable choices relating to food—
allergens or organic —is a shift that emerged as a consequence of different 
information about food and how we can improve our health through ‘better’ 
food. 
 
 
b) Member States 
EU food regulation has a significant impact on national food law. Labelling, 
mutual recognition, and now food safety affect national food policies and reflect 
																																																								
490 COM(1999)719 final,  16 and 19; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European 
Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 537-538.  
491 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
543. For the necessity of clear scientific evidence see Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA, 
[2002] II-3305 at 143-144. “A preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely 
hypothetical approach to the risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been scientifically 
verified [...] Rather, it follows from the Community Courts' interpretation of the precautionary 
principle that a preventive measure may be taken only if the risk, although the reality and extent 
thereof have not been 'fully' demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence, appears nevertheless 
to be adequately backed up by the scientific data available at the time when the measure was 
taken.“ 
492 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 16-21; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': 
Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 542. 
493 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 22(3); and COM(1999)719 final,  16 and 19. 
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a shift of national dominion to a harmonised EU-wide approach.494 To be clear, 
this does not abolish the competence of Member States to determine which 
products can be marketed under their national food law, but it restricts their 
power due to the harmonising nature of EU food law.  
 
With regard to food safety, national food law must implement general principles 
concerning food safety. Even if national food law may vary between the Member 
States, for whatever cultural reasons, the standards concerning food safety are 
harmonised. The consequence of the harmonisation is that now any,  
 
(9) food shall be deemed to be safe when it conforms to the specific 
provisions of national food law of the Member State in whose 
territory the food is marketed, such provisions being drawn up and 
applied without prejudice to the Treaty, in particular Articles 28 
and 30 thereof.495 
 
Member States still set the legal framework under which food can be marketed. 
This implies that Member States enjoy discretion “to decide at which level they 
intend to ensure the protection of the health and life of persons in the absence of 
harmonisation and in so far as doubts subsist in the current state of scientific 
research.”496 Evidently, there is space for a higher level of protection. In the 
absence of harmonisation, the Court of Justice held that Member States remain 
free to protect, legitimately, constitutional interests. Member States may decide 
on the basis of public health to impose special requirements as long as the EU 
Commission has not regulated on this.497 It requires, however, that activities are 
proportional and necessary, e.g. a total ban is considered as the most restrictive 
obstacle available.498 Better information for consumers and accurate labelling is 
																																																								
494  See Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011; and Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649; and Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. 
Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; and Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), 
[1987] ECR 1227; and Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and 
Traditional Ways of Life',  at 553. 
495 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 14(9). 
496 For example consider the public health exceptions under Article 36 TFEU. Further see Case 
C-333/08, Commission v. France, [2010] ECR I-757 at 85; and Joined Cases C-211/03, C-299/03 and 
C-316/03 to 318/03, HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH and Orthica, [2005] I-5141 at 38.  
497 Case C-446/08, Solgar Vitamin's France, [2010] ECR I-3973 at 35 and 54. 
498 Case C-333/08, Commission v. France, [2010] ECR I-757 at 85-86 and 89-90. 
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the preferred method to allow consumers to make informed choices.499  
 
The relationship of national food law and the food business operator is evident. 
Food business operators have to comply with national food law requirements in 
order to market a product. After successful marketing, products are protected by 
the principle of mutual recognition. However, due to its nature Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 enjoys direct applicability in national law and thereby binds food 
business operators directly. 
 
In the framework of general food law, Member States are responsible for 
enforcement, and monitoring that the “relevant requirements of food law are 
fulfilled by food and feed businesses operators at all stages of production.”500 In 
this sense, Member States shall only act as a means of control and protect the 
public at a final stage. In Berger, the Court of Justice clarified that public 
authorities may inform the public about food being unfit for human consumption 
if this is deemed necessary to protect the public health. If producers fail to 
provide safe food, Member States as a means of final power and control, have to 
act according to their responsibilities to protect individuals.501  
 
 
c) European Commission 
The responsibility of the EU Commission relates to the risk management and risk 
communication of food law. In relation to risk management, the Commission is 
responsible for weighing the policy alternatives in order to attain food safety.502 
Thereby it may opt for measures that concern the (1) content,503 (2) handling,504 
																																																								
499 For example see Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the European Court of Justice and the 
European Economic Constitution'.Of interest is the discussion about the provision of information to 
consumers in the internal market for goods through labelling. Further see Case 178/84, Commission 
v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227. 
500 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 17(2); and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, 
[2013] ECR 0000; and Case C-443/13, Reindl, of 13 November 2014 (not yet published). 
501 Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000 at 29-31 and 35. 
502 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 53 and Article 53(2); and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and 
Menno Van Der Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 154. 
503 For this see for example Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 ; and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. 
504 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 19; and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, 
[2013] ECR 0000.  
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or (3) communication 505  of food. This has direct impact on food business 
operators and the way they produce, handle, or market food or food ingredients. 
For example, in Solgar Vitamins it was held that the Commission should lay down 
standards according to Directive 2002/46/EC concerning food supplements.506 
These standards are binding for food business operators. Alternatively the 
Commission may regulate on how to ensure food safety. One option is to 
regulate inspections for example—the when, how and why controls are 
exercised.507 
 
 
3. Responsibility of food business operators 
The food business operator has an indisputable position in the organisational 
structure of EU food safety law, to which a specific function is attached. In 
comparison to the responsibilities of EFSA, the Commission, or the Member 
States, the food business operator is entrusted with a different task. In this 
respect, the food business operator is transformed into another competent 
authority for ensuring food safety under the institutional framework created by 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.  
 
The task allocated to the food business operator is not natural, but emerged only 
in the course of harmonising national laws on food safety. With harmonisation 
comes the reorganisation of roles and functions in the course of which food 
business operators were responsibilized and allocated a certain task in the ‘system 
of shared responsibility’ that is intended to deliver food safety in practice to the 
consumer.  
 																																																								
505 Labelling as a form of risk communication see Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011,  recital 17. “The 
prime consideration for requiring mandatory food information should be to enable consumers to 
identify and make appropriate use of a food and to make choices that suit their individual dietary 
needs. With this aim, food business operators should facilitate the accessibility of that 
information to the visually impaired.“ Further see Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649 at 13. 
506 Case C-446/08, Solgar Vitamin's France, [2010] ECR I-3973 at 24 and 32. And see Directive 
2002/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements (Text with EEA 
relevance) (OJ L 183, 12.7.2002, p. 51–57). 
507 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, 
animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1–141 ); and B. M. J. Van Der 
Meulen and Menno Van Der Velde, 'Food Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 
145. 
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3.1 The task entrusted to the food business operator 
The food business operator is entrusted with primary legal responsibility. Under 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 the food business operator must ensure “at all stages 
of production, processing and distribution within the businesses under their control 
… that foods or feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to 
their activities and shall verify that such requirements are met.”508 Thus, the food 
business operator is legally required to comply with food safety law at all stages in 
the food chain. 
 
Three elements seem to be important for understanding the role and function of 
the food business in the attainment of food safety, which will be considered 
below. (1) The notion of compliance is evident with regard to the task entrusted 
to the food business operator. Thus, some clarification is needed for the meaning 
of compliance. In this regard the focus will be on (2) the aspect that food safety 
must be ensured and verified at all stages of the food production process 
(traceability). This contends that the scope of responsibility of food business 
operators goes beyond the responsibility for one’s own activities. (3) Finally, I will 
investigate into the meaning of under their control. This assumes some form of 
power be exercised and implies some organisation and control between actors 
that are involved in the food chain.  
 
 
3.1.1 The meaning of compliance 
The requirement of compliance is very evident from the text of Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002. Food business operators are responsible for ensuring that their food 
products “satisfy the requirements of food law.”509 In this sense, Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 does not regulate or determine what food safety means, but it puts 
in place a system that ensures that only safe food is delivered to the consumer. 
Here the interdependence of the institutional framework of EFSA, the EU 
Commission, and Member States through national law, and food business 
operators is evident. The meaning of compliance requires that food business 
operators must take into account the different sources of food safety standards 																																																								
508 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  recital 30 and Article 17(1). 
509 Ibid., at Article 14(2) and 17(1); and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 
0000 at 29-30. 
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and be able to adapt to changes if they occur. This ensures a minimum level of 
protection for the consumer, which is legally stipulated. 
 
Compliance with food safety law is a precondition for food to be placed on the 
market and it implies food business operators are aware of the legal requirements 
to which they are subject. Thus, it is up to the food business operators to decide 
how to comply with food safety requirements. This compliance may include, for 
example, complying with the mandatory labelling requirements. 510  Another 
example is the legal requirement to set up food hygiene standards, such as 
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points).511 EU internal market law 
fulfils this idea of ‘food safety requirements’ through legislative means, e.g. 
labelling, GMOs, and food additives.512 Food business operators in light of their 
responsibilities under Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 must also comply with these 
standards.  
 
 
3.1.2 Verification and control 
The wording of Article 17(1) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 states that the food 
business operator is not only responsible for his activities concerning the 
verification of food safety but that he shall ensure at all stages of production, 
processing, and distribution within the food chain that food safety is 
guaranteed.513 This reflects an idea of a joint responsibility entrusted to the food 
chain. In terms of monitoring and supervision, EU internal market law prefers a 
system of an ‘integrated food chain,’ where safety is traceable all the way back to 
the origin.514 In this sense, “each link in the food chain should take the measures 
necessary to ensure food safety within the context of its own specific 
																																																								
510 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011,  Article 8(1) and Chapter IV. 
511 Case C-366/04 Georg Schwarz v. Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, Opinion of 
Advocate General GEELHOED,  at 21. 
512 COM(97)183 final, Communication from the Commission on Consumer Health and Food 
Safety, of 30 April 1997,  34-36. 
513 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. Article 17 reads as follows: “Food and feed business operators at 
all stages of production, processing and distribution within the businesses under their control shall 
ensure that foods or feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to their 
activities and shall verify that such requirements are met.” 
514 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
536-537. 
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activities.” 515  This makes food business operators responsible not only for 
complying with food law requirements with regard to their own activities, but 
also requires them to actively engage with the food chain. The requirement for 
the food business operator to verify that food law is complied with requires 
monitoring and supervision of the food chain and all stages of production in 
order to ensure compliance with legal requirements.  
 
Lidl Italia concerned the issue of whether traders of food can be held liable with 
regard to false labelling by producers. Investigations of regional health authorities 
showed that the actual alcohol content in a spirit was below the content stated 
on the label. Lidl Italia was held liable for false labelling. Lidl Italia challenged the 
national rule on liability, arguing that being only the trader of the product it was 
not responsible for the accuracy of the label and therefore could not be held 
liable.516 Although the assessment was based on the labelling Directive 2000/13,517 
the Court of Justice affirmed the notion of joint responsibility that is ascribed to 
actors involved in the food chain. The denial of responsibility for actors involved in 
the food chain would “compromise the achievement of the results prescribed by 
the directive,”518 i.e. to inform and protect the consumer.519 The Court concluded 
that there exists a joint responsibility for the actors involved in the food chain to 
ensure accurate labelling.520 The compliance of which is the “responsibility [of] all 
persons involved in the production and distribution process.”521 
 
Reindl concerned the issue as to what extent distributors can be held liable in the 
absence of a clear provision of EU internal market law for liability as a 
consequence of providing unsafe food. The Court of Justice argued that a system 
of strict liability is acceptable if it is “to encourage the persons concerned to 
comply with the provisions of a regulation and where the objective pursued is a 
matter of public interest.”522 For our purpose, Reindl is an important case as the 																																																								
515 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 18(1); and Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-
11181 at 41; and Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 59. 
516 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181 at 25-28 and 35. 
517 Now Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. 
518 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181 at 49. 
519 Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 44. 
520 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181 at 50 and 53. 
521 Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 60. 
522 Case C-443/13, Reindl, of 13 November 2014 (not yet published) at 42. 
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Court of Justice reemphasised the integrity of the food chain as being jointly 
responsible for the safety of food that is placed on the market. In this manner, it 
is irrelevant if the product became unfit for human consumption at the 
distribution stage, during processing, or during transport. Under EU food law, it 
is the final product that is sold to the consumer that is of relevance.523 
 
Lidl Italia and Reindl assume that part of the responsibility of food business 
operators is to verify compliance with EU food law requirements at all stages of 
production, processing, and distribution. Here, the function of the food business 
operator goes beyond mere compliance with the legal requirements. 
Responsibility requires an active, reasonable, and precautionary approach for 
ensuring that the food placed on the market is safe for consumption. This is 
made clear by the requirement of verification. Food business operators must be 
able to verify that food safety is ensured at all stages of production, processing, 
and distribution. This implies a form of actual control or supervision of other 
actors involved in the food chain.524 This permanent form of mutual control is 
different to the control Member States were required to exercise under the old 
regime. While the latter is only exercising control and monitoring on a selective 
basis, control through the food chain is exercised permanently.525 Food business 
operators must be able to prove that food products comply with food safety 
requirements at any time. The possible threat of being held accountable for the 
misconduct of other actors in the food chain functions as an incentive to exercise 
actual control.526 
 
 
																																																								
523 Ibid., at 44. 
524 COM(1999)719 final,  7-8; and B. M. J. Van Der Meulen and Menno Van Der Velde, 'Food 
Safety Law in the European Union : an Introduction',  at 143. It is interesting to see that Article 8(4) 
Regulation (EC) 1169/2011 states that: “Food business operators, within the businesses under their 
control, shall not modify the information accompanying a food if such modification would 
mislead the final consumer or otherwise reduce the level of consumer protection and the 
possibilities for the final consumer to make informed choices. Food business operators are 
responsible for any changes they make to food information accompanying a food.“ It shows a 
tendency to organise the adequacy of labelling through the food chain and internal procedures. 
However, at the same time it provides for the possibility to modify information, but requires that 
this information does not lower the standard of protection. 
525 For example see Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181. Case C-443/13, Reindl, of 13 
November 2014 (not yet published); and Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 
0000. 
526 Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 61. 
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3.1.3 Due-diligence 
The allocation of joint responsibility of the food chain is a technique to minimise 
risk. The requirement to ensure some form of internal organisation and control 
by the actors involved in the food chain is a way to reduce the risk that unsafe 
food is placed on the market and consumed by the consumer. Within this form 
of internal governance (i.e. self-organisation), the food chain and its individual 
members have to ensure at all stages that the risk to health that emerges with 
unsafe food is not transferred to consumers. The legal requirement imposed on 
food business operators implies a precautionary duty.527 Food businesses are 
responsible for withdrawing food that is unsafe and for informing consumers 
about risks in due time.528 The main responsibility of reducing risks and harm is 
shifted to the food business operator. In particular, the characteristics and the 
technical complexity of matters relating to food safety make it unreasonable to 
leave the consumer or Member States solely responsible for dealing with the risk 
inherent in the safety of food.529 
 
With an integrated food chain, the safety is “traceable all way back to origin.”530 
Traceability of food and food ingredients is a way to ensure a high level of 
consumer health by minimising the risk that unsafe food or food ingredients 
travel all the way through the food chain to the consumer before their risk to 
health are recognised.531 The precautionary duty is evident here when considering 
the food chain as a whole.  
 
The integrated food chain model differs from one that relies on individual 
responsibility, where food business operators would be in charge only for their 
own activities. Thus, responsibility goes beyond mere compliance. It creates a 
space for food businesses in which they are empowered and required to self-
organise a system of mutual control and supervision that ensures a high level of 
compliance with food safety standards. This kind of mutual control exercised by 
the food chain is an important element for the effective protection and 																																																								
527 Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 245. 
528 Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v. Freistaat Bayern, [2013] ECR 0000 at 29-31. 
529 See for similar idea Case C-316/09 MSD Sharp & Dohme GmbH, Opinion of Advocate General 
TRSTENJAK,  at 113-114. 
530 Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis',  at 244; and Damian 
Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 536-537. 
531 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 18(1). 
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organisation of food safety. Accordingly, part of the task entrusted to the food 
business operator is to organise the food chain so as to ensure effective control 
and supervision of food safety requirements throughout the food chain. This can 
be called a due-diligence requirement. Meaning that each “link in the food chain 
should take the measures necessary to ensure food safety within the context of its 
own specific activities.”532  
 
EU internal market law leaves the organisation of food chain relationships to the 
actors involved. Clearly, the legal requirements of traceability and joint 
responsibility prefer integrated food chains, reflecting the “farm to table 
approach.” This can be arranged through contractual relationships, whereby 
different actors involved in the food chain have different contractual obligations. 
Food business operators can “impose on manufacturers rules or quality criteria 
relating to the manufacture of foodstuffs which could be enforced by means of 
inspection programmes or regular checks.” 533  In this sense, control may be 
exercised through the contractual regulation of quality of products or through 
monitoring for example. How compliance with Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 is 
attained, is decided by the food business operators.  
 
This form of joint responsibility for food products requires economic operators 
to resort to “due diligence defence and self-protection,” or private 
standardisation of safety processes, for example.534 Food business operators are 
entrusted with the task of ensuring that food safety is actually produced in 
practice. This creates a space in which economic operators engage and compete 
with each other so as to find the most efficient solutions for producing and 
ensuring that food placed on the market is safe for human consumption. Food 
business operators may acquire knowledge on food safety and consumer needs 
and contract this expertise out to manufacturers. 535  The idea of joint 																																																								
532 COM(97)176 final,  46. 
533 Case C-315/05 Lidl Italia Srl, Opinion of Advocate General STIX-HACKL,  at 63. 
534  For example see Case C-366/04 Georg Schwarz v. Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt 
Salzburg, Opinion of Advocate General GEELHOED,  at 21. Sebastian Krapohl, 'Risk regulation in the 
single market : the governance of pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs in the European Union' (Palgrave, 2008). 
535 The freedom of organization allows actors involved in the food chain to allocate “costs” in the 
light of efficiency principles. In this sense it follows a market structure and the allocation of 
resources through sharing (some form of efficient organisation). Joint liability, then is a tool to 
“eliminate uncertainties, and therefore assumed only in so far as an alternative, clear and equally 
effective allocation of obligations and responsibilities has not been established by the parties 
involved or does not clearly stem from factual circumstances.” For the idea of organisation see 
Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm',  at 401. Although from Data Protection Law consider the 
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responsibility recognises a space or freedom for economic operators to interact 
and organise themselves so as to act according to their responsibilities. However, 
the complexity and interdependence of the food chain seem to allow for this kind 
of self-organisation by being compliant with EU food law requirements. It 
creates a space in which more efficient organisation of control and supervision is 
negotiated through the actors involved.  
 
 
4. Delivering food safety in practice 
This latest approach assumes that the market process alone—as organised under 
the Cassis de Dijon model —will not provide for a sufficient level of consumer 
health for several reasons. Prices could be one example: consumers may not make 
choices on the basis of their health but on the basis of their budgets. Healthy 
products are likely to be more expensive as they may require special standards of 
hygiene or production that increases the costs to consumers. This does not mean 
that consumers are not willing to buy healthy products, but the price argument 
assumes that some consumers may simply not be able afford to buy healthy 
products. When leaving health and food safety issues to the market, the risk 
clearly is on the consumer. This is evident from the BSE crisis in the 1990. A risk 
closely related to the price argument is a race to the bottom. A higher standard 
of care or health involves higher costs for food businesses, e.g. certifications of 
special standards or higher manufacturing costs. The ‘organic’ label is one 
example here. Thus, food safety may become a factor for competition. The 
regime adopted by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 is a response to the difficulties 
encountered in the internal market concerning delivering safe food in practice to 
the consumer.536  
 
Analysis of the Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 regime highlights a new approach as 
to how food safety is delivered to the consumer. The result of the reform is a 
matrix of competent authorities, which are responsibilized to ensure that only 
safe food is placed on the market. In this respect, the form of individual and joint 
responsibilization of the food business operator and the food chain as a whole 
instrumentalises private actors as alternative forms of regulatory authority. Table 																																																																																																																																																														
organisation of a complex system through joint responsibility Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of 
"controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 24. 
536 For example see the Preamble of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. 
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1 illustrates the shared responsibilities of actors in delivering food safety to the 
consumer.  
 
Food business 
operator 
European Food 
Safety 
Authority 
Commission 
Member States 
and National 
Food 
Authorities 
Compliance with 
law and proactive 
approach to control 
and verify 
compliance 
throughout the food 
chain; also in charge 
for aspects relating 
to risk management 
and risk 
communication 
Delivering scientific 
data and technical 
support for both 
food business 
operators and 
legislative bodies; 
also in charge for 
issues relating to 
risk assessment and 
risk communication 
Delivering 
harmonised 
regulation 
concerning food-
related issues (such 
as GMO’s or food 
additives); also the 
EU Commission is 
responsible for risk 
management 
Ensure that 
national food law is 
in compliance with 
EU food safety 
principles; also in 
charge for issues 
relating to risk 
management 
Table 1 The food safety Regulation (EC) 178/2002 system of shared responsibility 
 
Although the responsibility for ensuring food safety is shared, the system is based 
on the assumption that only when all actors comply with their functions is a high 
level of food safety delivered to the consumer. Each actor is put in charge of a 
specific function relating to the risk analysis scheme: risk assessment, risk 
management, and risk communication.537 EFSA is responsible for issues relating 
to risk assessment and risk communication, the EU Commission and Member 
States are responsible for risk management, and the food business operators are 
responsible for issues relating to risk management and risk communication. Food 
safety is generated by the interplay of all these actors. However, the key function 
in terms of efficiency of the system ensuring food safety is entrusted to the food 
business operator. This is due to the fact that the food business has to deliver 
safe food to the consumer in practice.  
 
This form of organisation creates a relative openness, and flexibility with regard 
to future changes to the meaning of ‘food safety.’ For example, if alterations in 
scientific evidence reveal changes concerning ingredients or food additives and 
their affects on consumer health, this institutional and structural organisation is 
flexible and can adapt to these changes: 
 
																																																								
537 Ibid., at Article 3(10)-(13); and Ellen Vos, 'EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE 
Crisis',  at 239. 
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It seeks to achieve this goal through coordinating the actions of a 
disparate number of institutional actors whose duties are set out in 
Regulation 178/2002/EC. A feature of such an organisational 
structure is that it is an adaptive process in which the nature of the 
'problem' regulated will vary over space and time.538 
 
For the food business operator this reflects a form of delegation of public power 
to private actors. Food business operators are now in charge for parts of the 
organisation of the food market. This capacity is reflected in a form of self-
governance granted to food businesses and the food chain as a whole to ensure 
that only safe food is placed on the internal market. Food business operators are 
responsible for ensuring that only safe food enters the market. How this is 
ensured is left at the discretion of the food business and the food chain. In fact, 
what EU internal market law does is to shift power vested in national institutions 
to EU level and reorganise it and allocate it to local actors in a decentralised, 
more effective (i.e. market oriented) way.  
 
 
4.1 The question of allocation 
In relation to food safety, the old regime seemed flawed and showed that a more 
pro-active framework was required that placed a significant portion of 
responsibility in attaining food safety on the sector that was likely to affect it, i.e. 
the food business operators and the food chain. This is not a theoretical issue but 
importantly about delivering safe food in practice. 
 
In this respect, the task allocated to the food business operator under the 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 regime in relation to the delivery of safe food to 
consumer was not natural but emerged as a choice of the EU legislator in 
searching for more ‘efficient’ solutions for attaining food safety in the internal 
market. The premise was that actors should be in charge of aspects that they are 
best equipped to deal with in terms of expertise, skills, and knowledge. This is 
where the picture of shared responsibilities and the allocation of specific tasks in 
relation to food safety emerged. This is to set up a system, conceptual and 
																																																								
538 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
556. 
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institutional that is, in relative terms, more capable than the old regime of better 
delivering safe food to the internal market. 
 
The fact that the food business operator occupies a central position in the 
context of food safety and especially on how food safety is attained reflects part 
of the choices involved. Here, the system set out in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 
is a consequence of a trade-off about material, conceptual, and institutional 
alternatives at the end of which the food business is recognised as a ‘competent 
authority,’ in the web of actors entrusted with the task of delivering food safety in 
the internal market.  
 
 
4.1.1 Transforming the food business operator 
An important factor relating to the allocation of responsibility to the food 
business operator is its position in the market for food. This position comes with 
an asymmetry of power over the consumer. This is because food business 
operators determine the means of production, the ingredients, or other issues 
relating to the production, processing or selling of food. As Iris Young argues, 
“the agents position in structural processes usually carries with it a specific 
degree of potential or actual power or influence over processes that produce the 
outcomes.”539 Consumers are only left with the choice among the foods finally 
produced.  
 
EU food safety law transforms the power of the food business operator vis-à-vis 
the consumer into an integral part of the institutional framework for attaining 
food safety. In light of this asymmetry of power, the allocation of a specific duty 
to deliver safe food to consumers is a way to increase the efficiency of the sector 
concerned. It is a legislative choice that food safety can only be attained through 
regulation and that food businesses ought to be involved in the contribution to 
health. As a consequence food safety standards ought to be internalised by food business 
operators. Consumer health becomes part of their economic activities.540 The economic 
activities of food businesses under the due diligence obligation have an outward 																																																								
539 Iris Marion Young, 'Responsibility for justice',  at 144. 
540 It is legally organised so that there is no need for food business operators to search for “more 
efficient” or “better” solutions in attaining food safety. This competition for better and more 
efficient solutions comes with the risk of race to the bottom. For example see Ronald Coase, 'The 
Nature of the Firm',  at 405. 
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effect, where an effective internal organisation of the food chain produces food 
safety for the market as a whole. Ultimately, the activities of food businesses 
under the Regulation (EC) 178/2002 framework serve the consumer and produce 
a higher standard of food safety in the long-term. This is the most efficient way 
in which food safety is delivered in practice. This reflects a form of Rawlsian 
improvement—a fairer and more efficient system. The inequality for some (i.e. the 
incurred costs for food business operators) is for the benefit of the least 
advantaged (i.e. the consumers). It reduces the risk for consumers to be exposed 
to risks to health. 
 
The result of allocating responsibility to the food business operators is that they 
emerged as another competent authority entrusted with a task formerly vested in 
public actors. The food business operator occupies a position that is bound up 
with a protective duty for consumers, reflected in the due-diligence obligation to 
ensure an effective monitoring and compliance with food safety requirements 
throughout the food chain. The food business operator has an active role in 
preventing harm from happening to consumer. It must minimise the risk to 
which consumers are exposed.  
 
 
4.1.2 Determining a level playing field 
The system set up by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 creates a level playing field 
with regard to food safety standards. Food safety under the latest regime is not 
subject to competition. The food business operator, due to its specific position in 
the food market, is entrusted with the due-diligence obligation. This due-
diligence obligation is a technique to ensure that food safety is actually delivered. 
The problem here is that private actors that are supposed to act freely based on 
their self-interests are also required to act in a public function. In the context of 
food safety law, this is reflected in the control and monitoring of activities in the 
food chain going beyond one’s own activities.  
 
The proximity to products, production, ingredients, and other stages of 
production where food safety may be affected, places food business operators in 
the centre of the organisation of ensuring food safety. Food business operators 
have better expertise and knowledge about risk potentials relating to the 
production chain of food than public authorities or agencies. Consequently, they 
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are better equipped to develop a system of effective monitoring and compliance. 
This distinguishes food business operators from public authorities, which lack 
this proximity in terms of expertise and knowledge of the relevant risk potentials 
and processes. This choice for a more effective organisation of the sector to 
attain food safety is reflected in the allocation of the obligations to food business 
operators under Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. In practical terms, the new system 
makes use of the power and the special structure of the food chain, the 
consequence of which is a protective duty reflected in the monitoring and 
compliance requirement.  
 
 
4.1.3 Leaving space for self-organisation—thriving for ‘more efficient solutions’ 
It appears that the food business operators are in charge of ensuring a certain 
level of food safety, but they enjoy a certain margin of discretion in order to 
attain this. This creates a market within the food chain to find efficient solutions 
to reduce the costs imposed by law. This market may function efficiently, 
because the floor for competition—the joint responsibility to ensure compliance 
with food safety requirements—is the same for all actors involved in the food 
chain. The food businesses, although required to comply with EU internal 
market law, enjoy discretion to organise the food sector (i.e. food chain) 
themselves. With this freedom (i.e. within the limits set by food law), food 
businesses may find or strive for more efficient solutions. This gives room for 
innovation.  
 
Through innovation, private actors involved in the food chain may reduce their 
costs further. By organising its relationships with other businesses in the food 
chain, food business operators may innovate in order to find more efficient 
solutions (i.e. being adapted to their needs and practices) within the limits set by 
EU internal market law.541 This reflexive and flexible approach leads to efficient 
outcomes. Thus, in terms of self-organisation of the food chain and supervision 
within, rather than a top-down command and control approach, EU food law 
favours a bottom-up approach—granting space to the actors involved to find the 
most suitable solution depending on the characteristics of the case in hand.  
 
 																																																								
541 See Ronald Coase on the idea of innovation. Ibid., at 397. 
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4.1.4 Enhancing the efficiency of the internal market 
Overall, the latest regime potentially puts the food business operator in a better 
position than before, despite the fact that it has to comply with food safety 
requirements and the due-diligence obligation. The system created by Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002 aimed to renew consumer faith in the internal market for food 
through harmonising food safety law and setting up a system that delivers safe 
food in practice. This in turn then benefits producers simply because consumers 
return to buy products. At the same time, the abolition of competition on the 
basis of levels of safety imposes the same costs on all actors involved in the food 
chain to comply with food safety requirements. In other words, all producers are 
burdened to the same extent: no producer can gain a competitive advantage on 
the basis of food safety.  
 
The process of self-organisation with regard to the due-diligence requirement 
may put the food business in a better position than before. It takes into account 
the very needs of the food sector. It requires compliance but is flexible on how 
compliance is reached. This flexibility and freedom is ‘controlled’ by enforcement 
through other actors involved in the food chain. In this respect, the integration 
of the food chain functions as a preventive mechanism. Mutual control ensures 
the early detection and subsequently prevention of risks to which consumers may 
be exposed. At the same time this is also advantageous for food business 
operators as they may adapt to risks at an earlier stage of production or 
processing.   
 
 
4.2 The consumer 
The role of the consumer in relation to food safety is relatively low. This is 
because food safety is not subject to competition and as such part of ‘consumer 
choices.’ Food safety is an integral part of the internal market and is guaranteed 
to the consumer by the EU legislator. Rights for the consumer relating to food 
safety only emerge in situations where the food business operators failed to 
comply with their obligations. In these cases they are subject to liability under 
the Directive 85/374/EC on liability for defective products.542 																																																								
542 See Council Directive 85/374/EEC, of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 
(OJ L 210 , 07/08/1985 P. 0029). 
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5. Liability 
The imputability of legal requirements does not go without liability, which is 
intended to ensure the effectiveness of the legal requirements. Under Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002 liability of food business operators is determined according to 
Directive 85/374/EC on liability for defective products. Food is treated as a 
product in the sense of Directive 85/374/EC and the same standards and rules 
concerning liability apply.543 Directive 85/374/EC sets up a system where the 
producer is liable for harm caused by a defective product.544 
 
Reindl and Lidl Italia were cases concerning liability in food law and both cases 
confirmed that when food unfit for human consumption is placed on the market, 
any party in the food chain can be held liable.545 In this regard, it is irrelevant if 
the unfitness for human consumption emerged during the processing or 
distribution stages. It is the final product that is sold to the consumer that is 
decisive.546 For example, Lidl Italia refers to this form of joint liability.547 Lidl 
Italia concerned the issue of whether traders of food could be held liable with 
regard to the false labelling of products by a manufacturer. In this case, 
investigations by regional health authorities revealed that the actual alcohol 
content of the spirit in question was below the content stated on the label. Lidl 
Italia was held liable for the false labelling. Lidl Italia challenged the national rule 
on liability, arguing that being just a trader of the product it was not responsible 
for the accuracy of the label and therefore could not be held liable.548 Although 
the assessment was based on labelling Directive 2000/13/EC,549 the Court of 
Justice affirmed the notion of joint responsibility that is ascribed to actors involved in 
the food chain. The denial of joint liability for actors involved in the food chain 
would “compromise the achievement of the results prescribed by the 
directive.”550 
 																																																								
543 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 21. 
544 Council Directive 85/374/EEC,  Article 1. 
545  Case C-443/13, Reindl, of 13 November 2014 (not yet published) at 42-44; and Damian 
Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 542. 
546 Case C-443/13, Reindl, of 13 November 2014 (not yet published) at 44. 
547 Council Directive 85/374/EEC,  Article 5. 
548 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl, [2006] ECR I-11181 at 25-28 and 35. 
549 Now Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. 
550 Ibid. 
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Liability of food business operators under EU food law places the decisions of 
sanctioning and awarding damages within the national environment. At first sight 
this might sound plausible and responsive to the very nature of EU food law, 
which is primarily national law. But it is if the sharing between EU internal 
market law and national law in terms of liability leads to an effective judicial 
framework that ensures the compliance of food business with the legal 
requirements on food safety that is the decisive factor here.  
 
Under German law it seems that national courts take their responsibility 
seriously. For example, in a case before the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Köln the 
court was confronted with a case where a woman had bought a sandwich at a gas 
station, which had a 6mm screw-nut in it. The biting on the screw-nut caused 
severe damages to the woman for which compensation was sought. The court 
reaffirmed the precautionary duty imposed on all actors in the food chain under 
EU internal market law to ensure that only food fit for consumption is placed on 
the market. The OLG Köln emphasised that the protective duty imposed on 
producers does not go so far as that all risks for the consumer must be excluded. 
However, in relation to the case at hand the court clarified that the current 
monitoring and control mechanisms in terms of visual tests, weight tests, and 
random sampling that were in place in the food chain were insufficient. In order 
to ensure adequate testing, the producer is required to comply with modern 
technical and scientific standards to ensure food safety. Thus, damages are 
awarded whenever the producer is found not to have acted according to its 
responsibilities.551  
 
 
6. Remarks 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 significantly transformed the role of food business 
operators in the course of reorganising the material and institutional approaches 
for attaining food safety in the internal market. This reorganisation emerged in 
response to a significant distortion of the internal market for food that had its 
origin in the old system of ensuring food safety at national level. The old regime 
relied on national law and national food safety standards through which 
consumers would be protected in the internal market through the principles of 
free movement of goods and mutual recognition. Therefore it was assumed that 																																																								
551 Oberlandesgericht Köln, 13 U 146/01, OLG Köln 24.07.2002. Case is available in German only.  
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where food was lawfully marketed in one Member State in compliance with 
national food safety regulations, this standard would deliver food safety to the 
internal market as a whole. The BSE crisis revealed that the old system failed in 
providing an adequate level of protection. The complexity of the food chain and 
the carelessness of the national and European authorities being responsible for 
supervision were not able to protect consumers adequately.  
 
The latest regime reorganises the framework through which food safety is 
attained and integrates it into the internal market for food. Food safety is now an 
integral part of the food market. The responsibility to attain and ensure a high 
level of food safety is now shared among the actors addressed by Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002. The food business operator emerged as a ‘competent authority’ in 
this context, which is reflected in the function allocated under the latest food 
safety regime.552 The food business operator and the food chain as a whole are 
now considered as an alternative ‘source of authority’ when it comes to the 
delivery of safe food to the internal market.  
 
The principles reflected in EU food safety law are now an integral part of the 
economic activities of food business operators. This is reflected in the due-
diligence requirement ascribed to food businesses. Under this requirement, food 
business operators are required to comply with food law requirements, but also 
are put in a position to set up and organise a system of mutual control covering 
all stages of the food chain. Thus, the food business and the food chain as a whole 
occupy a key position in the organisation of the food safety. This idea is reflected 
in the precautionary approach of Regulation (EC) No 178 /2002. Food should be 
withdrawn from circulation at any stage of the food chain if it is detected that it 
is unsafe for human consumption. In this manner, the risk of consumers 
consuming unsafe food is reduced. It is the task of food businesses to ensure that 
the risk of consumers being exposed to unsafe food is minimised. The 
precautionary and preventive system reflected in the internal control mechanisms 
of food chains is an important aspect of EU food safety law.  
 
The decision to involve private actors and in particular the food chain in the 
attainment of a high level of consumer health has practical reasons. Due to the 
position of the food chain in relation to the objective of ensuring food safety in 																																																								
552 COM(97)176 final,  45.  
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the internal market, food business operators are ascribed the primary 
responsibility to verify that the food placed on the market is fit for human 
consumption. As a consequence, food safety becomes a commodity that is 
produced in and delivered to the market. Thus, the key function in terms of 
efficiency of the system to ensure food safety is entrusted to the food business 
operator. The system is only efficient when safe food is placed on the market. In 
practical terms, this is only attained through a more active role of food business 
operators in actually producing safe food.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Responsibility of Private Actors in EU Data 
Protection Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In an information society, it is said that information is the most valuable asset 
“that many organisations, commercial or otherwise, possess”—information is 
power.553 The control of information generates power.554 This is the case even 
more so when the information relates to personal data. The power over personal 
data may be misused to the detriment of data subjects, for example, for specific 
business interests relating to commercial purposes.  
 
With increases in digital technology and digital information processing 
mechanisms, the protection of information relating to personal data “has 
emerged as one of the greatest challenges of our generation.”555 Partly, because we 
increasingly rely on communication through digital means, but even more so in 
our generation because “most of the actions we undertake leave a digital trace 
that make a huge amount of personal information potentially available to 
others.”556 This includes means for mass storage, digitalisation, new information 
technologies and specific algorithms collecting data relating to user behaviour 
and computing services. Take as a simple example the collection of personal data 																																																								
553 David I. Bainbridge, 'EC data protection directive' (Butterworths Law, 1996),  at 3. 
554 This is why for example food labelling in relation to the efficiency of the food market is a 
mandatory requirement. Information concerning the ingredients and quality of foods is an 
essential requirement for the internal market for goods to work. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral 
AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
555 Federico Fabbrini, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data Privacy', iCourts 
Working Paper Series, 19 (2015) at 4. 
556 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH, Opinion of Advocate Gerneral 
CRUZ VILLALÓN,  at 45; and Federico Fabbrini, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Rights to Data Privacy',  at 4. 
	184 
through so called ‘cookie profiling.’557 Every expression of preference made in the 
browser through search requests, online shopping, or other commercial activities 
for products, is collected: this information may be read by internet browsers and 
search engines, for example. Some programs do not even work without having 
access to cookies on a personal computer. The information is collected, stored, 
bundled, and sold to other commercial entities, or as was the case in Schrems, it 
may be forwarded to intelligence agencies.558 Personal data can be used to profile 
individuals. In relation to economic activities these profiles are a source for 
personalised offers or advertisements. However, this is not the only type of 
personal information concerned. Personal data collected may relate to far more 
sensitive information such as sexual orientation, political beliefs, or religious 
opinions.  
 
Within EU internal market law, the right to have personal data protected is now 
recognised as a fundamental right and has constitutional status.559 Under EU 
internal market law the concept of personal data covers any information that 
relates “to an identified or identifiable person.”560 Part of the problem faced with 
protecting personal data relates to the non-absolute character of the right to data 
protection.561 Article 8(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) 
provides that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.”562 Article 8(2) of the EUCFR refers to the exception 
where the right to personal data may be subject to interference. It states that 
personal data “must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law.”563 This implies that the processing—the forwarding of personal data—is 
needed in some specific situations. Different reasons may justify the processing, 
ranging from public interest concerns to mere compliance with contractual 																																																								
557  For information on cookie-profiling see < http://www.allaboutcookies.org/cookies/cookie-
profiling.html > 
558 For this see the latest decision of the Court of Justice on Facebook transferring EU personal 
data to the United Stated in Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Officer, of 6 
October 2015 (not yet reported). 
559 See Article 6(1) TEU and Article 16 TFEU and Lee A. Bygrave, 'Where have all the judges gone? 
Reflections on judicial involvement in developing data protection law', Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 7, 
11 at 4. 
560 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 2(a). 
561 Case C-465/00, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989 at 71. 
562 Also see Article 16 TFEU and in particular Article 16(2) TFEU. 
563 See Article 8(2) EUCFR. 
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agreements, such as the exchange of data for commercial activities. For example 
in Schwarz, the storing of fingerprints with passports was challenged before the 
Court of Justice. Schwarz argued that the taking of fingerprints violated his right 
to privacy. The Court of Justice rejected this claim. It held that the taking of 
fingerprints is an adequate means to prevent falsification of passports. There is 
no real alternative to serve the general interest and it is not overly interfering 
with the privacy of the data subject.564 The right to have one’s personal data 
protected is overridden by the public interest to prevent the falsification of 
passports. In some situations the processing of personal data may be essential to 
perform tasks and legal obligations the data controller is effectively subject to.565 
 
EU data protection law has had a profound impact on private actors with regard 
to the protection of personal data in the digital age. This does not only relate to 
the protection of personal data as such, but in particular refers to the systems 
through which personal data are attained in the context of the internal market. 
The central instrument in EU data protection law is Directive 95/46/EC. 
Directive 95/46/EC introduced a system of data protection that bestows a 
specific protective duty to the data controller. The consequence of this specific 
duty is that these data controllers occupy a central position with regard to 
effectively protecting personal data.566 Their responsibility in the context of data 
protection relates to the function of ensuring that the processing of personal data 
complies with data protection rules.  
 
 
1. EU data protection law 
Data protection issues relate to the organisation and regulation of risk. 567 This is 
how to ensure the protection of personal data from unlawful use and abuse 
through other actors in light of the need to ensure free movement of personal 
data within the internal market. The right to have one’s personal data protected 
																																																								
564 Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, [2013] ECR 670 at 27, 51 and 60f. 
565 See Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 7 on lawful processing. 
566 For example the employer is considered a controller of data in Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 
May 2013 (not yet published) at 23. 
567 Damian Chalmers, ''Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life',  at 
535; and Brendan Van Alsenoy, 'Regulating Data Protection: The Allocation of Responsibility and Risk 
among Actors involved in Personal Data Processing', Thesis (Doctor of Laws) (KU Leuven (Centre for 
IT & IP Law), 2016) at 43. 
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is far from unknown in the EU or the Member States.568 Some Member States 
are signing parties to Convention 108 that concerns the protection of individuals 
in regard to automatic processing of personal data. Convention 108 entered into 
force in 1985.569 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) similarly found 
the right to have one’s personal data protected to be a human right protected 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although the 
ECHR has no explicit provision for dealing with data protection, the ECtHR 
held that the right to have one’s personal data protected is inherent in Article 8 
of the ECHR on the protection of the right to privacy.570 Directive 95/46/EC 
brought the right for data protection to the EU legal landscape.571 
 
 
1.1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
The latest development in EU data protection law is the adoption of Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 was adopted on 4 May 2016 and will apply from 25 May 2018.  
 
After many years of political deliberation, agreement was reached to update and 
reaffirm the legal framework set into force by Directive 95/46/EC, through 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Although the approach for data protection and the 
structural changes it brings about in national laws remains unchanged, a decisive 
difference is the fact that the EU Data Protection framework will be set out in a 
Regulation. With this change, the EU legislator intends to set up a stronger 
framework that is directly applicable in national law and to reduce further the 
differences between national laws that are still in place due to the existence of 
differences in the implementation and application of Directive 95/46/EC. 572 The 
Regulation affirms the need to permanently ensure a “high level of protection of 																																																								
568 Federico Ferretti, 'Data Protection and the Legitimate Interest of Data Controller', Common Market 
Law Review, 51 (2014), 843 at 847 and 851. 
569 See Convention 108 of the Council of Europe on Data Protection, Article 1.  
570 C (84) 57, European Court of Human Rights, Malone v. The United Kingdom (violation of Article 8 
of the Convention), of 2 August 1984 at 66-68. And especially the deferring Opinion, which 
discusses the counter-measures that must be available to data subjects in the case personal data is 
processed.  
571 Directive 95/46/EC; and Gloria González-Fuster, 'The emergence of personal data protection as a 
fundamental right of the EU' (Springer, 2014),  at 136. 
572 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 recital 7 and 9. 
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natural persons and to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data within the 
Union.”573 
 
The analysis of the data protection regime under this chapter will focus on the 
system of Directive 95/46/EC for the following reasons. Firstly, the Regulation is 
not yet applicable and as such it is not binding law. Secondly, the Regulation does 
not bring about substantial changes against which the Directive 95/46/EC regime 
should be measured. Rather, this chapter is going to review the Directive that 
introduced the new, harmonised approach for attaining a high level of data 
protection within the internal market and which developed the responsibility of 
the data controller. In light of this thesis, which is concerned with the 
transformation of roles through EU internal market law, it is more appropriate to 
look at the original document that first developed the role of the data controller.  
 
 
2. Emergence of EU data protection law 
The concept of data protection relates to the control of power over personal 
data. In terms of the power relationship, data protection law deals with an 
asymmetry of power between actors that have access to personal data, for whatever 
reason, and the persons to whom this information belongs. The underlying 
question is how to deal with this power relationship through legal means to 
ensure an adequate protection of personal data and the fundamental right to 
privacy. Daniel Solove uses Kafka’s ‘The Trial’ to capture this underlying problem:  
 
Franz Kafka's The Trial, which depicts a bureaucracy with 
inscrutable purposes that uses people's information to make 
important decisions about them, yet denies the people the ability 
to participate in how their information is used. The problems 
captured by the Kafka metaphor (…) are problems of information 
processing—the storage, use, or analysis of data—rather than 
information collection. They affect the power relationships between 
people and the institutions of the modern state. They not only frustrate 
the individual by creating a sense of helplessness and 
powerlessness, but they also affect social structure by altering the 																																																								
573 Ibid., at recital 10. 
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kind of relationships people have with the institutions that make 
important decisions about their lives.574 
 
Prior to Directive 95/46/EC it was the task of Member States and national laws 
in accordance with the principles set out in Convention 108 to ensure the 
adequate protection of personal data. The model imposed by Convention 108 is 
based on the idea that national law and Member States are the key actors in the 
protection of personal data and the right to privacy. The responsibility in the form 
of a protective duty is bestowed on the public authorities in a national context 
only. Under this regime, Member States saw the protection of personal data as a 
central issue in protecting the idea of liberty, liberal society, and the right of self-
determination in relation to the new information technologies. 
 
With regard to EU internal market law and the internal market, the potential for 
conflict is evident. The internal market creates an environment that promotes 
trans-border interactions between private actors. Irrespective of issues of 
employment, health, communication or mere consumption, the economic and 
social freedom the internal market provides to private actors promotes an 
“increasingly frequent recourse” to the transnational processing of personal 
data.575 Processing of personal data is of “vital interest” for the functioning of the 
internal market.576 The functioning of the internal market is dependent on 
“cross-border flows of personal data.”577 The level of,  
 
economic and social integration resulting from the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market[...] will necessarily lead to a 
substantial increase in cross-border flows of personal data between 
all those involved in a private or public capacity in economic and 
social activity in the Member States.578  
 
																																																								
574 For this see Daniel J. Solove, ''I've got nothing to hide' and other misunderstandings of privacy ', San 
Diego Law Review, 44 (2007), 745 at 756-757. 
575 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 4. 
576 Ibid., at recital 8. 
577 Ibid., at recital 6. 
578 Ibid., at recital 5. 
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This includes the exchange of personal data between private actors located in 
different Member States, but likewise any national authority in the various 
Member States that is,  
 
being called upon by virtue of Community law to collaborate and 
exchange personal data so as to be able to perform their duties or 
carry out tasks on behalf of an authority in another Member State 
within the context of the area without internal frontiers as 
constituted by the internal market.579 
 
 
2.1 Harmonisation of data protection law 
The choice to harmonise a specific sector under EU internal market law always 
involves the decision that a new harmonised approach increases the efficiency 
and the functioning of the internal market. In relation to data protection, this is 
not about the fact that Member States were not protecting personal data 
adequately, but that the diverging provisions of laws, regulations, or 
administrative measures at the national level were distorting the functioning of 
the internal market due to the restrictive effects on the trans-border flow of 
personal data.580 Put differently, it is a conflict between national laws on the one 
hand and EU internal market law for the purpose of the functioning internal 
market on the other. 
 
With regard to the processing of personal data, the different levels of protection 
of personal data under national laws is likely to prevent the “transmission of such 
data from the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State.”581 
The consequence being “an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of economic 
activities at Community level, [a distortion of] competition and [impeding] 
authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under Community law.”582 It 
is the diversity between and the restrictiveness of national laws with regard to the 
																																																								
579 Ibid. 
580 COM(90)314 final, Commission Communication on the protection of Individuals in relation 
to the processing of personal data in the Community and Information security, of 13 September 
1990,  14. 
581 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 7. 
582 Ibid. 
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protection of personal data that distorts and impedes the functioning of the 
internal market.583 
 
Despite the traditional arguments for harmonisation, the Member States and 
national laws were under pressure due to the rapid technological developments, 
the increase in collecting and sharing personal data and globalisation that 
brought new challenges to public authorities to ensure an adequate protection of 
personal data.584 The increasing complexity of ensuring data protection in all 
sectors, coupled with constant new technical innovations made it difficult for 
Member States to ensure adequate protection of its citizens. The rapid changes 
in the business sector paired with the relatively slow nature of law-making 
procedures (and also a lack in expertise) led to inefficient laws. The emerging 
diversity between national laws and the different levels of protection awarded, 
affected both data subjects and the activities of businesses in the internal market. 
Here lies the core of the problem faced with EU data protection law: how to 
ensure a high level of protection of personal data while increasing the functioning 
of the internal market. The approach to reconcile these two objectives is 
reflected in Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
 
2.2 The Directive 95/46/EC regime 
Although it was adopted as an internal market instrument, Directive 95/46/EC 
recognised the need to guarantee a high level of  personal data protection.585 The 
driving force was not the protection of personal data or the right to privacy, but 
the functioning of the internal market.586 Directive 95/46/EC was adopted with 																																																								
583 This problem of data protection with regard to the transnational transmission of personal data 
found its way into Convention 108 already. Article 12 of Convention 108 requires States to not 
automatically restrict the trans-border flow of personal data for the sole purpose of the 
protection of privacy. States are required to give account to “the increasing flow across frontiers 
of personal data undergoing automatic processing“. For this see Convention 108 of the Council of 
Europe on Data Protection, Article 12. Processing is in particular relevant with regard to the 
personal data required for (inter)-actions between private parties in the territories of the Member 
States. See: Federico Fabbrini, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data Privacy'. 
584 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 recital 6. 
585 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 1. On the dual objective see Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR 
I-12971 at 96; and Case C-465/00, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989 at 39; and Joined 
cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), 
[2011] ECR I-12181 at 29; and Case C-73/07, Satakunnan, [2008] ECR I-9831 at 53. 
586 See Article 114 TFEU and Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, 'EU Law',  at 616. EU Directive 
95/46/EC was adopted as a means ‘to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’. 
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the intention of ensuring the functioning of the internal market.587 Directive 
95/46/EC states that: 
 
(8) …in order to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data, the 
level of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with 
regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent in all 
Member States; …Community action to approximate those laws is 
therefore needed; 
 
(9) …given the equivalent protection resulting from the 
approximation of national laws, the Member States will no longer 
be able to inhibit the free movement between them of personal 
data on grounds relating to protection of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy.588  
 
The consequence is that Directive 95/46/EC establishes a regime that serves two 
objectives: (1) the functioning of the internal market and (2) ensuring a high level 
of protection of personal data.589 This conflict of interests involved is strongly 
reflected in the organisation of EU data protection law.590 In this regard, the 
Court of Justice clarified that “Member States should, while permitting the free 
flow of personal data, protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons and in particular, their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of 
personal data.”591  
 
In Lindqvist, the Court clarified that the Directive 95/46/EC regime is designed 
to guarantee the functioning of the internal market while maintaining a high level 
of protection of personal data throughout the Member States. 592  Lindqvist 																																																								
587 Article 114(1) TFEU. 
588 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 8-9. 
589 The dual objective enshrined in the Directive is the reason why we have a system based on 
individual balancing of cases. Ibid., at Article 1(1) and Article 1(2).  
590 See Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 99; and COM(2003)265 final, First report 
on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), of 15 May 2003,  3; and 
COM(2012)9 final, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World: A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century, of 25 January 2012,  8. 
591  Case C-73/07, Satakunnan, [2008] ECR I-9831 at 53; and Case C-465/00, Österreichischer 
Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989 at 39. 
592 Alan Dashwood, 'The Harmonisation Process', in Carol Cosgrove Twitchett (ed.), Harmonisation in 
the EEC (St Martins Press, New York, 1981),  at 7; and Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 7-9; and 
COM(90)314 final,  14-15. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 96; and Joined cases C-
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concerned the setting up of a private webpage containing information about a 
group of catechists. Mrs Lindqvist set up this webpage to enable parishioners 
preparing for their confirmation to “obtain information they might need.”593 The 
webpage contained personal information about Mrs Lindqvist and 18 colleagues, 
such as full names, jobs, hobbies, family names, and telephone numbers. Thus, at 
hand was the issue between the availability of information on the internet and 
the protection of personal data. The Court of Justice held that for the 
functioning of the internal market, the data controller is the competing interest 
involved under Directive 95/46/EC, as the Court of Justice argued:  
 
80 … need to have access to personal data to perform their 
transactions or carry out their tasks within the area without 
internal frontiers, which the internal market constitutes. 
 
81 On the other hand, those affected by the processing of personal 
data understandably require those data to be effectively 
protected.594 
 
 
2.3 Effective data protection in EU internal market law 
The challenges the national authorities were confronted with in terms of rapid 
technological changes and masses of personal data available in the digital world 
required a new approach. This new approach needed to ensure improved and 
more efficient protection of personal data at a European scale. In order to 
respond to the very needs and characteristics of the sector concerned, Directive 
95/46/EC set out a new structural organisation and a new approach on how data 
protection is attained. The underlying assumption is that data protection is 
ensured if it is made effective in practice:  
 
This goes to the heart of the directive, its first objective being to 
protect individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. 
That objective can only be realised and made effective in practice, 																																																																																																																																																														
468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), [2011] 
ECR I-12181 at 29. 
593 Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 12. 
594 Ibid., at 80-81. 
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if those who are responsible for data processing can be sufficiently 
stimulated by legal and other means to take all the measures that 
are necessary to ensure that this protection is delivered in 
practice595 
 
Directive 95/46/EC provides this new approach for dealing with the asymmetry 
of power between data controller and data subject within the internal market. 
The responsibilization of private actors qua data controller is a consequence 
thereof.596 When acting in the capacity as data controller, private actors are 
transformed into ‘competent authorities’ in relation to the attainment of 
effective data protection in the context of the internal market. The process 
through which data protection is attained is reorganised. It involves new actors 
and a new process. Data protection is no longer determined within the scope of 
specific ‘rights,’597 but through a legal framework ensuring lawful processing of 
personal data. According to Directive 95/46/EC, effective protection of personal 
data is only attained when exercised at EU level and when imbedded in the 
internal market. A dispersed organisation of data protection at Member State 
level is likely to distort the functioning of the internal market as it impedes the 
free flow of data in cross-border situations. 
 
 
2.3.1 New approach to data protection: A legally structured ‘Data protection principle’ 
First and foremost, part of the new organisation is reflected in the approach on 
how personal data are protected. Instead of providing a clear legislative 
framework of what data protection means, the Directive 95/46/EC adopts a more 
flexible approach based on the idea of balancing. Data protection is absorbed and 
ingrained in the internal market context. Political power is taken from Member 																																																								
595 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 4. 
596 “While the concept of controller (of the file) plays a very limited role in Convention 108, this is 
completely different in the Directive. Article 6(2) explicitly provides that ‘it shall be for the 
controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with’. This refers to the main principles relating 
to data quality, including the principle in Article 6(1)(a) that ‘personal data must be processed 
fairly and lawfully’. The consequence is that all provisions setting conditions for lawful processing 
are essentially addressed to the controller. For an extensive analysis and overview of EU data 
protection law see Council Of Europe and Eufra, 'Handbook on European Data Protection Law' 
(Publications Office of the European Union, Brussels, 2014). On the idea of decentralisation see 
Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 4. 
597 This would be the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights which sets out 
what kind of activities are prohibited under Article 8 ECHR and the right to privacy. To this 
effect see: Council Of Europe and Eufra, 'Handbook on European Data Protection Law'. 
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States and shifted to the European level. The principle of data protection shifts 
from being a constitutional right towards a commodity produced by actors acting 
in a market environment and subject to data protection regulations—Directive 
95/46/EC in particular.  
 
The approach adopted by Directive 95/46/EC reflects this transformation and 
shift of power. Under Directive 95/46/EC data protection is no longer “regulated” 
but “produced.” This is because data protection is attained through lawful 
processing based on “protection principles.” 598  The system developed by 
Directive 95/46 EC is based on the idea that effective data protection takes place 
in the course of processing—lawfulness is the requirement that determines when 
and if data are processed. Directive 95/46/EC establishes a system that ensures 
protection of personal data through lawful processing of this personal data.599 This 
means that data protection is treated as a commodity in the market. The 
function of the internal market is ensured and personal data are protected if 
personal data are processed in accordance and in coordination with the rules and 
environment developed under Directive 95/46/EC concerning the processing of 
such data. The meaning of data protection is developed and determined on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account to all interests involved in a particular 
case.600 
 
Data protection is “produced” by weighing the interests of the data subject and 
the data controller on an individual basis, within a detailed legal framework 
defining lawful processing. Lawful processing is the key to data protection. 
Directive 95/46/EC determines that lawful processing of personal data is 
conditional on “principles relating to data quality.”601 The technique of balancing 
is used to determine if the interference with the right to data protection is 
justified or not in the context of the circumstances of the case. It is observed 
that EU internal market law develops a harmonised approach on which basis the 																																																								
598 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 25.  
599 Ibid., at Article 7.  
600 Ibid., at Article 6 and Article 7; and Gloria González-Fuster, 'The emergence of personal data 
protection as a fundamental right of the EU',  at 137. 
601  Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 6(1). Further see Mislav Mataija and European University 
Institute. Law Department., 'Private regulation, competition and free movement : sport, legal services and 
standard setting in EU economic law', Ph D (European University Institute (LAW), 2013) at 15. The 
“new approach to harmonization” puts an emphasis only on general principles through legislation 
and leaves the details to EU standard setting bodies. Data protection going beyond – it gives data 
controller specific roles in shaping and implementing the EU data protection policy. 
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interference with free movement is justified for the purpose of the protection of 
personal data. In fact, the lawful processing test is a mechanism to determine if 
in a specific case interference with free movement is justified or not.602  
 
The collection and processing of personal data may be justified for legitimate 
purposes. If personal data are protected it is to the detriment of an entity that 
has an interest in the processing of these data. Alternatively, if data are processed 
this may affect the data subject negatively. This implies a trade-off on a case-by-
case basis, shifting either to the side of the data subject or to the side of the 
entity processing personal data. Setting up a system that ensures that the right 
balance is struck is at the core of Directive 95/46/EC, which ensures data 
protection in light of the functioning of the internal market.  
 
 
2.3.2 New structural organisation: Decentralisation of responsibility 
For the approach detailed in Directive 95/46/EC and for data protection to work 
efficiently, roles and functions are reorganised. The new institutional system 
deviates from the model proposed in Convention 108 where the responsibility to 
protect personal data was vested in public authorities. The structure outlined in 
Directive 95/46/EC is best described as a decentralisation of responsibility.  
 
Directive 95/46/EC relies on a constitutional structure that empowers and 
engages multiple local actors in order to ensure a high level of protection of 
personal data.603 This decentralised approach is best described as a system of 
shared responsibilities. Different actors are equipped with different functions 
relating to the legal framework set out in Directive 95/46/EC. In relation to the 
effective protection of personal data, data subjects and data controllers occupy 
the centre of the new organisation. Their role with regard to the protection of 
personal data is well captured by the preamble of Directive 95/46/EC stating that:  
 
																																																								
602 Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Officer, of 6 October 2015 (not yet 
reported) at 38. The Court of Justice states in para. 38: “It should be recalled first of all that the 
provisions of Directive 95/46, inasmuch as they govern the processing of personal data liable to 
infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to respect for private life, must necessarily 
be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.” 
603 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought'. 
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(25) … the principles of protection must be reflected, on the one 
hand, in the obligations imposed on … bodies responsible for 
processing, in particular regarding data quality, technical security, 
notification to the supervisory authority, and the circumstances 
under which processing can be carried out, and, on the other hand, 
in the right conferred on individuals, the data on whom are the 
subject of processing604 
 
Directive 95/46/EC creates a type of coordination of multiple actors in charge for 
implementing, monitoring, and complying with the requirements set out in EU 
data protection law.605 This type of coordination generates a system of self-
organisation for those actors involved in the processing of personal data. It is the 
data subject and the data controller, confined by rights and obligations as set out 
in the Directive 95/46/EC, that determine when processing is lawful or when this 
is not the case.606 In this system, data subjects shall have the ultimate control 
over personal data, which is reflected, for example, in the right to access personal 
data,607  the right to be informed,608  or the right to obstruct processing.609 
Limiting the powers of data controllers paired with the allocation of rights 
transforms the relationship and the power dynamics in between into a tool to 
implement and to produce “data protection” within the internal market. Thus, 
data protection is not a definite right, but produced (i.e. ensured) within every 
individual case of ‘processing of personal data’ through a balancing exercise 
(guided by the legal framework set out in Directive 95/46/EC and the Court of 
Justice). Directive 95/46/EC depicts the natural relationship 610  between data 
controller and data subject as the centre of the organisation for data protection 
under EU internal market law and imbeds it in an institutional framework of 
shared responsibilities. 
 																																																								
604 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 25. Emphasis added. 
605 Maria Weimer, 'Democratic legitimacy though European conflicts-law?: the case of EU administrative 
governance of GMOs',  at 59. 
606 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 25. 
607 Ibid., at Article 12. And see Case C-553/07, Rijkeboer, [2009] ECR I-3889.  
608 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 10 and 11. 
609 Ibid., at Article 14. 
610 This natural relationship is defined on the basis of the conflicting interests at stake: the 
interests of the owner of personal data and the entity having access to or control over this data.  
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Member States, national authorities, national courts, businesses and social 
partners, and data controllers and data subjects are allocated specific tasks with 
regard to the protection of personal data.611 The protective duty in terms of data 
protection is shared among multiple local actors. The shift of responsibilities 
reflects a form of delegation of public powers. The actors put in charge for parts 
of the organisation of EU data protection law under Directive 95/46/EC are, 
partly, delegated “powers” that were formerly within the sphere of Member 
States and public authorities only. In this regard, data controllers are treated as 
an alternative source of authority in the realm of EU data protection law: they 
hold the power to affect the ‘level’ of data protection delivered to data subjects 
directly.  
 
 
3. Effective attainment of data protection in the internal market 
Data protection in the internal market organises responsibilities in a horizontal 
way. Different actors are involved and equipped with different functions 
concerning the protection of personal data. These actors share the responsibility 
with regard to the principle of data protection. The function of Directive 
95/46/EC is to achieve data protection through the coordination of different 
actors whose functions are defined by the legal framework it sets out. Directive 
95/46/EC sets up a new system of governance that is characterised by 
decentralisation of competences. The result is the responsibilization of different 
local actors that through legal coordination seek to ensure a high level of data 
protection. In this web of actors, the power relationship of the data controller 
and the data subject is imbedded in a wider institutional framework of shared 
responsibilities. In this framework the responsibility of the data controller is limited 
and confined by the tasks and capacities entrusted to other competent actors.  
 
 
3.1 National Data Protection Authorities  
Directive 95/46/EC requires Member States to set up one or more “public 
authorities responsible for monitoring, with complete independence, compliance 
with EU rules on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
																																																								
611 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 9. 
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such data.” 612  Consequently, National Data Protection Authorities play an 
important role in the framework created for the protection of personal data. 
They are entrusted with the task of ensuring the effective enforcement and 
monitoring of compliance with data protection rules.613 National Data Protection 
Authorities are supposed to control the activities of data controllers. This 
national scope of competence is important because national law, transposing the 
Directive 95/46/EC regime, provides the data protection rules that data 
controllers have to comply with.614 For this purpose they are entrusted with the 
task of supervising and monitoring the “application within its territory” of data 
protection rules.615 For example, Article 18 of Directive 95/46/EC requires that 
data controllers notify any processing activity to the National Data Protection 
Authority. It is to “serve as a basis for selective monitoring of the legitimacy of 
processing.”616 National Data Protection Authorities have far reaching powers 
and competences. They enjoy investigative powers, interventionist powers, and 
powers to engage in legal proceedings.617 
 
National Data Protection Authorities are the primary institutions that review 
possible infringements of data protection rules. They may even be addressed by 
data subjects before such cases go to court.618 This became evident in Schrems.619 
Schrems concerned the transfer of personal data by Facebook’s Irish subsidiary to 
servers located in the United States. EU data protection law, however, only 
allows for the transfer of personal data to third parties if an adequate level of data 
protection is ensured.620 In light of the disclosures made by Edward Snowden 																																																								
612 Ibid., at Article 28(1). See for example Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection 
Officer, of 6 October 2015 (not yet reported). 
613 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 28(1). 
614 Ibid., at Article 4 and Article 5. 
615 Ibid., at Article 28(1). 
616 Ibid., at Article 18(2); and COM(92)422 final, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,  28-29. 
617 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 28(23). 
618 Ibid. Article 28(3) last paragraph states: “Decisions by the supervisory authority which give rise 
to complaints may be appealed against through the courts.“ Further see: Loic Azoulai and Marijn 
Van Der Sluis, 'Institutionalizing personal data protection in times of global institutional distrust: Schrems', 
Common Market Law Review,  (2016 forthcoming). 
619 See Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Officer, of 6 October 2015 (not yet 
reported). 
620 To this effect see Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 25. 
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concerning mass surveillance by US intelligence agencies, Mr Schrems was 
doubtful about the requirement of “adequate protection.” For this reason, he 
filed a complaint to the Irish Data Protection Authority that rejected the 
complaint on the basis of the Commission’s Safe Harbour agreement, stating that 
the US ensures adequate protection of personal data.621 The Court of Justice 
strengthened the role of National Data Protection Authorities with regard to the 
system of data protection as established by Directive 95/46/EC stating that:  
 
40. … Directive 95/46 requires Member States to set up one or 
more public authorities responsible for monitoring, with complete 
independence, compliance with EU rules on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of such data.  
 
41. The guarantee of the independence of national supervisory 
authorities is intended to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of 
the monitoring of compliance with the provisions concerning 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and must be interpreted in the light of that aim. It was 
established in order to strengthen the protection of individuals and 
bodies affected by the decisions of those authorities. The 
establishment in Member States of independent supervisory authorities is 
therefore, as stated in recital 62 in the preamble to Directive 95/46, an 
essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data.622 
 
The independence of the National Data Protection Authorities from other 
national authorities is important. Even if National Data Protection Authorities 
act within the territorial limits of Member States they “shall act with complete 
independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them.”623 In Commission v. 
Germany 624  the importance of this independence was at stake. Germany 																																																								
621 Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Officer, of 6 October 2015 (not yet 
reported) at 26-36. 
622 Ibid., at 40-41. 
623 For example see Case C-614/10, Commission v. Austria, [2012] ECR 631 at 36; and Case C-288/12, 
Commission v. Hungary, of 8 April 2014 (not yet published) at 47. 
624  Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, [2010] ECR I-1885. Further see Case C-614/10, 
Commission v. Austria, [2012] ECR 631; and Case C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, of 8 April 2014 
(not yet published). 
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maintained a system whereby supervision of public entities processing data was 
subject to scrutiny by special public authorities.625 The Court of Justice held, that 
the very nature of the task entrusted to National Data Protection Authorities 
requires that they “remain free from any external influence.”626 National Data 
Protection Authorities must act impartially and objectively and free from any 
Member State influence. This is essential, because supervisory authorities are 
“the guardians of those fundamental rights and freedoms, and their existence in 
the Member States is considered, ... as an essential component of the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.”627 In this regard, 
the decision of the Court of Justice in Schrems also clarified that National Data 
Protection Authorities may engage with assessments of adequacy decisions of the 
Commission—in this case the Safe Harbour Agreement concluded with the 
United States. Thus assuming a form of independence also from EU 
institutions.628 
 
In fact, the responsibility ascribed to National Data Protection Authorities is 
different in kind if compared to the responsibilities of data controllers, for 
example. Even if National Data Protection Authorities are, in a wider sense, 
responsible for the protection of personal data, their responsibility in the 
narrower sense relates to the task of monitoring and supervising the compliance 
of data controllers’ activities with national data protection rules.  
 
A consequence of the responsibility ascribed to National Data Protection 
Authorities is that the role of national courts is marginalised. This is because the 
National Data Protection Authority according to Article 22(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC should be the primary authority dealing with supervision and 
complaints relating to data protection issues.629 It has a quasi-judicial function 
because it is National Data Protection Authorities that deal with the case in the 
first instance. Only as a form of appeal, under Article 28(3) is it possible that 
“decisions by the supervisory authority which give rise to complaints may be 																																																								
625 Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, [2010] ECR I-1885 at 7-13. 
626 Ibid., at 25. 
627 Ibid., at 23. 
628 To this effect see Loic Azoulai and Marijn Van Der Sluis, 'Institutionalizing personal data 
protection in times of global institutional distrust: Schrems'. 
629 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 22(1); and Lee A. Bygrave, 'Where have all the judges gone? Reflections 
on judicial involvement in developing data protection law',  at 9. 
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appealed against through the courts.”630  Courts are clearly reduced in their 
“ability to function as a corrective to the development of data protection law and 
policy.”631  
 
 
3.2 Other National Authorities 
Although National Data Protection Authorities act within a national 
environment they are not the only actors in the national environment that is in 
charge of aspects relating to the protection of personal data under Directive 
95/46/EC. 
 
The responsibility of the legislative process in the Member States relates to the 
transposition of Directive 95/46/EC into national law. Responsibility implies that 
Member States establish an effective legal framework that data controllers have 
to comply with.632 In this capacity Member States enjoy discretion. For example, 
“Member States shall, within the limits of the provisions of this Chapter, 
determine more precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal 
data is lawful.” 633  Member States may lay down in law the situations that 
determine when the processing of personal data is deemed to be lawful634 or 
when processing is required by law. Article 7(c) of Directive 95/46/EC recognises 
the competence of the Member States to lay down situations where data 
controllers are obliged to process personal data, the choice being subject to the 
principle of proportionality.635 Moreover, when transposing Directive 95/46/EC, 
Member States may exclude some kinds of data controllers from the scope of 
Directive 95/46/EC.636  																																																								
630 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 28 (3). 
631 See Lee A. Bygrave, 'Where have all the judges gone? Reflections on judicial involvement in developing 
data protection law',  at 7. 
632 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 4 and Article 5. 
633 Ibid., at Article 5. 
634 Ibid., at Article 4.For example see Directive 95/46/EC Article 4: ‘Member States shall apply’; 
Article 6 or 7: ‘Member States shall provide’; Articel 8: ‘Member States shall prohibit’; Article 13: 
‘Member States may adopt’. On the role of the Member States consider Case C-461/10, Bonnier 
Audio AB, [2012] ECR 219; and Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, of 8 
April 2014 (not yet published); and Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, [2011] ECR I-11959. 
635 Case C-275/06, Promusicae, [2008] ECR I-271 at 65 and 68. 
636 It is interesting to see that Member States enjoy no discretion in relation to exceptions under 
Article 9 but enjoy discretion (optional) under Article 13. See Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 9 and 
Article 13; and Case C-473/12, IPI v. Geoffrey Englebert, [2013] ECR I-715.  
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In Promusicae for example, the Court of Justice had to decide if Directive 
95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC oblige a Member State to make the 
communication of personal data obligatory in order to ensure effective 
protection of copyright in the context of civil proceedings. This case concerned a 
copyright infringement of internet users. Promusicae asked for the 
communication of the personal data relating to the internet users from 
Telefonica, the internet provider. Spain had not provided by law for this kind of 
processing of personal data. The Court of Justice clarified that the Directive 
gives Member States a margin of discretion when transposing the Directive into 
national law.637 It does not require Member States to lay down “an obligation to 
communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright 
in the context of civil proceedings.”638  
 
Similarly, in IPI, the Court of Justice clarified that Article 13(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC does not oblige Member States to lay down exceptions in national law 
for situations where processing of personal data is deemed to be lawful. In IPI, 
the question was whether private detectives for the very purpose of their 
activities should be exempted from the obligation to notify data subjects about 
the collection of personal data relating to them.639 The Court of Justice held that 
within the limits of Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC, Member States enjoy 
freedom in deciding what processing of personal data may be exempted from the 
obligation to inform data subjects about the collection of data.640 
 
Although Member States, in principle, may adopt legislation that makes 
processing lawful, this discretion is not unlimited. If doing so, Member States 
must strike a fair balance between all the fundamental rights that are involved 
and protected by the Community legal order. Where national law obliges the 
data controller to process personal data, this may not violate the principles of 
proportionality and necessity.641  
 																																																								
637 Case C-275/06, Promusicae, [2008] ECR I-271 at 66. 
638 Ibid., at 71. 
639 Case C-473/12, IPI v. Geoffrey Englebert, [2013] ECR I-715 at 42-48 and 50. 
640 Ibid., at 31-32. 
641 Case C-275/06, Promusicae, [2008] ECR I-271 at 65 and 68. 
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ASNEF dealt with the limits of the discretion afforded to Member States. In 
ASNEF, the question was whether Member States could add additional 
principles for the lawful processing of personal data. In this case, Spanish law 
required that personal data could only be processed without consent if the data 
were already available in public sources.642 The Court of Justice reasoned that 
harmonisation of national laws concerning the lawful processing of personal data 
is generally complete. This is necessary to ensure an equivalent protection “of 
rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data” 
in all Member States.643 The Court of Justice made clear that:  
 
35. Directive 95/46 includes rules with a degree of flexibility and, in 
many instances, leaves to the Member States the task of deciding 
the details or choosing between options. A distinction, 
consequently, must be made between national measures that 
provide for additional requirements amending the scope of a 
principle referred to in Article 7 of Directive 95/46, on the one 
hand, and national measures which provide for a mere clarification 
of one of those principles, on the other hand. The first type of 
national measure is precluded. It is only in the context of the 
second type of national measure that Member States have, 
pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 95/46, a margin of discretion.644 
 
The structure and organisation of data protection under Directive 95/46/EC 
reduces the role of Member States to that of facilitators.645 Their key function is 
to deliver protection to individuals through national data protection laws and to 
provide for effective enforcement in terms of sanctioning.646 It is national laws 
that data controllers have to comply with.647 Although Member States may 																																																								
642 Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito 
(ASNEF), [2011] ECR I-12181 at 17. 
643 Ibid., at 28 and 29; and Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 95-96; and Case C-
524/06, Heinz Huber v. Germany, [2008] ECR I-9705 at 50. 
644 Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito 
(ASNEF), [2011] ECR I-12181 at 34-35; and Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 83 and 
97. 
645 If this is so, then the role of Member States is marginalized. Member States can no longer 
“restrict the free flow of such data in the community on grounds of the protection of the data 
subject”. To this effect see COM(90)314 final,  7.  
646 Peter J. Hustinx, 'Data Protection in the European Union', P & I,  (2005), 62 at 62. 
647 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 4(1)(a). 
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determine in their national laws when processing is lawful, this margin of 
discretion is subject to review under EU internal market law and Directive 
95/46/EC in particular.  
 
 
3.3 Private actors  
In the institutional framework imposed by Directive 95/46/EC, the relationship 
between data subjects and data controllers plays a central role. Data subjects are 
empowered through the allocation of rights vis-à-vis the data controller. This 
reflects an approach to have data subjects more actively involved in the context 
of data protection. On the other side of the relationship is the data controller. In 
contrast to the data subject, who may exercise its rights, the data controller is 
obliged to comply with the requirements relating to the lawful processing of 
personal data set out under the Directive.648 It is the relationship of data subjects 
and data controllers, guided by the legal framework created by Directive 
95/46/EC that is intended to provide data protection in practice.  
 
Google Spain reflects this idea of an active data subject vis-à-vis the data 
controller. Google Spain concerned the possibility of a data subject having 
information relating to him deleted from Google Search listings. In this case, Mr 
Costeja Gonzales had found himself in financial difficulties in 1998: he was facing 
a real-estate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of 
social security debts. This information was published in the daily newspaper at 
that time. In 2010, having resolved the proceedings concerning him, he found the 
newspaper articles from 1998 on the internet via Google Search.649 Mr Gonzales 
claimed that the information concerning him found on the internet was out-
dated and should cease to exist in line with the EU data protection directive. In 
fact, he was claiming a right to be forgotten against Google, being the controller 
of the personal data.  
  
The Court of Justice, finding Google to be a data controller by the very nature of 
its activities, recognised the requirement for Google in this role to take into 
																																																								
648 See Edward Lee, 'Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to be 
Forgotten', Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper, 2015-13 (2015), 1. 
649 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 14-15. 
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account the wishes of the data subjects of which it controls personal data.650 The 
Court of Justice held that with respect to the processing of personal data, to 
“ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that that 
procession meets the requirements of Directive 95/46/EC, in order that the 
guarantees laid down by the Directive may have full effect.”651 In this respect the 
Court of Justice held in relation to Article 7(f) of the Data Protection Directive 
that:  
 
97. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights 
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information 
in question no longer be made available to the general public by its 
inclusion in such a list of results, it should be held, (…) that those 
rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the 
operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the 
data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it 
appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data 
subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental 
rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public 
in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the 
information in question.652 
 
 
3.4 The data controller  
This thesis is interested in the position of the data controller because instances 
of the counter-culture emerge where private actors act in the capacity of data 
controller under the framework created by Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
The concept of data controller is actor neutral. It encompasses any “natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body.”653 Only where private 
actors act in the capacity of a data controller do they come within the context of 																																																								
650 Ibid., at 57-58. Further see Federico Fabbrini, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Rights to Data Privacy',  at 15. 
651 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 83. 
652 Ibid., at 97, but see further 63,71 and 81. 
653 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 2(d). 
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Directive 95/46/EC. In this regard, the capacity to decide on the “purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data” is decisive.654 This involves an element 
of power in terms of control over personal data.655 Control over personal data 
automatically implies the power to determine the purpose and means of 
processing. If this is so, then the concept of controller is a functional concept. It 
ensures that responsibility linked to the role of the data controller in the context 
of data protection is allocated “where the factual influence is.”656 This ensures 
that the scope of the meaning of data controller is potentially wide.657  
 
The Court of Justice has emphasised this potentially wide scope as a necessary 
precondition to ensure a high level of protection of personal data. Today almost 
any relationship involves personal data. In Google Spain, the Court of Justice had 
to decide if search engines come within the scope of the data controller. This 
question emerged in particular as Google argued that it was not the controller of 
the data as it only hyperlinks the search results to the original content of 
webpages of third parties. Having decided that the activity of search engines that 
relates to,  
 
28. … exploring the internet automatically, constantly and 
systematically in search of the information which is published 
there, the operator of a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it 
subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the 
framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, 
as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in 
the form of lists of search results. As those operations are referred 
to expressly and unconditionally in Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46, 
they must be classified as ‘processing’ within the meaning of that 
provision.658 
 
Deriving from this approach, the Court of Justice concluded that search engine 
operators, are data controllers as they de facto “determine the purposes and 																																																								
654 Ibid. 
655 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 8.  
656 Ibid., at 9. 
657 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 28f. 
658 Ibid., at 27-28. 
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means of that activity and this of the processing of personal data that it itself 
carries out within the framework of that activity.”659  In this context, it is 
irrelevant that the content has already been made public by a third party.660 
Excluding search engines from the scope of data protection would “compromise 
the directive’s effectiveness and the effective and complete protection of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, which the directive seeks to 
ensure.”661 It is interesting to note that in order to determine the personal scope 
of the concept of data controller, the Court of Justice had recourse to a reasoning 
that was similar to the Walrave and Koch line of cases. Here, the decisive factor is 
the activity of the actor concerned and not the status held. The test is whether 
the actor is likely to distort the efficiency of the policy-making environment in 
which he is supposed to act. The court refers to this as the ‘compromising effect’ 
of the system set up by EU internal market law.662 
 
The potentially wide personal scope of the concept of data controller became 
evident in Lindqvist and Rynes; both cases related to the processing of personal 
data in a very private environment. Lindqvist concerned the setting up of a private 
webpage containing information about a group of catechists.663 The data made 
public provided personal information about Mrs Lindqvist and 18 colleagues, 
such as full names, jobs, hobbies, family names or telephone numbers. According 
to the Court of Justice this,  
 
27. …act of referring on an internet page, to various persons and 
identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving 
their telephone number or information regarding their working 
conditions and hobbies, constitutes ‘the processing of personal data 
wholly or party by automatic means’ within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 95/46. 
 
The consequence being that Mrs Lindqvist was considered to be a data 
controller. Even if the activity of Mrs Lindqvist was carried out for non-																																																								
659 Ibid., at 34. 
660 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan, [2008] ECR I-9831 at 48-49. 
661 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 58.  
662 Ibid.; and Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cyclist internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federacion Espanola Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405 at 16-17. 
663 Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971 at 12. 
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economic purposes, EU data protection rules were still applicable. A narrow 
interpretation is needed to ensure a high level of protection of data subjects.  
Rynes is a similar case that concerned a privately installed video surveillance 
system that partly covered a public square in front of the individual’s house. The 
Court of Justice clarified that in order to ensure a high level of protection of the 
right to personal data, the Directive must be narrowly interpreted.664 The Court 
of Justice held:  
 
33. To the extent that video surveillance covers even partially, a 
public space and is accordingly directed towards outwards from the 
private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it 
cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely personal or 
household activity for the purposes of Article 3(2) Directive 
94/46.665 
 
Thus, video surveillance cannot be exempted under the household exception 
pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. However, the Court of Justice 
continued that it might be justified for a legitimate reason mentioned in Article 7 
and the interests of the data controller in terms of his health and that of his 
family, and the safety of his property.666 
 
Under this definition, almost “every individual is a data subject and entities in 
every sector of the economy [may qualify as] data controllers.”667 This potentially 
wide interpretation of data controller allows the “allocation of responsibility 
where the factual influence is” upon issues relating to the lawful processing of 
personal data.668 The trigger is the mere capacity to process personal data. There 
is no formal distinction between public or private actors. Rather, the difference 
is drawn on a test of whether the activity is exercised in a purely private context. 
However, Lindqvist and Rynes reflect a very narrow and strict interpretation of 
the concept of “private context.”  
 																																																								
664 Case C-212/13, Ryneš, of 11 December 2014 (not yet published) at 25-31. 
665 Ibid., at 33. 
666 Ibid., at 34. 
667 COM(2003)265 final,  4; and Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not yet published) at 23; 
and Case C-473/12, IPI v. Geoffrey Englebert, [2013] ECR I-715 at 42-48. 
668 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 9. 
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4. Responsibility of the data controller 
The data controller occupies a genuine position in the context of the principle of 
data protection. In fact, it is EU data protection law that inaugurates private 
actors as an alternative source of authority in the system of governance for data 
protection. The task entrusted to data controller—to ensure lawful processing of 
personal data—only emerges under the Directive 95/46/EC regime. Thus, the 
power to affect the level of data protection ensured to data subjects, which is 
vested in the data controller through the allocation of a certain set of obligations 
set out in Directive 95/46/EC, is delegated by the EU legislator.669  
 
 
4.1 Compliance with data protection principles 
The language of the Directive and assumes that the responsibility of the data 
controller relates to an obligation to comply. Data controllers must ensure 
compliance with data protection rules when processing personal data.670 This 
includes requirements to inform data subjects about the processing of personal 
data,671 being responsive to the rights of data subjects particularly in relation to 
access, obstruction or erasure of personal data672 or notification requirements.673 
The misleading notion of compliance is problematic. It is misleading because it 
implies that the responsibility of the data controller is simply to comply with the 
legal obligations emerging from Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
In fact, Directive 95/46/EC entrusts data controllers with some freedom of 
action in relation to the lawful processing of personal data. Data controllers are 
conferred the power to decide if the processing of personal data is legitimate, in 
accordance with Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. The power to decide implies a 
choice vested in the data controller.  
 
The responsibility of data controllers relates to the requirement to comply with 
data protection rules when processing personal data. In particular, the principles 																																																								
669  For example see Brendan Van Alsenoy, 'Regulating Data Protection: The Allocation of 
Responsibility and Risk among Actors involved in Personal Data Processing',  at 96-97. 
670 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 18 Article 16(2).  
671 Ibid., at Article 10 and 11. 
672 Ibid., at Article 12 and 14. 
673 Ibid., at Article 18-21. 
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relating to data quality set out in Article 6 and Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC 
must be observed. The Court of Justice repeatedly recalled that: 
 
33 …in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Directive 
95/46, entitled ‘General rules on the lawfulness of the processing of 
personal data’, all processing of personal data must, subject to the 
exceptions permitted under Article 13, comply, first, with the 
principles relating to data quality set out in Article 6 of Directive 
95/46 and, secondly, with one of the six principles for making data 
processing legitimate listed in Article 7 of that directive.674  
 
Article 6 of the Data Protection Directive provides several obligations for data 
controllers to comply with. Here, the details are key. Directive 95/46/EC sets up 
an open system. It accepts that no blank solution exists that is applicable to all 
situations coming within the scope of EU data protection rules. The 
consequence being that Directive 95/46/EC establishes an open and flexible 
system for the protection of personal data. This is reflected in Article 7 of 
Directive 95/46/EC and the power vested in the data controller to decide/balance 
on a case-by-case basis if the processing of personal data is lawful or not. The 
context, which varies in every individual case, is decisive.675 It is the context that 
determines the meaning of data protection, i.e. whether data protection is more 
likely to be demanded or not. Article 7 states that personal data may be 
processed if: 
 
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party … 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to 
which the controller is subject; or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out 
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested 																																																								
674 See Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not yet published) at 33-34; and Case C-465/00, 
Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989 at 65; and Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Germany, 
[2008] ECR I-9705 at 48. 
675 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 8. 
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in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; 
or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties 
to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject, which require protection under Article 1 (1).676 
 
Whereas points (a)–(c) presuppose some external legitimation giving approval to 
and making processing lawful, this is not required for the remaining provisions of 
Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. Even if sections (a)–(c) assume some dependency 
of the data controller on consent, a contract, or an obligation adopted by law, 
this is not the case for points (d)–(f). In these cases, the data controller has the 
power to decide if the processing of personal data is lawful or not. ‘Lawful 
processing’ is the requirement that combines the competing interests of the data 
controller and the data subject. Therefore the responsibility of the data 
controller—and the protection of personal data—relates to the lawful processing of 
personal data in an individual case.677 It is the data controller that is entrusted with 
the task of ensuring that any processing of personal data complies with data protection 
rules.678 This approach acknowledges that the free flow of personal data may be 
needed in some circumstances, but places an equal emphasis on the necessity to 
ensure a high level of protection.679 Competing interests with regard to the 
processing of personal data may exist. It is the responsibility of the data 
controller to ensure that personal data are processed only when this is lawful. 
This reflects a task that is classically entrusted to legislators and national courts. 
The data controller is in charge of a specific function (i.e. ‘to ensure lawful 
processing’) in an organisational framework that leads to the protection of a 
constitutional right.  
 																																																								
676 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 7 
677 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 3(1); and Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", 
(00264/10/EN WP169) at 4. 
678 It is the duty of the data controller to ensure that personal data is processed fairly and lawfully. 
See Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 6(1)(a) and 6(2); and Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not 
yet published) at 23. 
679 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 6(1)(a) and 7; and Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación 
Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), [2011] ECR I-12181 at 30; and Case C-
131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 71; and Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not 
yet published) at 33. 
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4.1.1 Liability 
Responsibility entails liability, which is intended to support the legal framework 
through an accountability mechanism. Directive 95/46/EC imposes direct liability 
on the data controller in case of illegal processing, unless it can be shown that the 
controller is not responsible for the damage. Article 23 of Directive 95/46/EC 
clarifies that it is the data controller that is liable for any damage caused by the 
unlawful processing of personal data. Moreover, the data subject who has 
suffered damage “is entitled to receive compensation from the controller.”680  
 
However, it is the Member States that shall provide the system for compensation 
in cases violating EC data protection law. Liability is decided in a national 
environment.681 In this environment, the data controller may be subjected to 
administrative remedies and other sanctions if its activities violate data 
protection law.682 The system of liability is special because it aides the “conflict 
solution mechanism” that the National Data Protection Authorities are 
entrusted with. This is clear from Article 22 of Directive 95/46/EC: 
 
Without prejudice to any administrative remedy for which 
provision may be made, inter alia before the supervisory authority 
referred to in Article 28, prior to referral to the judicial authority, 
Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a 
judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him by the 
national law applicable to the processing in question. 
 
 
4.2 Producing data protection in the internal market 
The new protection system creates an environment where the data controller and 
the data subject are placed in the centre of the organisation. It creates a policy-
making environment where the data controller and the data subject should 
engage in order to find ‘private’ solutions on matters relating to data protection. 
This assumes that data protection is primarily ensured within the relationship 																																																								
680 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 23. 
681 For example see Case C-465/00, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989. 
682 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 22 and 24; and Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not yet 
published) at 15. 
	 213 
and activities of these actors. In a wider sense, this new approach reflects a shift 
on how to address the asymmetry of power that exists with regard to data 
protection. The data controller’s access to personal data is the primary factor 
that generates an asymmetry of power between the data controller and the data 
subject. An efficient system of data protection in a market environment can only 
function when the interests of both the data controller and the data subject are 
reconciled on a permanent basis. Therefore, EU data protection law creates a 
legal environment in which the asymmetry of power between the data controller 
and the data subject is balanced and the interplay of the data subject and data 
controller produce and ensure data protection. The legal and institutional 
framework creates an environment that is intended to sufficiently stimulate the 
data controller to take all the measures that are necessary to ensure that 
protection is delivered in practice.683 This is reflected in the extensive allocation 
of rights and obligations to data subjects and data controllers. Rights and 
obligations function as instruments to create an environment in which data 
protection is primarily attained through the engagement of data subjects and data 
controllers and the interests they have in relation to personal data. Rights 
empower and protect the data subject to have access to information about the 
storing, content, or the authenticity of the information concerned. This 
correlates with the obligations and protective duties allocated to data controllers, 
which limit the power to process and use personal data according to their own 
interests. Through this interplay of rights and obligations between data 
controller and data subject, data protection is “produced.”  
 
A good example of this model is the recent Google Spain case where data 
protection was ensured through the engagement of Mr Costeja, the data subject, 
with Google Spain, the data controller. On request of Mr Costeja, and affirmed by 
the Court of Justice, Google Spain was required to assess the validity of the 
request and delete the personal information if approved, therefore data 
protection is ensured and “produced.” Thus, it is through the exercise of rights 
granted to data subjects under Directive 95/46/EC in combination with the legal 
requirements addressed to data controllers that a system of self-governance 
emerges. Data protection should primarily be attained through engaging data 
																																																								
683 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 4. 
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subjects and data controllers in case of disagreement as to whether personal data 
are adequately protected and lawfully processed.684  
 
 
4.3 Producing data protection through balancing 
The idea of data protection as a commodity that is produced becomes clear if we 
observe the approach adopted under EU data protection law. Effective data 
protection relates to and takes place in the context of the internal market and is 
attained through lawful processing based on “protection principles.”685  
 
Within this space the data controller must balance the competing interests 
relating to (1) the free flow of personal data for ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market and (2) ensuring a high level of protection of personal data. The 
balancing and trade-off between both interests on a case-by-case basis constitutes 
the central element of the lawful processing test. With this idea, data protection 
is internalised by the market process. The balancing exercise involved in the 
‘lawful processing’ test becomes part of every decision related to processing 
personal data in the internal market environment. In fact, the power to balance 
creates a power to make law.686 
 
Disputes between data controllers and data subjects are the places where 
balancing is exercised. The Directive does not define the right to have personal 
data protected. It does not provide minimum standards of protection, but 
emphasises a mechanism of balancing in individual cases; it is the data controller 
that exercises this task. This is why the data controller, on a case-by-case basis, 
must strike a balance between the “protection of individuals against unjustified 
collection, storage, use and dissemination of their personal details” on the one 
hand and instances “where the delivery of public or private services depends on 
the processing of personal data and the use of information technology, either 
nationally or across borders” on the other.687  																																																								
684 To this effect see Edward Lee, 'Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to be Forgotten'; and Federico Fabbrini, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data 
Privacy'. 
685 Directive 95/46/EC,  recital 25. 
686 To this effect see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, 'Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 47 (2008-2009), 72 at 83. 
687 Peter J. Hustinx, 'Data Protection in the European Union',  at 63. 
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The Court of Justice affirms this individual balancing as a source of data 
protection. In ASNEF, the Court of Justice held that Article 7(f) of Directive 
95/46/EC,  
 
45. necessitates a balancing of the opposing rights and interests 
concerned, which depend, in principle on the individual 
circumstances of the particular case in question and in the context 
of which the person or the institution which carries out the 
balancing must take account of the significance of the data 
subject’s rights arising from Article 7 and 8 of the Charter.688  
 
Factors, that might affect balancing can be, for example, whether the 
information is already publicly available or if the data subject concerned is a legal 
person or a natural person.689  The sensitivity of the information is also an 
important factor. On the other hand, the status and power of the data controller 
vis-à-vis the data subject is significant for determining when processing is deemed 
to be lawful and when it is not. The fact that data controllers offer a service to 
the public might be of relevance.690 The seriousness of the interference with the 
right to privacy “manifests itself in different ways” and must be weighed on a 
case-to-case basis.691 This is why the proportionality and necessity test is applied 
restrictively, meaning that the processing of personal data shall not go beyond 
what is strictly necessary for the purpose for which it is processed.692  This 
restrictive approach to processing is affirmed in Google Spain. At stake was the 
right to have personal data deleted from search results if the information is out-
dated. With regard to Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC the Court of Justice held 
that:  
 																																																								
688 Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito 
(ASNEF), [2011] ECR I-12181 at 45; and Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 97. 
689 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke and Eifert, [2010] ECR I-11063 at 87. 
690 For example see Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 97. 
691 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke and Eifert, [2010] ECR I-11063 at 87. 
692 To this effect see Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, of 8 April 2014 
(not yet published). In this case the Court of Justice annulled the Data Retention Directive 
2006/46/EC because the framework created led to systematic violations of rights to personal 
data. Further see Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Germany, [2008] ECR I-9705 at 49, 52 and 59-60; 
and Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB, [2012] ECR 219; and Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 
[2011] ECR I-11959; and Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317. 
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97 …the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights 
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information 
in question no longer be made available to the general public by its 
inclusion in such a list of results, it should be held, …that those 
rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the 
operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the 
data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it 
appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data 
subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental 
rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public 
in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the 
information in question.693 
 
One can observe that the responsibility of the data controller goes beyond mere 
compliance with legal requirements. In fact, it bestows the data controller with a 
public power, which is reflected in the task to balance the interests involved and 
to determine if the processing of data is lawful or not.694 The consequence being 
that data controllers are empowered under the Directive 95/46/EC regime to 
determine what data protection means on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The fact that the data controller is entrusted with a balancing task confers a 
certain form of authority with regard to ensuring that data protection is delivered 
to data subjects. Private actors qua data controllers are now exercising public 
functions that formerly under national law were only vested in public authorities. 
This power to affect turns the data controller into a ‘competent authority’ in the 
web of actors that are responsibilized under EU data protection law. Other 
authorities that are recognised by Directive 95/46/EC shape the ‘environment’ in 
which the data controller and the data subject should engage: member States 
through their national laws and regulations, or National Data Protection 
Authorities through investigations and supervisory tasks exercised over the data 
controller. National Data Protection Authorities in particular occupy a key 
position with regard to ensuring the efficiency of the system of self-governance. 																																																								
693 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD, [2014] ECR 317 at 97, but see further at 63, 71 and 81. 
694 To this effect see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, 'Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism',  at 83. 
	 217 
As a primary contact point in cases of disagreement between data subject and 
data controller it is the National Data Protection Authorities that must review if 
the data controller exercised their powers in accordance with the framework of 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
 
4.4 A space granted to the data controller 
The ‘data protection system’ set up by Directive 95/46/EC is intended to enhance 
efficiency with regard to the protection of personal data in the internal market. 
Although Directive 95/46/EC legally defines the procedure on how data 
protection is attained within the internal market, it leaves open how this is 
organised by the data controller. For example, data controllers are required to set 
up access points for data subjects where complaints or requests can be raised in 
accordance with the Directive. In relation to the right to access information 
relating to the processing of personal data Rijkeboer is a good example for these 
requirements. Rijkeboer concerned the issue as to what extent the access to 
information concerning the processing of personal data must be ensured. In 
Rijkeboer this information had been stored only for one year by the data 
controller. Thus the Court of Justice had to decide to what extent this duration 
was sufficient in terms of the right of access to information for data subjects. 
Advocate General Sharpston argued that the “holding of personal data is a 
responsibility with time-limit.”695 Even if the deletion of data is a key to the 
protection, this should not go so far as to eliminate the possibility to access 
information concerning the processing of personal data for the data subject. In 
this sense, Article 12 on the right of access to personal data has precedence over 
Article 6 concerning the deleting of personal data no longer used.696 Advocate 
General Sharpston argued that:  
 
32. the obligation to delete data is secondary to the right of access. 
The articles concerned confer a right, which is born when the file is 
created and dies when it is deleted. Accordingly, the erasure of 
personal data is merely a moment in the life of the right of access, a 
feature which is determined and justified by Article 12.697 																																																								
695 Case C-553/07 Rijkeboer, Opinion of Advocate General SHARPSTON,  at 26. 
696 Ibid., at 28-29. 
697 Ibid., at 32.  
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Similarly, data controllers must have in place effective procedures dealing with 
the requests made by data subjects. Put differently, data controllers must have in 
place effective procedures that allow balancing. Data controllers having access to 
excessive amounts of personal information like Google or Facebook are 
especially required to develop internal procedures for dealing with complaints 
raised and for making the information stored on the local servers available to data 
subjects.698  Data controllers must develop internal technical mechanisms that 
ensure the protection of personal data that are stored digitally. For example, the 
Apple iCloud was under pressure after a hacker managed to break into the cloud 
servers and download pictures and personal data.  
 
The system adopted under Directive 95/46/EC responds to the dynamics 
described above. Processing of personal data becomes complex and the number 
of transactions so high that personal data cannot be effectively protected through 
legislative means.699 This openness granted to the data controller is a response to 
the complexity and rapid technological changes involved in processing personal 
data.700 The speed and complexity relating to the development of information 
technologies with regard to the collection of data makes the organisation of these 
sectors through legal means overly difficult. Regulation and laws were simply not 
able to deal with such rapid changes in terms of time, but equally in terms of 
expertise and knowledge. Regulators in comparison to data controllers lack the 
knowledge and understanding of specific digital processes, for example, mass 
storage of personal data, which in turn makes effective regulation even more 
difficult.  
 
Furthermore, the system takes into account the possible large number of 
situations where the issue of data protection might emerge. Issues of data 
protection touch upon virtually all sectors within the internal market. For 
example, employers when administering data of employees,701 hosts of private 																																																								
698 For example see Edward Lee, 'Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to be Forgotten'. 
699 European Commission Press Release (Ip/12/46) 25 January 2012 'On a reform of data protection 
rules'. 
700 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", (00264/10/EN WP169) at 18; and 
Opinion 3/2010, on the principle of accountability, (00062/10/EN, WP 173),  19.  
701 See Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 (not yet published). 
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webpages containing personal information,702 or even video surveillance of one’s 
own house703 may come within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
A possible side effect is that the space granted to data controllers in terms of 
self-organisation creates a market between data controllers for efficient systems 
of internal organisation. This relates to technical innovations leading to better 
and more efficient data protection, or the development of internal review 
procedures that reduce costs and ensure higher standards and more effective 
means of data protection for data subjects. 
 
 
4.5 The data controller as a source of regulatory authority 
Why is the data controller entrusted with the task of assessing lawful processing? 
The answer is found in the requirement that for the EU legislator, harmonising 
instruments must increase the ‘efficiency’ of the internal market. In other words, 
harmonisation and reorganisation of a certain policy at EU level must improve 
the old regime, which is normally the organisation and regulation within the 
Member States.  
 
The data controller has a natural interest in the processing of personal data for 
whatever interests. However, the asymmetry of power that the possession of 
personal data entrusts to the data controller over the data subject is problematic. 
Under this natural state of affairs, data protection would not take place, as the 
data controller would process the personal data for his own interests. EU internal 
market law turns this around and places the data controller in the data protection 
framework as the primary authority capable of delivering protection of personal 
data. 704  The requirement to determine the lawfulness of this processing 
transforms the data controller into a competent authority that ‘produces’ data 
protection and thereby serves a common objective (i.e. a high level of data 
protection in the internal market).705 The allocation of legal requirements under 																																																								
702 See Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971. 
703 See Case C-212/13, Ryneš, of 11 December 2014 (not yet published). 
704 In terms of social justice, this constraining of economic freedom would be considered a 
Rawlsian improvement. The constraining of the data controller is to the advantage of data 
subjects and ensures a high level of data protection in the internal market. 
705 See Brendan Van Alsenoy, 'Regulating Data Protection: The Allocation of Responsibility and Risk 
among Actors involved in Personal Data Processing',  at 96-97. 
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Directive 95/46/EC requires the data controller to internalise their part of the 
data protection principle into their economic activities. The outward effect is 
that their activities produce data protection.  
 
The question here is to what extent may data controllers define their role as 
competent authorities entrusted with the task to protect data subjects and their 
data vis-à-vis other public actors. For example, we see that Article 7(e)–(f) of 
Directive 95/46/EC, in particular, allows for discretion when determining lawful 
processing of personal data without consent of the data subject. In light of the 
Directive and the broad definition of lawful processing for every individual, the 
task of the data controller may involve a decision to not process personal data 
due to legislative obligations, i.e. because the reasons are deemed to be unlawful. 
The data controller may deny complying with national legislation in order to 
protect data subjects and personal data. In the United States, Apple had this 
dispute with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The case concerned an 
iphone of assumed terrorists to which the FBI wanted access, but did not manage 
to hack the software. Apple was required, by a decision of a national court, to 
bypass the security log on the iphone, which deletes its contents. Apple denied 
the delivery of such software, as it would have potentially posed a security risk for 
all iphone users and empower the national agencies to unlimited and 
uncontrolled access to personal data.706 
 
 
5. Remarks 
EU data protection law emerged in response to distortions in the functioning of 
the internal market. Prior to Directive 95/46/EC, the responsibility to protect 
personal data was enshrined in national constitutional law. The diversity in 
national laws, the difficulty to effectively protect personal data through national 
law, and the ever increasing demand for free movement of personal data in the 
internal market required the harmonisation of data protection law to increase the 
efficiency of the internal market.  
 
The regime established by Directive 95/46/EC reorganises the way in which data 
protection is attained. The organisation introduced by Directive 95/46/EC relies 																																																								
706 For this see ED 15-0451M, Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, United States 
District Court for the Central District of California of 16 February 2016. 
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on the natural relationship of the data controller and the data subject. The 
allocation of rights and obligations to data subjects and data controllers under the 
new legal framework is the mechanism for coordinating the activities of those 
actors that are put in charge of ensuring the protection of personal data. The 
data controller, due to the very nature of its position in the context of data 
protection, is transformed into a competent authority. The new legal and 
institutional framework creates a policy-making environment through which data 
protection is produced whereby the power relationship between data subject and 
data controller is allocated a genuine function.  
 
Finally, even if Directive 95/46/EC was adopted to ensure the free flow of data 
across Member States, it now coordinates a far-reaching obligation for Member 
States and data controllers to “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy in relation to the 
processing of personal data.”707  
  
																																																								
707 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 1(1). 
	222 
  
	 223 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
Transforming the ‘Private’ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Who are you?’ is a question that may be answered in many ways. Most people 
would answer spontaneously by offering their first or last name. But the question 
‘Who are you?’ has many levels. It relates to identity and the way identity is 
constructed. In modern states, the nationality and citizenship are ways of 
creating identity. Voting rights and the obligation to pay taxes are part of this 
identity. Still, there is more to identity than just this. Identity is everything that 
defines us as a person. It is the way we define ourselves as individuals, through 
the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the music we listen to, or the job we pursue. 
Most of us would agree that these are free choices, and thus, we are free in the 
construction of our identity. But we are not, at least not to the extent we would 
assume.  
 
The law plays a crucial role in how we organise society and how identity may be 
shaped.708 The law is the way we organise society in a modern state. Although we 
are free to make choices in principle, this is not so as to be free for absolute 
purposes. In his book ‘Propaganda’, Edward Bernays reviews the organisation of 
societies and the necessity for cooperation of the vast number of individuals “if 
they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.”709 Strikingly, he 
continues, “We are governed, our minds are moulded, our tastes formed, our 
ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.”710 We act and we 																																																								
708 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history'; and Niklas Luhmann, 
Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima Kastner, 'Law as a social system'; and John Rawls, 'A theory of justice' 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971). 
709 Edward Bernays, 'Propaganda' (First edn.: Routledge, 1928),  at 9; and N. A. Barr, 'The economics 
of the welfare state',  at Chapter 2. 
710 Edward Bernays, 'Propaganda',  at 9. “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the 
organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those 
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develop our identity and make our choices in a specific social environment. Every 
social context is constituted in a particular way and we may form and realise our 
identity in the context of this organisation.711 In the end, we are steered by the 
law that structures this social context. The granting of rights comes with a notion 
of empowerment: an incentive to act in a specific way. We are more likely to act 
in a specific way if we are encouraged to do it. If you have a right or you are 
legally encouraged to behave in a particular way, you are more likely to do so than 
for example, in situations where it is unclear or uncertain if we can or we should 
act in a specific way. 712  
 
 
1. The transformation of private actors through EU internal market law 
EU internal market law constitutes a ‘new legal order’ that comes with a new 
social arrangement: the internal market. 713  With the change of social 
environment comes a new rationality and ideal on how private actors are 
supposed to act. The responsibilization of private actors in the realm of EU 
internal market law transforms private actors and their ‘roles’ under national law 
and in domestic socio-economic contexts. As a means to ensure the construction 
and functioning of the internal market EU internal market law adds an additional 
layer to the domestic socio-economic context of regulation. Private actors are 
imbedded into this new social arrangement, which reflects a fine example of 
social engineering. 714  
 
Since the development of the doctrine of direct effect through the Court of 
Justice, the transformation of social roles and functions has been considered as a 																																																																																																																																																														
who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government, which is 
the true ruling power of our country.” 
711 Philip Bobbitt, 'The shield of Achilles : war, peace and the course of history',  at 205-206; and Case 
178/84, Commission v. Germany (Beer purity requirement), [1987] ECR 1227. 
712 For example consider Luhmann and his idea of the binary code of legal/illegal on which all legal 
thinking resides. See Niklas Luhmann, Klaus A. Ziegert, and Fatima Kastner, 'Law as a social 
system',  at Chapter 3 and 4. 
713 Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12. 
714 For example see Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, 'Unorthodox Marxism',  at 104-105. “In 
analysing societies we find it useful to create a dividing line demarcating a human centre and an 
institutional boundary, which are dynamically interrelated and determine one another. The centre 
is the collection of people who live within the society including all their needs, powers, 
personalities, skills and consciousness as discussed above. The boundary is the societies particular 
institutional framework of interconnected roles that serve to coordinate social activity as well as 
the material objects that exist within the society.” 
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technique to attain the objectives of EU internal market law. The fact that the 
treaties set up an internal market, which unifies highly regulated national 
markets, part of the technique of EU internal market law to construct the 
internal market was the development of a new individualism. EU internal market 
law structures and coordinates the relationship and activities between the 
actors.715 This new individualism placed private economic actors in the centre of 
organisation through the allocation of rights. Rights to free movement and rights 
to equal treatment have a stark outward impact. While in individual cases rights 
provide access to and equal treatment in foreign national markets, in a wider 
social context the exercise of these rights leads to economic and social 
integration simply because allocative efficiency works at a transnational level. 
The direct allocation of rights under treaty provisions transformed private actors 
into commodities, which through engaging in economic activities ensures 
economic and social integration. Private actors are instrumentalised and 
integrated into a new legal order in which they are conferred an additional 
‘economic identity’ for cross-border situations.716 
 
 
2. The counter-culture in EU internal market law 
In EU internal market law, the rights culture emerged alongside the counter-
culture. Both forms of ‘cultures’ relate to and are committed to the same EU 
legal culture, which seeks to construct and ensure the functioning of the internal 
market in light of conflicts emerging vis-à-vis national laws and interests. Both 
paradigms seek to transform and steer private behaviour in a way that leads to 
the attainment of the objectives of EU internal market law. Put differently, EU 
internal market instrumentalises private actors that are normally situated in 
national contexts for the sake of the efficiency of the internal market qua legal 
subjects. Yet, the rights culture and the counter-culture are functionally 
different. In contrast to the rights culture, the counter-culture seeks to steer 
private actors within the internal market through the allocation of constraints 
and legal obligations. A central issue with this phenomenon was that it developed 
in stark contrast to the values of individualism and economic liberties, which 
constitute the core of market dynamics.  																																																								
715 François Ewald, 'A Concept of Social Law',  at 46. 
716 On this instrumentalisation see Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective 
Entities (Market, Family, Society)',  at; and Marco Dani, 'The subjectification of the citizen in European 
public law'. 
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As has been shown in the analyses in this thesis, the counter-culture emerged as a 
tool to deal with situations of asymmetry of power between economic actors. 
Legal constraints are allocated where the asymmetry of power is of such a level 
that it distorts the construction and the functioning of the internal market in 
relation to specific sectors. Legal requirements are the tools used to minimise the 
risks of distortions to the market process that emerge from this asymmetry of 
power. The allocation of legal constraints is intended to restore the efficiency of 
economic dynamics in specific legal contexts. This makes the emergence of the 
counter-culture, or the responsibilization of private actors a tool of governance of 
the internal market.  
 
The analysis outlined that the counter-culture—as a technique of governance—
emerges in two situations. This is (1) the control of private autonomy that 
emerges in a national context to an extent that it is capable of interfering with 
other ‘private interests’ in the internal market. This kind of distortion is 
addressed under the free movement provisions and the prohibition of 
discrimination. Free movement law and discrimination law deal respectively with 
situations where some actors are in a position to affect the access to either a 
certain ‘national market,’ or are excluded from the labour market for other non-
economic factors (e.g. age, gender, or disability). In these cases EU internal 
market law directly regulates upon private actors. Alternatively, (2) harmonisation 
of national laws or community-wide regulation is a technique through which 
‘policy-making environments’ are reorganised in a way to enhance the efficiency 
of the market process in these specific sectors. This refers to private 
relationships coming with a certain asymmetry in terms of power to the extent 
that the diversity of national laws regulating this private relationship at national 
level is likely to distort the functioning of the internal market. In this case, the 
distortion to the internal market does not emerge in the private relationship 
itself, but in the national laws dealing with the specific characteristics of a certain 
relationship. For example, this is seen in the case of EU data protection law and 
EU food safety law.  
 
All case studies detailed here reveal that private actors under the counter-culture 
are recognised as ‘competent authorities’ in the context of the internal market. 
In this course of responsibilization, the difference with the rights culture is that 
private actors are recognised to have or are charged with certain ‘regulatory’ 
functions. In the internal market, this regulatory authority is reflected in the 
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‘power to affect’ other actors. For example, in the context of EU free movement 
law and EU discrimination law, this authority relates to a capacity of regulatory 
power. Private actors are recognised as competent authorities because of their 
regulatory power in the context of the internal market for labour or services. In 
this way, it is a technique that intends to coordinate the different sources of 
regulatory authority, i.e. some private actors being one form of authority, so as to 
ensure the internal market functions efficiently. At the same time, the control of 
regulatory power recognises the freedom to organise and regulate measures 
within their national environment. The obligations allocated under EU internal 
market law include a requirement not to interfere with the integration process of 
the internal market.717 The private actors addressed are nevertheless free to 
regulate and be active in a national environment as long as their activities do not 
interfere with the objectives of the internal market. Control of the regulatory 
power only relates to the activities and measures that restrict the rights of other 
actors to have access to the internal market. EU free movement law addresses 
specific activities affecting transition from one Member State market to another 
(i.e. economic integration) while EU discrimination law regulates equal access to 
the internal market for labour (i.e. social integration).  
 
With regard to the emergence of private actors as ‘competent authorities’ in the 
context of harmonisation measures this is different. Here, the role allocated to 
private actors emerges from the reorganisation of public power in a definite 
context. The analysis of the frameworks created by Directive 95/46/EC on data 
protection and Regulation (EC) 178/2002 on food safety revealed that private 
actors are placed in a system of shared responsibilities and the status as a 
competent authority consequently emerges.718 Both legal instruments introduce a 
new legal and institutional framework that is intended to increase the efficiency 
of the internal market by implementing the objectives of data protection and 
food safety into the economic activities of the ‘stronger’ entities. Through this 
allocation the inherent asymmetry of power between the data controller and the 
data subject, and between the food chain and the consumer, is intended to be 																																																								
717 At the same time the Court of Justice recognised the capacity of private entities holding 
positions of regulatory power to justify restrictive measures for the protection of legitimate 
interests. For example see Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; and Case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
718 Directive 95/46/EC; and Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. 
	228 
balanced. This is why the data controller on the one hand and the food business 
operator on the other occupy central positions in the respective frameworks that 
are intended to ensure a high level of protection of personal data and a high level 
of consumer health respectively. The difference being that the specific power an 
actor holds in EU internal market law emerged either in (1) national law as a form 
of self-organisation or (2) is delegated through the reorganisation exercised in the 
course of harmonisation at EU level. In the first scenario, power is recognised 
and transformed from a valid power in the national environment into a legal 
power in the internal market. The power of associations or collective entities to 
self-regulate under national law is recognised as a regulatory power within the 
meaning of EU free movement law, for example. In the second scenario, EU 
internal market law creates the power of a specific actor. This is the consequence 
of the reorganisation of roles in relation to creating a more efficient environment 
for attaining social objectives that were formerly regulated at national level. The 
responsibilities of private actors, for example, the requirement to ensure lawful 
processing of personal data through the data controller is a responsibility that 
emerged in the legal framework of Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
 
2.1 Alternative Choices 
The positions and powers that the private actors have under EU internal market 
law are not natural, but a choice made by the Court of Justice on the one hand 
and the EU legislator on the other. Due to the fact that the emergence of the 
counter-culture relates, directly or indirectly, to the distortion private activities 
produced in the internal market, the recognition of private actors as competent 
authorities is a choice in terms of efficiency. This is a mode of social 
coordination and how we structure,  
 
rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers 
are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.719 
 
Governance refers to the processes of governing power, which is about the 
control of conduct.720 The counter-culture or the responsibilization of private 																																																								
719  Mario Monti, 'A New Strategy for the Single Market'; and Maria Weimer, 'Democratic 
legitimacy though European conflicts-law?: the case of EU administrative governance of GMOs',  at 96. 
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actors in the context of the internal market is a technique in the “regulatory 
toolkit” of EU internal market law to attain the functioning of the internal 
market.721 In specific cases, the allocation of obligations is an instrument for 
restoring an environment in which economic interests can compete. This does 
not equate to an equal balance of social powers, but to a level of asymmetry that 
allows for effective representation of the competing economic interests.722  
 
The involvement of private actors implies that the attaining of specific social 
objectives may be more effectively realised through a reflexive form of 
governance rather than through a classical top-down regulation through 
centralised authorities. Each situation where the counter-culture emerged could 
have been solved through the classical top-down command and control structure. 
EU institutions, under EU internal market law, could have taken the route via 
Member States and the construction of positive obligations, á la Commission v. 
France, to deal with distortions in the internal market caused by private actors. 
The route taken in relation to the internal market and in situations where the 
counter-culture emerged is different. Under the counter-culture some economic 
actors are subject to legal constraints and obligations. The practical effect of the 
legal obligations is that the prohibited matter is internalised by these economic 
actors. For example, where an economic actor is prohibited from discriminating 
on grounds of nationality, then economic activities that are in compliance with 
this obligation produce equal treatment. The legal obligations clearly define the 
requirements with which the actors concerned must comply, i.e. they steer the 
economic activities of these actors. The allocation of specific duties or 
obligations is a way to ensure this form of internalisation of social objectives in 
economic activities. Consequently, the transformation of private actors in this 
context is a way to attain social objectives through the use of the market 
dynamics and the power relationship between economic actors. 
 
The choice for this more reflexive and market-imbedded approach to regulation 
reveals a philosophy of EU institutions to preferably produce social objectives 
from within and through market activities rather than regulating and correcting 
the market from the outside through regulatory tools. In this case, a distinction 																																																																																																																																																														
720 Nikolas S. Rose, 'Powers of freedom: reframing political thought',  at 16-17. 
721 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, 'Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation',  at 1-2. 
722 To this effect see François Ewald, 'A Concept of Social Law',  at 46. 
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is to be made between regulation as a corrective tool and regulation or 
adjudication from the outside that reorganises the socio-political structure within 
the internal market in order to ensure the attainment of social objectives.  
 
The counter-culture is a very special form of governance due to the fact that it 
instrumentalises and delegates ‘public power’ under EU internal market law to 
certain private actors. Clearly this raises issues of suitability of socio-economic 
contexts in which this form of governance can be considered a suitable 
alternative to other forms of regulation and control of private power in the 
internal market. In practical terms, the counter-culture may only function as an 
alternative form of governance in areas where public-regulation may be replaced 
by private forms of governance. For example, this is the case in highly technical 
contexts where top-down regulation is likely to fail to provide ‘efficient’ 
regulation due to the lack of expertise and knowledge.723 Thus, it makes no sense 
to consider the counter-culture as a form of governance within the internal 
market as ‘the alternative’ to the classical top-down regulation. The counter-
culture works well in areas where private actors are delegated powers such as 
monitoring, compliance, or supervision, in relation to complex and highly 
technical contexts (i.e. food safety in the food chain or lawful processing of 
personal data).724  
 
In terms of alternative regulatory choices, the development of the counter-
culture is welcomed as it adds an alternative form of governance to the classical 
top-down command and control approach at both EU level and national level. 
This is particularly the case for situations where regulatory intervention in the 
internal market, due to a distortion caused by an asymmetry of power between 
private actors, is needed to maintain either the unity or the functioning of the 
internal market. The advantage of the counter-culture is that it seeks to strike a 
balance between the protection of individualism, which is needed for the 
functioning of the internal market process, and the requirement to control a 
certain form of private power which may give rise to distortions to the market 
process. This compromise is well reflected in the allocation of legal requirements, 
which are minimally invasive and only prescribe requirements intended to 																																																								
723 On this issue of institutional alternatives see Neil Komesar, 'Imperfect alternatives'; and Neil 
Komesar, 'Law's Limits' (Cambridge: CUP, 2001); and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'We the court: the 
European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution'. 
724 For example see Loic Azoulai, 'The Complex Weave of Harmonisation',  at 609-610. 
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balance the power between economic actors. Through steered economic 
activities, private actors produce social objectives in the long-term. Thus, the 
allocation of constraints goes hand in hand with a form of legal empowerment. 
The result of the counter-culture is that ‘public institutions’ (i.e. EU legislators 
and Court of Justice) delegate public power in terms of regulatory authority 
within certain parts of the internal market to private actors. Private actors are 
transformed into sources of authority actively contributing to the attainment of 
social objectives within the legal framework created by EU internal market law. 
Yet, this delegated regulatory authority is framed in a web of shared 
responsibilities where ‘ultimate’ control and power to correct the system of 
governance is vested in public institutions (i.e. EU legislators and Court of 
Justice). 
 
 
2.2 The risk inherent in the counter-culture 
The counter-culture deals with the control of private power for the sake of the 
construction and the functioning of the internal market; the constraining of 
private autonomy under EU free movement law is a good example. Originally, 
national law created a space for private actors to engage in economic activities 
subject only to the limits set by national law in the framework of private law. The 
Europeanisation of vested positions of regulatory power changed this situation. 
The freedom for economic activity (and the social power thereunder) under 
national law is confined by EU internal market law and assessed against a wider 
framework of social objectives of EU internal market law. The effect of this 
European supervision on private actors is that in exercising their economic 
activities they are required to take into account the interests of other actors and 
potential outsiders, which would not be considered under the national law 
framework. The educative function of this technique is to widen the 
understanding of economic actors about the potential effects of economic 
choices beyond the national context. The unique feature is that the forces and 
powers of the legal system back this educative function.  
 
The control that private actors have as ‘competent authorities’ in certain parts of 
the internal market is a central element of the counter-culture. In both scenarios 
in which we see the counter-culture emerging, EU internal market law places 
certain private actors under the control of EU institutions and the EU economic 
	232 
constitution. From an EU perspective this emergence of a counter-culture as a 
technique of governance kills two birds with one stone. In simple integrationist 
terms, it reduces the influence of national law and national institutions, which 
under EU internal market law are considered to be the key sources of distortions 
to the construction and functioning of the internal market. Moreover, the 
counter-culture elaborates a model of governance where policy objectives of EU 
internal market law are placed alongside economic activities of private actors. In 
this regard, national ‘regulation’ is not replaced by EU ‘regulation’ but it sets up a 
framework in which ‘policy objectives’ are produced. Whether this reflexive 
model of decision-making is more effective remains to be seen.  
 
Nevertheless, under this reflexive approach the risk remains that the space 
granted for private choices is too wide or too narrow on the basis of legal rights 
or obligations. To find the middle ground between these two poles of private 
spaces, i.e. to find the right form of autarky and balance within a power 
relationship between private actors needed for a policy-making environment to 
function efficiently, is the major difficulty confronted by EU institutions. This 
requires effective systems of review, e.g. impact assessments, early warning 
mechanisms, reviews, and monitoring techniques seeking to ensure the 
‘effectiveness’ of this form of governance. The new Commission Better 
Regulation Package is an initiative, which seeks to ensure up-to-date efficiency of 
EU legislative frameworks and systems of governance in force. In relation to the 
requirement to provide better law-making, Frans Timmermanns stated that:  
 
we must rigorously assess the impact of legislation in the making, 
including substantial amendments introduced during the legislative 
process, so that political decisions are well informed and evidence-
based. And while the natural tendency of politicians is to focus on 
new initiatives, we must devote at least as much attention to 
reviewing existing laws and identifying what can be improved or 
simplified.725 
 
Thus, the task of EU institutions is to review if the counter-culture as a form of 
governance in a certain sector is still an efficient form of regulation or needs 																																																								
725 European Commission Press Release (Ip/15/4988) of 19 May 2015 'on Better Regulation Agenda: 
Enhancing Transparency and scrutiny for better EU law-making'. 
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revision. For example, the latest data protection reform and the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 must be seen in this context. The reform was driven by 
rapid changes in the areas of data protection and processing of personal data:  
 
(6) Rapid technological developments and globalisation have 
brought new challenges for the protection of personal data. The 
scale of the collection and sharing of personal data has increased 
significantly. Technology allows both private companies and public 
authorities to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale 
in order to pursue their activities. Natural persons increasingly 
make personal information available publicly and globally. 
Technology has transformed both the economy and social life, and 
should further facilitate the free flow of personal data within the 
Union and the transfer to third countries and international 
organisations, while ensuring a high level of the protection of 
personal data.  
 
(7) Those developments require a strong and more coherent data 
protection framework in the Union, backed by strong 
enforcement, given the importance of creating the trust that will 
allow the digital economy to develop across the internal market.726 
 
With the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 the EU legislator not only 
affirms the system of governance set up by Directive 95/46/EC, which puts 
private actors acting in their capacities as data controllers in the centre of 
organisation of the data protection framework, but it strengthens this approach. 
A decisive difference is the fact that the EU data protection framework will be 
set out in a Regulation. With this change, the EU legislator intends to set up a 
stronger framework, which is directly applicable in national law, and to 
strengthen the position of data controllers, which will be now directly bound by 
the Regulation.727 
 
 																																																								
726 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 recital 6 and 7. 
727 Ibid., at Article 5. Article 5(2) states that “The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to 
demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).” 
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2.3 EU paternalism 
Another issue to be raised is that the shaping of private actors as a commodity in 
the internal market under the counter-culture takes place in light of a 
predetermined pattern. Private actors are shaped in light of the objectives of EU 
internal market law, which ultimately are to construct and ensure the functioning 
of the internal market.  
 
This Europeanisation of private actors must be seen in relation to the special 
character of the internal market, which is transnational and unifies highly 
regulated national markets. EU internal market law relates to the attainment of 
the objectives for which the internal market was set up, i.e. ultimately economic 
and social integration. Private actors are shaped according to the dynamics that 
affect the construction and functioning of the internal market. Clearly, this 
shaping of identities reflects a form of EU paternalism. The Court of Justice and 
EU institutions bestow upon private actors a clear vision about their role in 
certain sectors of the internal market or in relation to certain policy objectives. 
EU internal market law by no means gives ‘freedom back to private actors’ but 
only replaces a national regulatory framework within which economic identities 
were formed by a new framework at EU level. For example private actors acting 
in the capacity as an employer in the internal market are affect by legal 
requirements imposed on them under EU free movement law, EU discrimination 
law and under EU data protection law.728 In this respect, EU internal market law 
comes with a structural completeness. EU internal market law is at the same time 
the reason and telos of the internal market and it provides all the principles and 
mechanisms that are needed for attaining its objectives. The permanent shaping 
of powers and requirements of private actors is an indication of this tendency. 
EU internal market law increasingly relies on private actors to attain social 
objectives; the data protection and food law frameworks being only two examples 
here.  
 
The characteristics of Europeanisation of the private affect societal structures and 
societal identities in Europe. The counter-culture reflects this transformation of the 																																																								
728 The employer is subject to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and on 
any other grounds covered by EU discrimination law, but at the same time, the employer acting 
as a data controller over the data of its employees is subject to EU data protection law. For 
example the employer is considered a controller of data in Case C-342/12, Worten, of 30 May 2013 
(not yet published) at 23. 
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‘private.’ Roles, at least in economic terms, are disaffiliated from national 
boundaries and have to find new identities in a transnational economic 
context.729 Economic actors must increasingly consider their roles and functions 
in a European rather than purely national contexts. The opportunities the 
internal market provides to private actors creates transnational possibilities for 
improving “their living and working conditions and promoting their social 
advancement.”730  
 
The transformation of the ‘private’ is even more evident in the counter-culture. 
Where private actors were acting as ‘private entities’ in a national context, only 
under the counter-culture are they transformed into alternative sources of 
regulatory authority and placed in a web of actors being jointly responsible for 
the organisation of a certain sector that is governed by EU internal market law. 
Private actors are transformed into ‘competent authorities’ being partly in charge 
for the attainment of policy objectives. Under EU internal market law and the 
counter-culture the new individualism is no longer only about the exercise of self-
interests. Rather, the new individualism developed under EU internal market law 
comes with a requirement to take into account the interests of other actors 
acting within the internal market. Put differently, some actors are put in charge 
of collective interests and must actively contribute to policy objectives that are 
intended to benefit the European society as a whole. This,  
 
more organic individualism combines the ideas of individual value 
and individual debt, and includes both a concept of freedom that is 
neither anarchistic nor self-centred and a reference to rationalism 
that does not demand the impossible, while at the same time it 
calls for the creative use of the imagination and initiative rather 
than conformity to a preordained pattern.731 
 
 
																																																								
729 To this effect see Loic Azoulai, 'The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, 
Family, Society)',  at; and Marco Dani, 'Assembling the fractured European Consumer'; and Marco Dani, 
'The subjectification of the citizen in European public law'. 
730 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011,  recital 4. 
731 Roland J. Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility',  at 18. 
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2.4 Private liability and the counter-culture 
Where someone is legally put in charge or is delegated a form of power for 
something bound up with legal requirements,  this inevitably raises questions of 
liability and enforcement in case of non-compliance. In light of EU internal 
market law this is ever more the case when private actors are put in charge, as 
competent authorities, of contributing to the attainment of social objectives. In 
light of the counter-culture the pertinent question to ask appears to concern 
liability. Are private actors to be held accountable? 
 
With regard to EU internal market law, the problem faced is that liability is not 
conceptualised in a general manner. EU internal market law does not provide for 
a concept of liability in case of breach of obligations or requirements imposed by 
EU internal market law. For example, the Court of Justice developed the 
doctrine of Member State liability as being “inherent in the system of the 
Treaty.”732 The Court of Justice found the reasons in the wording of the principle 
of ‘sincere cooperation’ set out in the treaties, which requires that Member 
States must fulfil their obligations under EU internal market law. For example, 
the non-transposition of Directives gives rise to Member State liability.733 A 
similar general concept for breaches of EU internal market law through actors 
coming within the framework of the counter-culture has not yet been 
established. Rather, the approach developed by the Court of Justice and within 
secondary law is the construction of context-related forms of liability.  
 
Liability, without doubt, would provide a further incentive for private actors to 
comply with legal requirements. 734  However, there is no EU tort law that 
determines who is liable under certain conditions. A discipline where we can find 
some framework of liability is competition law. Regulation (EC) 1/2003 sets out 
the possibility to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on private actors 
violating EU internal market law. 735  Alternatively, with regard to consumer 
protection Directive 85/374/EC on product liability establishes a system whereby 																																																								
732 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian 
Republic, [1991] ECR I-05357 at 35. 
733 Ibid., at 36; and Paul Craig, 'Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages Liability', LQR, 109 
(1993), 595. 
734 Barend Van Leeuwen, 'Private Regulation and Public Responsibility in the Internal Market',  at 8. 
735 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC, on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, (OJ 2003/L 1/1) at Article 23 and 24. 
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the producer is made liable for damages caused by a product he placed on the 
market.736 With regard to liability in relation to the counter-culture the picture 
presented is skewed and fragmented.  
 
As has been revealed in the case studies, all approaches to liability of private 
actors under the counter-culture place the decision about sanctioning and 
awarding damages within the national environment. Under free movement law 
and EC discrimination law no general framework for liability exists. The 
assessment of liability is done under national law by national courts; this is 
evident in Viking for example. With regard to the legality of the collective 
actions organised by FSU the Court of Justice held that:  
 
85 ...even if it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole 
jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, 
to determine whether and to what extent such collective action 
meets those requirements.737 
 
The special feature is that the national court must determine the possibility of 
liability of private actors under the national framework regulating civil liability in 
light of the requirements imposed on private actors under EU internal market 
law. Here, the problem with legal certainty is that the national court must 
balance a right protected under a national law against a right protected under EU 
internal market law. The Court of Justice may guide the finding but not 
determine the tone of liability. This is clear from Laval that concerned the 
possible restriction of the freedom to provide services through collective 
measures. The Court of Justice found the restrictive effects of blocking premises 
in order to force the provider of services to enter into negotiations concerning 
employment conditions to be not justifiable. 738  The Swedish Labour Court 
followed this view and awarded damages against the trade unions for a violation 
of the freedom to provide services.739  																																																								
736 Council Directive 85/374/EEC,  Article 1 and 6. 
737 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779 at 85 and 87. 
738  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 
at 108f. 
739 The Labour Court Judgment, Judgment No. 89/09 2009-12-02, , Case No. A 268/04, unofficial 
English translation: 
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Reasons for this relatively restrictive approach of the Court of Justice may relate 
to the nature of EU free movement law and EU discrimination law and the role 
of private actors awarded the status of holding regulatory power. Both disciplines 
address situations of power that are vested in national law, e.g. the national rights 
of trade unions, national rights of association, or with regard to the employer the 
national rights under the freedom of contract. From this perspective it appears 
reasonable to leave choices on liability to the national courts, because the power, 
which is assessed, has a stronger link to national law than to EU internal market 
law. National courts are better equipped to decide cases that emerge within their 
jurisdiction. They have better knowledge of facts, contexts, habits, or practices, 
relating to private actors and private power in a national context. 740 
 
Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 set out when liability may 
be awarded to the data controller or the food business operator respectively. 
Article 23 of Directive 95/46/EC makes the data controller liable for the 
illegitimate processing of data, unless it can be shown that the data controller is 
not responsible for the damage. However, it is the Member States that shall 
provide for a system for compensation in case of violation of EC data protection 
law. Therefore, liability is decided in a national environment.741 Similarly, under 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 liability is determined according to Directive 
85/374/EC on liability for defective products. Food is considered as any other 
product to which the same standards and rules concerning liability apply.742 
Directive 85/374/EC sets up a system where the producer is liable for harm caused 
by a defective product.743   
 
In the context of harmonisation, the frameworks set out by the regulatory 
instruments determine similar forms of liability for actors that are 
responsibilized. The food business operator and the data controller are to be held 
accountable for not acting according to their obligations set out in Directive 																																																																																																																																																														
http://arbetsratt.juridicum.su.se/Filer/PDF/ErikSjoedin/AD%202009%20nr%2089%20Laval%20
English.pdf. 
740 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [1981] ECR 911 at 14; and Case C- 45/09, Rosenbladt, [2010] 
ECR I-9391 at 52. 
741 For example see Case C-465/00, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989. 
742 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,  Article 21. 
743 Council Directive 85/374/EEC,  Article 1. 
	 239 
95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 respectively. Yet, liability is not 
further defined. How liability is imposed and how compensation is awarded is 
left to national organisation and national law. The consequence is that national 
courts, again, move to the centre of the organisation for awarding liability for 
breaches of EU internal market law by private actors. Within their jurisdiction, 
national courts must determine if liability is imposed and how this is punished. 
The difference to liability under the treaty provisions is that the national court 
must assess the position/power of the private actor that is vested in EU internal 
market law, in the context of national rules on liability. In this regard, private 
actors are liable under national law for a power EU internal market law has 
ascribed to them. 
 
The consequence of this context-related approach is that liability is determined 
on the violation of EU obligations in specific cases framed in national law. This is 
different from the approach adopted under Member State liability where the 
framework in which the violation is assessed is EU internal market law. The 
advantage of the former approach is that it allows a specific discretion for 
national courts to deal with specificities of national law. At first sight this might 
sound plausible and responsive to the very nature of EU internal market law and 
the internal market. This is an internal market comprised of national laws and 
national markets. Many positions are vested in national law. Thus, it appears 
reasonable to award damages, for example, in accordance with the roles in which 
this position is grounded. The risk, however, is that the lack of a consistent 
principle may give rise to different levels of enforcement and legal protection of 
EU rights between the Member States. This shall not be about judging if the 
current approach in EU internal market law is good or bad, but it should provide 
some food for thought in order to provide a basis for further research.  
 
The strength of a decentralised approach is that it takes into account the 
national forum in which private actors are mainly framed. EU internal market law 
only adds a layer to the extent that private actors engage in the internal market. 
The advantage of the reflexive and less intrusive approach to liability takes into 
account the national socio-economic and cultural contexts in which private 
actors exist and perform specific functions. For example, in Laval the Court of 
Justice recognised that the,  
 
national authorities in Sweden have entrusted management and 
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labour with the task of setting, by way of collective negotiations, 
the wage rates which national undertakings are to pay their workers 
and that, as regards undertakings in the construction sector, such a 
system requires negotiation on a case-by-case basis, at the place of 
work, having regard to the qualifications and tasks of the 
employees concerned.744  
 
The current approach grants a wide margin of discretion to national courts to 
assess violations of actors under EU internal market law, in light of their function 
and position in the organisation of national socio-economic contexts. Ultimately, 
the test against which a centralised concept of liability must hold is if it increases 
the efficiency in terms of effectiveness of EU internal market law in practice. 
The preliminary investigation carried out in the course of this thesis revealed that 
in cases where liability needed to be determined, national courts were not likely 
to favour ‘national protectionist’ interpretations of liability.  
 
It could be argued that EU internal market law should supplement the counter-
culture with a concept of liability, but the question remains as to ‘what extent 
does this increase efficiency?’ And would a centralised approach to liability be at 
all desirable? In any case, the conceptualisation of the counter-culture in terms of 
responsibility would allow the development of a general concept of liability 
similar to the concept of Member State liability. The consistency in terms of 
legal obligations imposed on private actors provides a framework within which a 
general idea of liability can emerge. Private actors are put in charge of 
contributing to the attainment of social objectives under EU internal market law. 
Consequently, one could argue that in case of non-compliance they would fail to 
fulfil their obligations under EU internal market law, which raises liability. 
However, this is to be discussed elsewhere.  
 
 
2.5 The public/private divide 
A last point to be raised in the context of this thesis relates to the public/private 
divide in EU internal market law. The enquiry reinforces the idea, that was once 																																																								
744  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 
at 69. 
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circulating, that EU internal market law prefers a functional to a formal approach 
in relation to roles.  
 
The public/private divide has significantly shaped our thinking about law and 
how we organise matters in society. Public affairs should be governed by public 
entities and public law, and private actors should be governed by private law.745 
The public/private distinction was the analytical tool for considering the roles 
and functions in the Member States. In this regard, it is interesting to read Ross 
who considered the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘state organs’ in constitutional law.746 
Ross argued that it is “rules of competence that create public authority.”747 In 
other words, legal context determines what is public and what is private. This is 
also true for EU internal market law. It is within the meanings of the different 
disciplines of law that emerge in relation to the internal market that the 
meanings of “public” and “private” are determined. Under EU internal market 
law, the meaning of public and private are determined on the basis of effects. 
Within the meaning of the internal market and EU internal market law, the 
general meaning of “public” in terms of effects refers to the capacity to affect 
others in the exercise of their economic activities. The threshold for the 
assessment of power and effect is not merely the existence of simple asymmetry 
of power between the actors, but it is assessed in terms of relative strength, 
equality of positions, permanent or temporary positions, and the capacity this 
produces in terms of influence. In this regard, the capacity to steer and affect the 
exercise of economic activities of other actors on a permanent basis generates 
‘public’ power within the meaning of the internal market, because the exercise of 
this power affects the market dynamics. It is evident that private and public 
actors may occupy public power that is understood in this way. In EU internal 
market law, this functional approach also works the other way around. Member 
States are treated as private actors, for example, if they act in the capacity as 
employer.748  
 
																																																								
745 On the idea of the classical distinction for example see Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the 
Public/Private Distinction'; and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, 'Rethinking the public/private divide',  at 275 
f. 
746 Alf Ross, 'On the Concepts "State" and "State Organs" in Constitutional Law'. 
747 Ibid., at 117-118. 
748 For example see Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, [1974] ECR 153. 
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With regard to the counter-culture, this functional approach to the public and 
private divide is reinforced and further developed. The analysis of the counter-
culture in terms of responsibility showed that EU internal market law recognises 
that some private actors hold ‘public’ power within the internal market under EU 
free movement law and EU discrimination law. Moreover, under EU data 
protection law and EU food safety law, private actors are bestowed with a 
position that holds a form of “public” power by EU internal market law.  
 
 
3. The concept of responsibility 
The transformation of private actors as actors in the internal market witnessed in 
the context of EU internal market law emerged some time ago and the aim of 
this research was to shed some light on this development. The problem with the 
roles and positions of private actors in EU internal market law is that they are 
not always defined clearly. Reliance on the concept of responsibility as an 
analytical tool improved this situation. On the one hand, the concept of 
responsibility filled the gap between the social role of private actors and the 
subsequent legal consequences. The advantage of the concept is that the role an 
actor has in a societal context can be linked to how this is shaped and manifested 
in the legal system. It fills the gap encountered with regard to EU internal 
market law as to why some private actors are constrained in their freedoms. On 
the other hand, the concept of responsibility provided a tool to observe the role 
of private actors in a wider context, in terms of their function in the internal 
market.  
 
The concept of responsibility opens the door for a wider analytical framework, 
which intends to explain the legal consequences imposed on some private actors 
in a specific legal context. The justification for this is derived from the social and 
normative functions of the concept of responsibility. While the social functions 
of the concept of responsibility determine the social role and function an actor 
has in a specific context, the normative functions justify the imposition of legal 
consequences due to the position held. The explanation is derived from the 
analysis of the social role the private actor is supposed to have in the social 
arrangement underlying the legal context.  
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The use of the concept of responsibility shall not be understood in normative 
terms. The concept of responsibility is by far not the only way to analyse the 
roles and functions of actors under EU internal market law. Yet, the concept of 
responsibility has proven to be a useful tool for analysing the role of actors within 
the context of the counter-culture. Thus, we should reasonably consider the 
inclusion of the concept of responsibility into the ‘analytical tool box’ from which 
analytical tools are used to understand the development or emergence of new 
phenomena under EU internal market law—particularly where this relates to EU 
internal market law shaping roles and positions of actors in the internal market. 
For example, the concept of responsibility may also be useful for considering the 
roles of Member States or Authorities within the internal market and under EU 
internal market law. Alternatively, in relation to the idea of shared 
responsibilities, the concept of responsibility may be used for a wide-ranging 
dissection of specific regulatory contexts, such as EU data protection law—and 
the way EU internal market law structures roles and powers within this 
framework. 
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